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THE TELEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT IN THE
GIFFORD LECTURES
INTRODUCTION
The subject of this dissertation is The
Teleological Argument in the Gifford Lectures , and
its first task is the definition of the two main
terms, M teleological argument", and "Gifford Lec-
tures .
"
1. Definition of "teleological argument", and brief
history of its role in the history of philosophy.
The teleological argument may be stated as
follows: Because animate and inanimate nature is ob-
served to be an orderly and intelligible system in
which there is abundant evidence of adaptations of
means to ends, it must have as its creator and sustainer
one intelligent Mind or God.
The teleological argument is frequently called
the "argument from design", Kant refers to it as the
"physioo-theological argument", and the Gifford Lectur-
ers have named all three. Except in quoting directly
from the authors 1 works, I shall refer to the argument
by using the term given in the title.
The argument historically has bet.x allied
with both the ontologioal and cosmological proofs, but

2more intimately with the latter which definitely in-
volves the concept of cause. It has persisted in
religious and philosophical thought in spite of the
attempts that have "been made at various times to dis-
card it and the other two traditional arguments.
Anaxagoras is generally given the credit
of being the first philosopher in history to recognize
the necessity for a rational cause of the recognized
movement and order in the universe.^" Socrates is
represented in Plato's Phaedo as complaining that
Anaxagoras did not carry out the full implications of
his doctrine of Nous, and that, after all, he was
2
chiefly concerned with mechanical causation. It is
Socrates himself who gives the first real statement of
the "argument from design." It is clearly formulated
in Xenophon's Memorabilia when Socrates, talking with
Aristodemus, calls attention to the numerous adapta-
tions of means to ends in living creatures, to the
design of eye, ear, and tooth, and argues that these
organs must have been designed by a wise, though invis-
5
ible
,
creator. Plato seems not to have stated the
argument as clearly as his master, though in conceiving
the world as a single teleological system with the Good
as its heart, he was not out of harmony with his teacher,
X4
3and in the Laws he makes a distinct argument from the
4
order of the heavens to the mind of a creator.
Aristotle concentrated on the teleological principle
within each living thing as an autonomous unit. A
similar conception appears in the work of Hans Driesch
as I shall indicate in my treatment of Drieschian
5
"entelechy." He was interested not so much in the
conception of First Cause or Prime Lrover as in the
idea of Final Cause and ultimate destiny.
Passing to Stoicism we find again that the
beauty, order, and harmony of the universe manifesting
the rational unity of the world impressed that school
of thought. Marcus ^urelius and Cicero state the argu-
ment in clear form.
Christian thought, both Catholic and Protestant,
has been greatly influenced by the argument. Thomas
Aquinas gives the argument "from the governance of the
world." fifth place in importance, but one of the most
recent treatments by a Catholic theologian gives the
argument a high rank and brings in new evidence to prove
p
"design" in nature.
Leibniz, writing at a time when mechanistic
theories were popular, and realizing the issues at
stake, undertook to reconcile mechanism and teleology

4in his doctrine of "pre-established harmony."
Berkeley is a friend to the argument, stating it un-
qualifiedly in the second Dialogue Between Hylas and
Philonous
The argument did not go unchallenged. As
early as the days of Leucippus, Democritus, and
Epicurus there were theories which reduced the world
to atoms or to a series of sensations. In his
Treatise on Human Nature Hume seems to deny teleology
altogether; his Dialogues are less severe, but whether
Hume's real meaning is expressed by Cleanthes or by
Philo, in either case, Hume does not accept the tradi-
tional form of the argument.^ It was Kant who made
the first systematic and thorough criticism of the
traditional arguments. In his Kritik der reinen
Vernunf
t
the "physico-theological argument" is the last
to be criticized;, he admits his respect for it, yet
finds it untenable. At most, he declares, the argument
yields us an architect only, not a God worthy of wor-
ship; furthermore, it rests upon the cosmological argu-
ment, which in turn r4sts upon the ontological, and all
three are therefore untenable because there is no way
to bridge the gulf between the phenomenal and noumenal
12
realms. The Kantian disproofs are important, because

5some of the Gifford Lecturers take it for granted that
these are decisive; others, however, devote pages of
their books to attempted refutations of these disproofs.
Hegel agreed with Kant as to the inadequacy of
the argument in its rational or logical phase, since
the conception of design neither makes clear nor ade-
quately represents the true relation of the world to
God. He held, however, that this argument marks a very
real advance beyond the stage of thought represented by
the cosmological argument, since it apprehends God as
self-conscious intelligence. Kant's mistake, he be-
lieved, was in creating the gulf between the two realms,
a gulf which is not absolute, but which can be bridged
by noting the continuity of development from the realm
of nature to the realm of mind, a development which is
a unity within the mind of God himself. 13 This point
of view will also be found among the Gifford Lectures.
The Natural Theology of William Paley and The
Bridgewater Treatises, all published during the nine-
teenth century, form the classical and fullest statement
of the evidence of design in nature, animate and inani-
mate. They are referred to repeatedly in the Gifford
Lectures. Paley takes his evidence chiefly from the
field of human anatomy, arguing that "contrivance must

Ghave a contriver; design a designer." He deals with
the structure of the eye, always a popular bit of evi-
dence for the teleologists . He describes the mechanical
parts, functions, and arrangements of plants, animals,
and human beings, dwelling at length on the relation
between animate and inanimate nature and on the correct
proportioning of the size and weight of human bodies to
their environment. All this accumulated evidence leads
him to the conclusion that these adaptations must have
their source in one personal God to whom goodness must
be attributed.
The same line of argument is pursued in the
Bridgewater Treatises, which are named for the Earl of
Bridgewater. He died in 1829, leaving a considerable
sum of money for the writing and publication of works
"on the Power, 'wisdom, and Goodness of God as manifested
15in Creation." Eight men were duly appointed, each
taking up some special aspect of nature to prove the
16
general thesis. Thomas Chalmers wrote about the
general adaptation of external nature to the moral and
intellectual constitution of man, attempting to prove
that nature is admirably suited to maintain the
supremacy of man's conscience, the inherent pleasure
of the virtuous, and the misery of the vicious. John
Kidd's treatise dwelt on man's physical and intellectual

1needs and offered evidence to prove that the atmosphere,
minerals, vegetables and dumb animals are suited to
meet these human needs. William Whewell dealt with cer-
tain laws of physics, of earth's conducting and radia-
ting power, of the process of expansion and contraction,
of the length of years and days; his conclusion was
that there was no chance in the universe , but that all
substances seemed to secure the best welfare of others.
Such evidence, he concluded, was proof of God as the
17
"most wise and benevolent Chooser." Charles Bell wrote
about the human hand, dealing with its structure,
mechanism, sensibility and muscular development, advancing
through the study of comparative anatomy to the idea
of God as slowly fulfilling his designs, until in man
is perfected the formations found in less perfect
state among lower animals. Roget's treatise was
concerned with animal and vegetable physiology.
Buckland dealt with geology, discussing and illustrating
the fossil remains of animals, vegetables and of the
strata of the carboniferous order, considering all
these as evidence of "orderly and wonderful dispositions
of the material Elements" originating in the "will and
18
workings of One Omnipotent Creator." The seventh
treatise by William Kirby was concerned chiefly with the

creation, history, habits and instincts of the lower
animals, although there are a few pages in the book
which deal with man. His conclusion is the same as
the others; that nothing is left to chance, but that
all is adapted. Kirby's treatise is the only one
which discusses the problem of evil, and his conclusion
is that suffering on the part of one creature is
necessary, by the will of God, for promoting the
19
welfare of another. The final treatise, by William
Prout, discussed the laws of chemistry, meteorology
and digestion. All these treatises emphasize God^
method as that of continuous Creation; all of them are
homocentric, believing man to be the center of God's
attention, and that everything in external nature is
adapted to him and his needs. Except for the brief
statements by Kirby, there is no recognition of the
fact that evil and suffering exist.
The above sketch of the history of the tel-
eological argument in no way attempts to describe all
its various developments, nor to note its enemies.
It is an outline undertaken to emphasize the long
history of the argument and the fact that it has
20
persisted in spite of opposition to it.

92. Definition of "Gifford Lectures".
The Gifford Lectureship is named for Lord
Adam Gifford of Edinburgh, Scotland, by whose gener-
osity it was established. He was born in 1820 and
died in 1887 after several years of invalidism. During
the last few years of his life he became increasingly
interested in philosophy and religion, and this interest
led him to provide in his will for lectures on these
subjects which have been given every year since his
21
death
•
Statements concerning the Gifford Lectures
naturally may be divided into two parts: (A) Terms of
the Gifford bequest, and (B) List of the Gifford
Lecturers and their published works.
(A) Terms of the Gifford bequest.
The terms of the bequest which established
the Gifford lectureship need not detain us long, for
the copy of the will of Lord Gifford is attached.
Following a statement of his own religious convictions
and a declaration that he believed that the knowledge
of God "when really felt and acted on, is the means
of man's highest well being and the security of his
upward progress, "Lord Gifford assigns to the proper
authorities at the University of Edinburgh twenty-five
thousand pounds; to the University of Glasgow twenty

10
thousand pounds; to the University of Aberdeen twenty
thousand pounds; ana to tne University 01 Saint Andrews
fifteen thousand pounds for promoting and establisning
in these four centers "a Lectureship or Popular Chair
for 'Promoting, Advancing, Teaching and Diffusing the
Study of Natural Theology in the widest sense of that
term, in other words, the Knowledge of God, the Infinite,
the All, the First and Only Cause, the One and the Sole
Substance, the Sole Being, the Sole Reality and the Sole
Existence* '*
The details of the administration of the
Lectureship were largely left in the hands of the
Universities thus dndowed, but Lord G ifford H indicated* eight
principles which he desired to be governing principles
for the authorities, A few may be mentioned here. One
was that there might be intermissions between the appoint-
ments of lecturers, so that conceivably some years there
might be no lecturer at one institution or at all four
Universities, This principle was adhered to in several
instances. Another was that the period of appointment for
each lecturer should not be longer than two years, although
at some later date a lecturer might be re-appointed, A
notable case of this kind is that of P, Max Miller who
lecturered four years in all, with an intermission.

11
The insistence upon freedom of religious thought,
allowing the lecturers to represent any or no re-
ligious creed, should be noted. Lord G-ifi'ord further
requests that the lecturers treat their subject as a
"strictly natural science .just as astronomy and science
23
are." There are other principles regarding the
reports of the "Patrons" of the Lectureship, and dis-
position of funds which need not be mentioned.
(B) List of the Gifford Lecturers and their
published works.
I list on the pages which follow the
Lecturers and dates of their lectures, noting those
whose works were not published.

12
24
GIFFORD LECTURES, UNIVERSITY OF
EDINBURGH
1889-90 J. H. Stirling
Philosophy and Theology
1892-94 Otto Pfleiderer
Philosophy and Development of Religion
1891 and 1893 G. G. Stokes
Natural Theology
"
TTatunal Ttteology
1894-1895 "a. C. Fraser
Philosophy of Theism
1896-1897 C. P. Tiele
Elements of the Science of Religion
1901-02 William James
The Varieties of Religious Experience
1904-05 H. M. Gwatkin^
The Knowledge of God and Its Historical
Development
?fi
1905-06 S. S. Laurie
Synthetica: being lleditations Epistemological
and Ontological
1907 Robert Flint^'
1909-10 ff« ... Fowler
The Religious Experience of the Roman
People From the Earliest Times to the
Age of Augustus
1911-12 Bernard Bosanquet
The Principle of Individuality and Value
The Value and Destiny of the Individual
1913 Henri Bergson2 *3
1915-16 W. M. Ramsay
Asianic Elements in Greek Civilization
1919 G. F. Stout^
1922 A. S. Pringle-Pattison
The Idea of Immortality
1924-25 J. G. Frazer ,n
The Worship of Nature (Vol. I. 1926) ou
1927 A. S. Eddington
The Nature of the Physical World
1927-28 A. N. whitehead
Process and Reality
1929 John Dewey
The Quest for Certainty

31
GIFFORD LECTURES, UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW
1888-1892 F. Max duller
Natural Religion
Physical Religion
Anthropological Religion
Theosophy or Psychological Religion
1892-93 John Caird
1895-96
The Fundamental Ideas of Christianity
1893 William Wallace
Lectures and Essays on Natural Theology and Ethics
1897-98 a.B . Bruce
The Providential Order of the World
The Moral Order of the World in Ancient
and Modern Thought
1900-02 Edward Caird
The Evolution of Theology in the
Greek Philosophers
34 33
1903 Emile Boutroux
35
1906 i.C. Bradley
1910-12 John Watson
The Interpretation of Religious Experience
1914 and 1922-23 A.J, Balfour
Theism and Humanism
Theism and Thought
1916-18 S. Alexander
Space. Time and Deity
1920-21 Henry Jones
A Faith That Enquires
1924-25 W.P. Paterson
The Nature of Religion
1927-28 J.S. Haldane
36 The Sciences and Philosophy
1928 J.A.Smith

37
GIFFORD LECTURES, UNIVERSITY OF ABERDEEN
38
1889-91 E.B. Tylor
39
1891-93 A. M. Fairhairn
1896-98 James V/ard
Naturalism and Agnosticism
1899-1900 Josiah Royce
The World and the Individual
1900-02 A. H. Sayce
The Religions of xoicient Egypt
and Babylonia
1904-06 James Adam
The Religious Teachers of Greece
1907-08 Hans Driesch
The Science and Philosophy of
40 the Organism
1909-11 William Ridgeway
1912-13 A. S. Pringle-Pattison
The Idea of God in the Light of
Recent Philosophy
1914-15 W. R. Sorley
Moral Values and the Idea of God
1918-19 C. C. J. Webb
Divine Personality and Human Life
God and Personality
1921-22 E. W. Hobson
The Domain of Natural Science 41
1924-25 William Mitchell
42
1926-28 E. W. Barnes
43
1929-31 Etienne Gilson

44
GIFFORD LECTURES , UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS
1888-90 undrew Lang
The Making of Religion
1890-92 Edward Caird
The Evolution of Religion
1894-95 Lewis Campbell
Religion in Greek Literature 45
1899-1900 Rodolfo Lanciani
New Tales of Old Rome
1902-04 R. B. Haldane
The Pathway to Reality
1907-10 " James Ward
The Realm of End^ or Pluralism
and Theism
1911-13 J. G. Frazer
The Belief in Immortality and
The Worship of the Dead
1915-16 J. A.. Thomson
The System of Animate Nature
1917-18 W. R. Inge
The Philosophy of Plotinus
1922-23 C. L. Morgan
Emergent Evolution
Life. Mind and Spirit
1920 and 1924-25 L. R. Farnell
Greek Hero Cults and Ideas of Immortality
The Attributes of God 46
1926-28 A. E. Taylor
1929-1930 Charles Gore 47
(See general note on the dates of these lectures #48)
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• The work of previous investigators of the Gifford Lectures,
While there are numerous reviews od, and comments
upon the work of individual Gifford Lecturers, and
even of groups of Lecturers, no one has undertaken an
investigation of the entire series, thougn William
Davidson reviews, in his Croall Lectures of 1921, all
that had been delivered up to that year, and published
his investigations Binder the title, Recent Theistic Discussion
Professor Davidson discusses at length the
Gifford Lectures of Hans Driesch, A. J. Balfour, A. C.
Fraser, and A. S. Pringle-Pattison. In addition he wrote
two concluding chapters, one on the present status of
theism, the other a brief survey of the entire series of
Lectures, in which he describes their general subject
matter, and gives the titles of the published works. He
has also made a valuable classification of the Lectures
according to subject matter. Approving his outline, I
have added to it the classification of Lectures since
1921, excepting those Lecturers whose work was not pub-
lished. This outline is on pages 19-20.
I am indebted to Professor Davidson for tracing
several Gifford Lectures which have not been publisned as
such, and full credit to him for this work is given in
the reference notes of this dissertation.

17
Since the date of Professor Davidson's book,
Sir William Ramsay has published his Lectures under
the title, Asianic Elements in Greek Civilization,
and Professor Farnell has delivered a second set of
Lectures published under the title, The Attributes
of God * Professor Davidson does not pretend to mention
the work done afterl919, although his book was not
published until 1921. Therefore, it is not a
complete survey of the entire field up to the year
1929.
I find the following errors and omissions
in Professor Davidson's book. First, he omits all
mention of Robert Flint who is listed in the official
Calendar as a Gifiord Lecturer. I find no trace of
his published work, and therefore his Lectures are
not included as a part of my own investigation.
However, since Professor Davidson was attempting to
include all the Gifford Lecturers in his work, he
should not have omitted Flint's name. Secondly,
Professor Davidson was evidently not aware of the
publication of the outline of Tylor's work, which
came out in 1907. Thirdly, he makes no mention of
the two books published by G. G. Stokes, both en-
titled Natural Theology
, the one published in 1891,

13
the other in 1893, They are not identical and deserve
separate mention. Fourthly, I cannot agree with him as
to the published Lectures of Boutroux and Fairbairn, and
in the reference notes I have stated the source of tnis
disagreement, I find in the works mentioned by Davidson
as embodying portions of the Gifford Lectures of these
two men no acknowledgment that the books contain the
Lectures, nor do these works bear any evidence of having
formed the subject matter of Lectures,
Professor Davidson's book does not attempt
the study of a specialized field. The teleological argu-
50
ment is given only brief mention, and his investigations
cover only the Lectures delivered through the year 1919,
W. P. Paterson's Gifford Lectures make
51
mention of Davidson's book, and I find reference to
it also in a book by William Fulton entitled Nature
52
and God , For my purposes in this dissertation, the
chief value of Davidson's book lies in the bibliography
and in the author's classification of the Lectures.
On the following two pages I reproduce his outline and
add my own classification of the Lecturers who have
published their work since Davidson's book was
printed*
*
19
CLASSIFICATION OF THE GIFFORD LECTURERS
ACCORDING TO THE SUBJECT MATTER
OF THEIR LECTURES
A. Origin of the idea of God and the growth of
religious "beliefs 53
To the year 1919 Since 1919 54
E. B. Tylor J. G. Frazer
A. Lang
F. M. Muller
J. G. Frazer
C. P. Tiele
Wm. James
Wm. Ridgeway
R. Lanciani
Wm. Ramsay
B. The philosophical development of xeligion
1, The rationality of religion
Edw. Caird ( Evolution of Religion )
John Caird
H. M. Gwatkin
0. Pfleiderer
Wm. Wallace
A. M. Fairbairn
2. Religious philosophy among ancient peoples
A
. H. Sayce L. R. Fame 11
J. Adam ( Greek Hero Cults )
Edw. Caird ( Evolution of TheologyT
"
L. Campbell
W. R. iige
W. W. Fowler
C. Philosophy and ultimate reality
J. Ward ( Naturalism and Agnosticism)
J. Royce
R. B. Haldane J. Dewey
E. Boutroux A. N. Whitehead
a. C. Bradley
B. Bosanquet
J. Watson
S. Alexander
G. F. Stout
D. Philosophy and Theism
1. Theism a general theme
J. H. Stirling W. P. Paterson
G. G. Stokes Jones
A. C. Fraser
A. J. Balfour
... S. Pringle-Pattison
S. S. Laurie

20
CLASSIFICATION OF THE GIFFORD LECTURERS
ACCORDING TO THE SUBJECT MATTER
OF THE LECTURES (Continued)
To the year 1919 Since 1919
2. Special aspects of theism
J. Ward ( Realm of Ends )
W. R. Sorley
A. B. Bruce
H. Bergson
C. C. J. Webb
3. Theism and science
Hans Driesch
J. A. Thomson
A • S. Pringle-
Pattison
( The Idea of
Immortality )
L. R. Farnell
( The attributes of
God)
_A« S. Eddington
J. S. Haldane
C. L. Morgan
E. W. Hobson
It will be noted that out of the twelve sets
of Gifford Lectures published since 1919, four are
devoted to the discussion of the relation between
theism and science. The works of Dewey and Yftiitehead
are also related to this general theme, although I
have classified them elsewhere since it seemed that
their work primarily concerned the relation between
philosophy in general and ultimate reality.
This paragraph concludes the subject of the
Gifford Lectures in general. I have defined the main
terms of the title of this dissertation, and I turn
now to the reasons for the present interest in the
teleological argument and to the general plan of the
dissertation.

21
4. Reasons for interest in the teleological argument
during the period of the Gifford Lectures.
At least three great scientific developments
during the latter half of the nineteenth century and
the twentieth century have challenged the defenders
of the traditional teleological argument. They are
(A) the doctrine of evolution with the allied doctrines
of heredity; (B) the doctrine of vitalism, and
(0) the discovery of and emphasis upon dysteleological
evidence. I shall briefly discuss each of these
developments
•
(a) The doctrine of evolution and its
bearing on the teleological argument.
While the main tenets of the doctrine of
evolution had been stated before 1850 by Buffon,
Erasmus Darwin, Lamarck, Lyell and Robert Chambers,
the factor by which the progressive changes in
species is brought about was not named until the
publication, in 1859, of the Origin of Species by
55Charles Darwin. Darwin summarized in this work
the arguments for evolution and named "natural
selection" as the factor operating in the process.
It was used as the basis for works on the subject
of evolution and heredity for the rest of that

22
century and even to the present day. Romanes and
Grulick, while accepting the factor of natural selection,
emphasized also the importance of the factor of
isolation, physiological and geographical, as
56
operating in the process of evolution. A. R. Wallace
published his Darwinism in 1889, defending the
proposition that natural selection was the sole factor.
58
We i smarm' s Studies in the Theories of Descent , the
English translation of his work, was published in 1882.
He attacked the question of the variability of organisms,
denying the transmission of acquired characteristics,
and advancing the germ plasm theory of heredity which
corroborated Wallace's view of the importance of
natural selection. H. F. Osborn's From the Greeks
59
to Darwin was published in 1894. The theory of evol-
ution was, then, being much discussed just before the
first Clifford Lectures were delivered, and during
the early years of the Lectureship. Nor have the
years since 1888 seen any lack of interest. Evolution
60 «T 62
"creative!! "emergent? x "purposive," Still holds
a central place in scientific study.
The theory is important because if it be
true, and if natural selection be the sole factor op-
erating in the process, the old hypothesis of continuous
creation, or of choosing of means for his ends, by a
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Divine Creator, Designer, or Chooser, is not only an
unnecessary hypothesis but is one actually incompatible
with the theory of evolution. No one of the Gifford
Lecturers, therefore, can accept the teleological
argument in its traditional form without giving full
and adequate account of his views on the theory of
evolution, ^nd if he accepts the theory he must
indicate his opinion as to the factor or factors
operating in the process.
(B) The doctrine of vitalism.
Hans Driesch, in his Gifford Lectures published
under the title, The Science and Philosophy of the
Organism , discusses the theory of vitalism, and there
is no need at this point of describing the theory in
detail. I shall therefore note only certain points in
its development before the year 1888 and its bearing
on the teleological argument, and on the theory of
natural selection.
Vitalism is "the theory of the autonomy of
63the processes of life." It is opposed, then, to the
reduction of life processes to any mechanistic view.
Driesch points out that if one admits that the
processes of life are purposive he must take one of
three views of the "purpose" involved: 64 He may deal
rc
•
•
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simply with the existence of the purposiveness
,
describing
it, but leaving open the question of whether the processes
are to be judged teleological because of a given mechanical
form or structure, or because of a special kind of
autonomy operating within the organism itself; this is
called "descriptive teleology". If he accounts for the
teleology in terms of given structure, his theory is to
be designated as "static teleology"; if he attributes
autonomy to the life organism in its life processes, the
theory is "dynamic teleology" or "vitalism."
Vitalism is an old theory; -^ristotle was
perhaps the first to formulate a theory of "dynamic
teleology", called by Driesch "naive vitalism" because
of its impartial examination of the phenomena of life,
and because it had no prevalent doctrines to struggle
against. In the eighteenth century there were adherents
to the "dynamic" type, and by the beginning of the
nineteenth century Driesch speaks of biology as finally
emancipated from philosophy and become a science in its own
right. Vitalism as a theory had never died out, and the
term"neo-vitalism" is therefore hardly correct, but
during the latter part of the nineteenth and the
beginning of the twentieth centuries four opponents to
the theory rose to necessitate a new formulation of the
r
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old faith. These four are named by Driesch as (1) a
materialistic metaphysic; (2) Darwinism; (3) the discovery
of the lav/ of the conservation of energy, and (4) "the
discovery and systematic investigation of the delicate
structures of living beings with the help of improved
optical instruments »"^
The specific doctrines of the new theory of
vitalism may be left until Driesch 's own Lectures are
66
discussed. It is necessary at this point to indicate
(1) the attitude of vitalism towards the teleological
argument, and (2) the attitude of vitalism towards natural
selection.
(1) The Bridgewater Treatises and Paley's work have
generally represented nature, animate and inanimate, as
clay in the hands of God, the potter, who moulds and
designs it, and, where he gives it life, directs that
life according to his purposes. The theory in these
works corresponds closely to what DriLesch describes as
"static teleology", which is opposed to his "dynamic"
theory. Wherever teleology is ascribed to life processes,
therefore, by Gifford Lecturers, the meaning of the term
must be carefully examined. Does the author ascribe
purposiveness to the organism itself as an autonomous
unit, or is it given by God according to his will?
(
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(2) Natural selection as stated by Darv/in is
generally regarded as the rival theory of Drieschian
vitalism. Driesch holds that the former theory can only
explain to a certain extent the directive movement in
evolution, but that vitalism alone can account for
67
epigenesis, the genesis of the germ itself.
(C) The discovery of and emphasis upon dysteleolog-
ical evidence.
The thinking world, especially during and after
the Great War, has ceased to be blindly optimistic. With
the decline in the belief in such theological dogmas as
the "fall of man" and "predestination" as explanations
of the problem of evil and suffering, men have been in-
quiring into the ways for interpreting that problem. The
increased knowledge of parasites and bacteria, furthermore,
is leading to an inquiry concerning the power and
goodness of a God who" could choose to design the kind of
world which nourishes such organisms. The development of
the telescope and the growing knowledge of other worlds
around our own has at last put an end to the disposition
so marked in the Bridgev/ater Treatises of regarding this
world as the center of the universe and the sole focus
of God's attention. If, therefore, the world yields
evidence of design
,
it also yields evidence of nialadap-
tations and of adaptations suited to
(
27
carry out what seeins like a diabolic purpose. No
defender of the teleological argument in these days can
afford to omit a treatment of the problem of evil and a
reconciliation of the facts of evil with a belief in a
good and omnipotent God,
5. Statement of the general method and plan of the
dissertation.
It was my hope in beginning this study that
the Gifford Lectures could be treated according to
certain main topics, without bringing in the details of
the separate systems of the individual Lecturers. I
have found, however, such a wide v.riety of subject
matter, with the problem of teleology approached from
so many different points of view that the purely topical
treatment will not be possible. The Gifford Lectures
can be classified into groups according to their general
theories on the idea of God, and within these groups
other classifications can be made according to their
respective attitudes on the teleological argument. The
chapters will follow the order of this grouping, and I
shall adopt a general method of topics made in reference
to arguments for God's existence, noting individual
deviations from the general points of view.
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r- The plan, then, is as follows: The first
and main topic shall be "The teleological argument as
treated in the Clifford Lectures." This topic will be
considered in the first four chapters. In Chapter 1
I shall eliminate from further study the Gifford
Lectures which are irrelevant to the teleological
argument, those which ignore all arguments, and those
which give slight mention to the teleological
argument, without comment upon its merits. Chapter 2
will consider the works which oppose the teleological
argument, and offer no substitute proof of God's
existence. It will be necessary in this chapter to
note the grounds for opposition, the main tenets of
the beliefs of the opponents, and possible intenal
inconsistencies in these systems which may weaken the
strength of their opposition. This will, in general,
be the method which I shall follow in dealing with each
group of Lectures. The arguments against the
teleological argument will not be discussed in this
first main topic, but will form part of the subject
matter of the second main division of the dissertation.
In Chapter 3 I shall discuss the Lectures which
defend the argument in its traditional form. Chapter
4 will examine the use of the argument in some other
forms, and -.the proofs which have been advanced as
c(
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substitutes for it. This will be the longest chapter,
for it v/ill involve the study of the extent to which
the argument is used, and evaluations of the substitutes.
The second main topic will examine the
evidence offered in the first. Chapter 1 will consider
new evidence for the argument, and Chapter 2 will
examine all the objections which have been advanced
in the Lectures against it.
Ic
\
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PART I
The Teleological Argument as Treated in the Gifford
Lectures
.
CHAPTER 1
The Elimination of Lectures that do not Need Further
Comment
.
The Lectures which do not bear upon the
subject in any vital way may be classified into three
groups: (1) Works whose subject matter is irrelevant.
(2) Works which ignore the subject of the theistic
arguments. (3) Works which give some slight mention
but without comment upon the merits of the argument.
(1) Works whose subject matter is irrelevant.
The Lectures which do not vitally concern
the teleological argument are chiefly those of the
group which consider the "origin of the idea of God and
the growth of religious beliefs 11
,
and the group which
68deal with "religious philosophy among ancient peoples."
The following Lectures from these groups may be thus
eliminated
:
Campbell, L., Religion in Greek Literature .
Farne 11 , L . R
.
,
Greek Hero Cults and Ideas
of Immortality 70
Fowl er ,W . W .
,
The Religious Experience of
thft Roman Pp.nplA ffrnn
Earliest Times to the Age
of Augustus . 7l
Frazer, J. G., The Worship of Nature
.
Vol. 1 72
cc
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Ramsay, V/. M. , ^sianic Elements in
Greek Civilization 73
Sayce, A. H., The Religions of ^vnci'ent
Egypt and Babylonia 74
Tylor, E. B
.
Lanciani, R., New Tales of Ola Rome , 76
(2) Works which ignore the subject of the
theistic arguments.
Only one Lecturer seems to have avoided the
subject of the theistic arguments altogether. This is
C. P. Tiele, whose interest in his Elements of the
Science of Religion is historical and psychological rather
77
than metaphysical. The matter of arguments does not
concern his problem.
(3) Works which give some mention to the
argument, but without comment upon its merits.
James Adam attributes to Diogenes end to
Socrates a belief in the argument, saying that
Socrates was the first who "deliberately employed the
aposteriori traces of design in nature with a view to
establishing the existence of a rational and beneficent
78
Deity*" His Religious Teachers of Greece does not
deal with the merits of the theistic arguments.
Andrew Lang relates the story of an Eskimo
5
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who stated the argument
Lang uses this incident
everywhere seem to hold
approve it but does not
from design to a mission
as a proof that all men
this argument. He seems
discuss it further.
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CHAPTER 2
Gifford Lectures Which Oppose the Teleological
Argument and Offer No Substitute Proof
I
There are two classes of Gifford Lecturers
who oppose the teleological argument in its traditional
form: Those who oppose it and offer no substitute
proof, and those who oppose it and, either drawing on
the argument for their method or material, or breaking
from it altogether, offer what is supposed to be a
better argument. I shall consider the first group in
this chapter, and I find to begin with that this
group also may be divided again into (1) those who
oppose all arguments for God's existence, and (2)
those who specifically oppose the teleological
argument
.
(1) The opposition to all theistic arguments.
The opposition to all arguments for God's
existence comes from three main sources: (Aj the
pragmatists; (B) the "emergent evolutionists"; (C)
the scientists.
(A) The pragmatists 1 opposition comes from
80William James and from John Dewey. James' book is a
defense of the element of feeling in religion, and of
individual religious experience. Rationalism, he
believes, can give account of relatively little that
goes on in man's experience. Mystical states may
I<
34
claim*" to be authoritative for the individuals who
experience them, though they need not be accepted
uncritically as authoritative for those who do not
81
have such experiences* All such religious
experiences are to be judged as "hypotheses"^-and
their value measured by their fruits. In the states
of faith and of prayer the individual actually
84
experiences an "inflow of energy". James has an
QC
"over-belief" that there are other divine facts
apart from these states, but declares that what these
are we do not know. It is enough for man's practical
needs that he believes that beyond him there is a
"larger power which is friendly to him and his ideals.
While all talk of defining God's metaphysical
attributes is "destitute of all intelligible
signif icance" , ' James believes that, pragmatically
considered, the moral attributes are important and
must be ascribed to whatever God there be in order
to determine man's own hopes and fears.
There can be, however, no proofs for God's
existence ;.nd no adequate definitions of his
character. The traditional "proofs" are no proofs
at all; if you believe in God already, they confirm
that belief; if you are atheistic, they fail to
convince. The teleological argument besides being
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"based on the principle of causation which is"obscure?
has had to be completely revolutionized by Darwinism.
Moreover, on the same principle invoked by the argument
to prove God, it may also be argued that for every form
of disorder there is a God who is the author of evil.
The attempts which the defenders of the teleological
argument have made to save it and the "beneficent
designer" are all dubious. The first principle, that
nature by itself would tend towards disorder and
destruction, is contradicted in the lignt of recent
science; the second, that nothing appearing as disorder
to us can possibly be the object of design, is simply
crude anthropomorphism. Hence the argument from
design and all other theistic proofs are inconclusive.
90
Dewey's book, The Q.uest for Certainty , is
a protest against isolating knowledge from action. Ideas
are to be regarded as anticipatory plans, to be tested
91
by their consequences. They are not innate in mind,
but are mere hypotheses with action at their heart; laws
are mere formulae for predicting probabilities; values,
far from being directive and authoritative, are merely
92
the "conditions and results of experienced objects f «
Mind is to be defined in terms of doing and results,
and in general, religion and
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philosophy- are to take their clues from the natural
93
sciences. There is nodirect criticism of the
arguments for God's existence, but a great deal is
implied. In general, all our endeavors, in the
religious realm as well as every other, are M to the
94
future," and they attain no certainty; tenets and
creeds about good or goods are to be recognized as
hypotheses only; the doctrine that nature is inher-
ently rational has deprived mm of the active function
95
of reason.
For both these men, beliefs are always
hypothetical, to be measured by their results. While
James has an "overbelief" that there are objective
divine facts, he still insists that they cannot be
defined, even as Dewey insists that the quest never
ends in certainty. There is a difference between
their theories, however, even while they agree on
their criterion of truth. James insists on his "over-
belief" in the existence of a higher realm of
consciousness of which we are a part, and this "over-
belief" enters into much of his work. Dewey remains
frankly positivistic
,
insisting that religion and
philosophy learn from science and adopt her methods.
James finds a place for feeling, for mystical exper-
ience ; -'Dewey • s whole emphasis is upon action, finding
i(
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no place for the contemplation which is so large a
part of mystical experience.
It is difficult to attack the position of
the pragmatists on their attitude tov/ards theistic
arguments without undertaking a criticism of their
whole position. The crux of the matter, in proving
whether God exists or not, or whether any fact he
true or not, rests on the criterion of truth which
is adopted. The pragmatist holds, and James and
Dewey agree here, that the test of the truth of a
belief is its consequences, its usefulness. As soon
as a lie proves useful or single fact lies fallow
without "working" just so soon the pragmatic
criterion of truth is disproved. It seems to me that
the pragmatic criterion can be disproved on both
these grounds, for nearly every man has made use of
lies, and any bureau of statistics can testify to the
fact of useless truths.
As soon as James utters his faith in an"over
belief, just so soon he has left the realm of the
immediate experience which he prizes, and has con-
ceded something to the rationalism he argues against.
To be consistent he should have remained in his
radical empiricism and avoided "beliefs", unjustified
<
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by experience. Furthermore, he objects to the
traditional proofs because they "follow the combined
suggestions of the facts and of our feeling."®^
Admitting the large place which the fee. ling element
holds in religious beliefs and practises, we cannot
overlook the factual evidence altogether. James
does not do so in his able treatment of evil and
disorder. The teleological argument may not be
valid, but at least if it be based on ooth facts
and feeling, it is likely to be nearer the truth
than if based upon feeling alone.
Dewey makes all beliefs, creeds, values,
laws, a matter of hypothesis, and he declares that
the belief that nature is inherently rational has
been a harmful belief. It seems to me that of all
the arguments for Goa the one which adapts itseif
most easily to the point of view that our beliefs
are all hypothetical is the teleological argument.
It is based upon the experience of nature that can
be observed; it observes there order and disorder,
and then its conclusions are drawn upon an analysis
of what has been found in nature . For one of the
"actions" of mind is just the action of interpret-
ation, of synthesizing, of unifying and discovering

39
a meaning in the mass of experience which confronts
it. Even if the point of view of Dewey in regard
to the hypothetical status or ail creed and beliefs
be agreed upon, the teleological argument could still
be maintained. Dewey speaks of the harmfulness of
the belief that nature is inherently rational.
There would be, logically, only two possible
alternatives to the belief, one that nature is
inherentxy irrational, which Dewey himself would
hardly accept, the other that it is partly rational,
partly irrational. My contention is that if Dewey
is to deny the inherent rationality of the universe,
he must prove its total irrationality, or account
for its partial rationality. In either case, having
denied its inherent rationality, the burden of proof
in upon him.
The objections to the teleological argument
as well as the treatment of the problem of evil by
97
James will be considered in a later section.
(B) The opposition from the "emergent evolution-
98 99
ists" comes from Alexander and Morgan.
Both Alexander and Morgan describe evolution
in terms of levels emerging in ever higher and
higher degrees of complexity. Alexander claims that
the basis of the whole process is "Space-Time"
,

40
100
which is the "stuff of which all things are made."
1/Iorgan doubts that "Space-Time" exists apart from
matter, and makes "physico-chemical events" the
101
lowest level of reality.
dexander describes the divine in two
different phrases. "Deity" is the next higher
empirical quality to the highest each respective
level knows; for matter it is life; for life it is
mind; and ior mind there must be another higher
quality which will emerge. God, on the other hand,
is just the whole universe as possessing this
102
quality of deity. It is neither good nor evil,
though it may be said to be "on the side of
goodness" since goodness stands for permanence and
evil for impermanent elements. There are no proofs
of God, for even if he be the sum of reality it is
the quality of deity in him which we worship and
103
experience, but do not prove. The traditional
proofs all introduce apriori elements which are
invalid because they are supplied by mind. The
teleological argument is more persuasive than the
others, but the conception of God as designer carries
with it so many di f ficulties that it cannot be
accepted; an infinite Designer must perforce create
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his own material . Furthermore natural selection
adequately accounts for adaptations and for internal
teleology of all forms. "External teieology" is
better accounted for not in terms of an external
force operating in the process, hut as "an incident
104
of passage to the future." If, on the other hand,
the conception of external force be abandoned in
favor of some conception of immanent design, we have
only said that ti.e world seems to produce some plan,
and if God be given credit for it, he must in some
way also be responsible for the wastefulness
connected with the execution of the plan. It is far
105
more "modest" to discuss the quality of deity,
looking for it in our experience, and expecting that
as the world grows in time deity will grow with it,
for it is a variable quality.
Morgan's theory is definitely theistic.
God is the "nisus through whose activity emergents
emerge, and the whole course of emergent evolution
106
is directed." Although he is "above and beyond"
the evolutionary process, he is also within each one
107
of us so that we "intuitively enjoy" him. In his
Life, Mind and Spirit Morgan discusses the theory
of the organism as a unity, which can be considered
(
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in "physiological regard" in respect to its life,
or in "psychological regard" in respect to its mind.
The organism thus has two attributes which are
108
"concomitants", Both are manifestations of the
Divine Purpose. We are thus given a world of natural
events which is God's manifestation, and of this plan
of events we are a part and as such we reveai God.
The Divine Purpose ijj just this rational order of the
cosmos, manifesting itself in various ways.
There is no discussion of arguments for
God's existence. Proofs, from the point of view
of this author, would be as superfluous as they were
for Spinoza who, seeing the world as one substance,
considered the very affirmation or the world as the
afiirmation of God.
Because Alexander's system is the background
for his disbelief in all apriori arguments, it should
be examined for possible internal inconsistencies
and ambiguities. I shall undertake to do this by
criticizing three of his doctrines: (1) Space-Time;
(2) Emergents; (5) Deity.
(1) The doctrine of "Space-Time."
Obviously if Alexander can reduce
everything to a "Space-Time" basis, he can rule out
the Designer who creates the world and the series of
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ascending forms in it. The question is, lias
Alexander made a complete case for this "Space-Time*
basis? There is a lack of evidence to prove that it
is the basis for all present, past, and future forms,
and to argue for such a basis seems to me to require
at least as great faith as is required by the teleologists
in arguing for their God, I submit that Alexander has
introduced as many apr iori arguments for the existence
of his "Space-Time" as have the teleologists for God.
A further question concerns the pseudo-simplicity of
the "Space-Time* basis. Have we any rigttt to speak
of *higher* and "lower" empirical qualities if all
are derived equally from this basis? It does not
seem to me that Alexander has proved his case, and on
this ground of origin alone, therefore, he has not
disproved the hypothesis of God acting as creator and
designer of the world.
(2) The doctrine of emergents.
Alexander's chief case against the
traditional arguments, as we have seen, is based on
their introduction of apr iori elements, elements
supplied by mind, not by experience. In his
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doctrine 01 "Space-Time 11 as the primordial stuff
he seems to have introduced apriori elements into
his own theory. I believe the same is true of his
doctrine of emergents. His theory that emergents
come out of "Space-Time" is sheer faith; there is no
empiricaj. evidence to this effect, nor does Alexander
bring such evidence to bear. There would again be
less difficulty with the theory of emergents as
stated by Alexander, omitting the "Space-Time" basis,
under the hypothesis of the existence of God as the
force guiding these emergents and causing them to
emerge, for we could at least think of God as
endowed with will and arbitrarily bringing forth
these new levels.
(3) The doctrine of Deity.
Alexander's deity and his God are
certainly unique conceptions. Neither appears to be
worthy of worship; deity is simply the next higher
empirical quality and therefore variable. As a
higher quality emerges, the lower ceases to be deity
except as it be handed down to the next lower level.
Nor is it clear why God should be worshipped since he
is just the universe, possessing deity. One feeis
that "Space-Time" and "emerging levels" are important
factors in Alexander's system, but it is difficult
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to understand why the theological terms had to be
applied to such un-theological conceptions. He has
simply named the fact that levels emerge and will con-
tinue to emerge. To call this belief a belief in
deity does not make of it a theistic theory.
C. D. Broad sees in Alexander's conception
109
of deity an "unwarranted optimism." Our own fate
as human beings may be a dangerous one if the higher
complexes are developed, for, as Broad points out,
judging by our own relation, as minds, to the level
of those beings who have only life, whose deity we
are, we may well expect that our deity will strive
to eat us I
The conclusion to be drawn from Alexander's
theory is that he has not presented an adequate case
against the teleological argument if that case be
based on his own theory of evolution, and that he
has not, in his conception of deity and of God,
offered an adequate substitute for the God of
theism.
The case of Morgan is more difficult, for
Morgan avows himself to be a theist. It is a theism
built upon an evolutionary naturalism, and the
difficulties of his theory seem to rest upon the
peculiar combination of these two. Mind and body

46
are attributes of a single substance, and they are
"concomitants", in the sense that there is never the
one without the other. At the successive levels of
emergence there are present no new agencies, but
only new kinds of relatedness. Yet all integral
entities, with this duality of attribute, disclose in
the process of evolution "the activity of one
spiritual uplift in which each partakes in accordance
with its status." ^® Morgan opposes the "hormic
theory" held by J. ^rthur Thomson which is that
there is guidance when the *anima*
,
possessing body,
manifests conative endeavor to achieve its ends.
Morgan holds on the contrary that "when the cognitive
level of reference is reached - and a fortiori when
the higher reflective level is reached - there is
conscious guidance which counts for progress in the
two-fold story of life and mind." Thomson*
s
theory is founded on the hypothesis that mind or the
•anima' possesses body and consciously guides it;
Morgan's theory is that at a certain level there is
guidance which tells for both life and mind. My
question concerning Morgan's whole theory, which
directly affects the question of the teleological
argument, is one concerning this factor of guidance.
Thomson names it: it comes from the 'anima' itself;
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Morgan says there is guidance at the cognitive level,
but it can in no sense be ascribed to mind in its
relation to body. Whence, then, does it come? It
seems hardly in keeping with his theory to take the
clue that God is "above and beyond" the evolutionary
process and to give God direct credit for this
guidance. The only alternative, then, if the fact of
guidance be admitted, is to attribute interaction to
the two concomitants, letting the mental concomitant
affect the physical process. This would mean that
the two did not run concomitantly, but that they are
interwoven, they interact in such a way that mind
guides body. Either guidance must be denied or the
"hormic theory" accepted. Then, if the latter
theory holds, the dual aspect must be rejected and mind
regarded as emerging at an advanced stage in the
evolutionary process. On this basis some driving or
creating force must be recognized as its cause, and
this cause we may call God. The teteological argument
would find its place in such a conception. On
Morgan's view, however, God seems little more than the
name for the fact that levels emerge.
Morgan, as I have indicated, does net
discuss the arguments for God, since his conception
of Goct is not that of traditional theism. Once
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having admitted the fact of guidance, however, he
must in some way account for it in other than
naturalistic terms. I submit that his theory of
concomitants is inconsistent with the admission of
guidance, but that, if re-interpreted in terms of
the "hormic theory" , the fact of emergent levels could
very well be used as a bit of evidence for the
teleological argument itself,
(C) The opposition from the realm of science
113 113b
comes from Eddington, Driesch, and Whitehead.
Eddington does not believe in proofs; we
114
must turn from them to "plausibilities." So
many proofs of God, swept away in subsequent
scientific revolutions, have been offered from the
field of science that that field no longer seems a
ground for evidence. Let science and religion stay
each in its own domain in order that they may avoid
conflict. The scientist is skeptical; he would wait
until every scientific difficulty is solved before
he accepts amy belief, but it were better if he
consented to be an ordinary man, accepting much on
faith that he cannot prove by science. Eddington is
not unfriendly to mysticism as we shall see in the study
115
of the argument for God from religious experience.
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Eddington recognizes the presence both
or chance and of design in the universe, and the
force of that side of our personality which "impels
us to dwell on beauty and other aesthetic signifi-
117
cances in Nature." He believes creation to be
not a single act but continuously the act of "con-
118
scious mind." Judging by the prodigality of
nature in her works which we see about us, we may
reason that, to achieve her purpose and to provide
a home for "her greatest experiment, Man," she may
be as prodigal of all her materials, and "it would
be just like her method to scatter a million stars
whereof one might haply achieve her purpose
•
The world, according to Eddington, is
mind-stuff; the substratum of everything is of a
mental character; indeed, he admits the same formu-
lation as that urged by Clifford himself. u He
develops a theory of predictability as opposed to
determinism
,
according to the quantum theory, by
which of five hundred atoms, for instance, it can
be predicted that four hundred will develop into
State 1 and one hundred into State 2. The 4:1 ratio
is predetermined although there is no mark to dis-
tinguish the four hundred from the one hundred in
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the original assemblage. In the same way an individ-
ual may be said not to be predestined for one state
or another; the most that can be said is that there
12
are "respective odds on his reaching these states."
There is no clearly formulated idea of God
in Eddington's book, although the idea of God is
constantly implied. With Sorley-^^ he agrees on
the sanction of correlating a spiritual domain with
one side of our personality just as we find sanction
for correlating a real physical world with certain
123
of our sensations. Spiritual aspirations have,
then, a real object, He also refers to a "Power
124greater than but akin to consciousness," which
is the background of mental consciousness, and he
declares that a mere physical survey can never touch
this background.
Eddington is, as we have noted, opposed to
all "proofs." His attitude towards religion seems
to be that of faith, rather than that of demonstra-
tion. He could still take the teleological argument
as an argument, not as a conclusive proof . It seems
to me that he is most sympathetic to the teleologi-
cal, acknowledging the presence of design and beauty
in the universe, and calling attention to the
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prodigality of nature in matters we ourselves can
observe, as a possible clue to understanding the
size of the universe.
Concerning the relation between science
and religion there seems to be some danger connected
with the instruction that each discipline shall
stay in its own territory, for unless the universe
is completely bifurcated into two distinct realms,
one secular, and one religious, it is neither pos-
sible nor desirable to keep these studies from
interpenetrating. The teleological argument especi-
ally is one which requires both disciplines, and of
the tbree traditional proofs it is the one which is
pre-eminently the meeting place for both science
and religion. Nor is it possible, as Eddington
suggests it should be, for the man of science or
the man who thinks at all to enter into any door
125
be it "barn" or "church", blindly, by faith
alone, as does the ordinary man. He does not do it
in the realm of science; it cannot be done in the
realm of religion, if we are to purge religion of
superstition and outworn beliefs.
Driesch defines vitalism, as we have seen,
126
as the doctrine of the" autonomy of life," and he
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gives to the autonomous factor the name "entelechy
He holds that in organic nature there are processes
which are incapable of being carried on under
physico-chemical laws, or described in terms of
mechanics. Unlike Morgan, he holds that there are
emergents in organic matter only, not in the inorgan-
ic realm where uniformity obtains and where opera-
tions take place entirely according to causal
mechanical laws. Vitalism concerns only the levels
127
of life and of mind. Entelechies may be of
different kinds, and two or more kinds may be at
work in the same organism, morphogenetic entele-
chies, for instance, and "psychoids", while the
latter may again be divided into those which govern
actions and those which govern instincts, each kind
acting separately. Different parts of the brain,
moreover, may possess different kinds of entelechies.
As to the character of the entelechy, it is not
spatial, for it lacks all the characteristics of
quantity; nor can it be said to be a kind of ener-
gy; it is "order of relation and absolutely noth-
127ing else." It is not temporal, but it "implies
128 125duration." It "uses matter" for its "purposes."
i
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Since the mechanical theory of life would
be incompatible with morality, and since, Driesch
holds, the latter exists categorically, the very
assertion of morality must imply some sort of
130
entelechy. "Purposefulness" must be differen-
tiated from "usefulness." Only beings who have a
knowledge of what ought to exist, and who can act
towards the accomplishment of that obligation can
be said to be "purposeful"; machines are only
131
'useful." Nature is not through and through
teleological , for we find in it not only purpose
132
but contingency. In nature as a whole, how-
ever, we find "inklings" of a "supra-personal har-
mony"- in the whole of nature, a harmony between
entelechian manifestations and the "distribution
134
of inorganic realities^" Natural selection
is only a negative factor and of no great impor-
tance to the problem of entelechy; Lamarckian
and Darwinian evolution fail to explain many kinds
of adaptation accounted for only in terms of
vitalism, and err especially in their failure to
account for the process of restitution in
135
organisms
.
4c
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The teleological argument might be said
to be decisive for the existence of God if we
define him as "the entelechian factor in ftivenness,-
136
but is not an argument for the Absolute. Of the
absolute we can know very little, though it seems
137
to have "connection with something like reason."
There are a few "windows" open to it, however; one
of these is morality; another is the fact of the
"unity of subjective experience in general and of
memory in particular; a third is the "contingency
of immediate Givenn- ess and the immanent coherence
of the single phases of Givenness in spite of its
contingency."
The merits of the theory of vitalism as a
possible objection to, or substitution for, the
argument we are considering will be discussed in a
139later chapter. Two or three points need to be
noted, here
.
The hypothesis of entelechy acting as the
autonomous factor in life processes can only be
maintained if all other hypotheses are to be ex-
cluded. The question is, has he excluded all other
possibilities? Spaulding holds, for instance,
t
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that with the same data offered by Driesch one can argue
as well that the organism is simply a "specific complex
140
of certain physical and chemical constituents."
Another reviewer has said that his theory mereiy calls
attention to the peculiarity of certain physico-chemical
processes.
141
My o*n criticism is that his entelechy is
intelligible only because it behaves as mind behaves,
and does the things which mind does, although Driesch
would not ailow such activity to mind. In other words,
the criticism of science upon the theory is that it is
but a re-statement of the problem of the physico-chemical
realm, with "entelechy" used as a name for the problem.
The criticism of the philosopher may well be that he
does not show how entelechy supplants mind in its
functions
.
Driesch is opposed to the theory of natural
selection on the ground that it is a purely negative
factor, but he has not indicated how the entelechy
becomes a selective factor in its stead. The entelechy
maintains and, in certain cases, restores the organism;
the "psychoid" is said to"direct n the body. He insists
142
that this is a "neutral term", but its functions
appear to be very like those we ordinarily ascribe to
mind.
(
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There is no definition of the Absolute,
Driesch has spoken of our having "inklings" of the
I "supra-personal". The latter term, unless defined,
has little meaning, and his failure to define it
perhaps means he could not himself put the concept into
words. To speak of the "supra-personal" in the sense of
a greater degree of personality would carry some
meaning, but if he means a higher category than that of
personality I can only say that the burden of proving
that such a category is possible rests upon him, and
that the term has no meaning until it is defined. His
"windows" into the Absolute are far more interesting.
The "window" of morality might well be developed into a
moral argument for God's existence; Driesch mereiy
names the clue, and does not develop the concept. The
"window" which he speaks of as the unity of subjective
experience, especially of memory, might well be used as
an argument for the existence of a G-od of the nature of
mind. The third "window" seems to me to be an approach
to the cosmological argument. All three concern the
order of the universe, in its moral aspects, its mental
activities, its general coherence. This particular
part of Driesch ! s book is not at all out of harmony
with the teleological argument. It is not, however, a
clear statement, since he refuses to define the Absolute,
(i
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and since he does not carry out the full implication
of the "windows" which open out to it.
My conclusion is that the Drieschian " entelechy"
is still an obscure conception, and one challenged by
many scientists. If Driesch me^ns to substitute this
autonomous factor for the old conception of design,
then the teleologicai argument remains unimpaired, for
Driesch has not made his case. The doctrine of the
Absolute might wexl be part of a teleologicai argument.
Eddington has insisted that the realms of science
and religion shall not overlap, lest mutuaj. contradiction
be the result. Whitehead's Process and Reality , a
"philosophy of organism", is, whether the author
knew it or not, an opposed point of view, for it is in
this philosophy of organism that Whitehead's science
and philosophy meet.
There is in Whitehead's book no discussion of
theistic arguments as such, because they would hardly be
relevant to his theory of God's relation to the world.
The universe, according to Whitehead, is in
the process of accomplishing its actuality through
"four creative phases". The first is the phase of
"conceptual origination" ; the second, the stage of
"physical origination"; the third, that of "perfected
actuality in which the many are one"; the fourth and final
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stage is that by which "creative action completes
itself", in which the actuality completed in the third
phase passes back again into the temporal world so
that in that world every "temporal actuality" will in-
clude the perfection as an "immediate fact of relevant
142c
*
experience," Now the organism or "actual entity* is
a "concrescence" from certain "eternal objects" which in
their turn are only potentialities in the space-time
continuum* There is no principle in this continuum to
determine what the character of the actual entities
shall be. Entities have a three-fold character: a
character given them by the past, the "subjective character
aimed at" in their process of conci esc ence^ and the
" superjective Character", which, apparently, is what
these entities are worth in measure of satisfaction for
"transcendent creativity", and this latter character seems
to be what is meant by God, or by God plus the world
when the universe finally reaches the fourth stage
of its actuality. Now God also is an actual entity,
and shares all three of the above characteristics: he has
nothing given to him from the past because his nature
is primordial, but the first characteristic of God,
nevertheless, corresponds to the first character of the
actual entities, for he has a "primordial nature",
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which is a unity of "conceptual feeling*, and among
these "feelings* are the "eternal objects*; in other
words, all potentialities of possibilities of actual
entities are in God f s "primordial nature? The
second characteristic is God f s physical "prenension*
of the universe^ "evolving actualities"; the third
characteristic is also the same as that of all actual
entities, a "superjec tive nature* wnose pragmatic
142d
value is conceived in the same way. Thus God in
his "primordial nature* is simply the multiplicity of
potentialities, out of which actual entities become
concrete. His immanence in the world so far as tnat
"primordial nature" is concerned, is just an "urge*
towards the future phases of creativity. Apart from
God these potentialities would never become concrete,
and herein Whitehead differs from Alexander, for
instance, in conceiving God not as a next higher empirical
quality, nor as the whole universe possessing deity, but
as a certain principle upon which the world acts. For htm
God and the world are distinct and separate, although
they complement each other as we shall see. Whitehead
holds that however far we push back the "sjihere of
efficient causation", we
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come finally to a M self-creative unity of the universe"
and its reaction, and the reaction "completes the
142e
self-creative act." applied to God, this me^-ns
that God needs concrete actual entities as the object-
ification of the "urge" of his primordial nature. Yfe
have seen how God corresponds to actual entities in hav
ing the same three characteristics; in yet another
regard he resembles them: each actuality has a "bipolar
nature, physical und mental, which are integrated in a
process of concrescence ; God also has a bipolar nature,
primordial and consequent; his primordial nature is
constituted by "conceptual experiences", and it is
eternax, deficient in actuality, and unconscious; the
"consequent nature" is incomplete, fully actual and
conscious. It is derived from the temporal world, and
is finally integrated with the primordial nature. God
and the world are opposites
,
needing each other and
complementing each other. In God the conceptual is
prior to the physical, and in the world the physical
is prior to the conceptual; in God permanence is pri-
mordial, and in the world flux is the primordial
quaxity. The world's nature is a "primordial datum"
for God, even as God's nature is "primordial datum"
142f
for the world.
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God is not prior to his creation; he is "with
it"; he is not a transcendent creator calling the
world into existence, hut he "saves it" as its principle
of concretion, even as, I suspect he would say, the
world saves God, by filling in with physical
experiences his unconscious, primordial nature. If
mere "concresence" were the aim or purpose of God,
then the very fact of the existence of concrete
actual entities should indicate God's immanence.
Moreover, God and the world are never identified,
although each needs the other. Thus far, Whitehead's
theory is not out or harmony with the teleologicai
argument. However, the one reason that God is
different from the world seems to be the fact of his
primordial nature, which, contrary to the spirit of
the teleologicai argument, is unconscious; God is not
a directing force. There is no reference in the book
to God's immcinence in the universe beyond the statement
of immanence as "urge" in the primordial nature.
Is concreteness , in the sense of potential-
ities becoming actual, sufficient to represent God's
principle in regard to the world, or his purpose?
It seems to me that the last two stages of the
creative work of the universe need further explanation,
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and that that chapter in which Whitehead deals with
the relation "between God and the world especialxy needs
elaboration. Ke has carefully avoided teleological
expressions, substituting "feelings," "urge," "con-
creteness," for the ordinary terms that have been
used in connection with a God of will and of purpose.
(2) Specific opposition to the teleological
argument
.
In addition to those who oppose all theistic
proofs, there is a second class of opponents who have
criticised the teleological argument to a greater ex-
tent tharti the other theistic arguments. There are two
143 144in this class, Bosanquet and Bruce. It is with
some hesitation that I have made this group into a
separate classification, for according to his own term-
inology Bosanquet has spoken of logic as the clue to
reality, and in a certain sense his conception of logic,
of totality, is an argument for the Absolute, .-gain
with Bruce, there are conceptions which have an affili-
ation with the argument from development, and with the
moral argument. Neither one of these, however, is
stated in sufficiently systematic form to be considered
as substitute proofs, and I have therefore felt justified
in placing both Bosanquet and Bruce in the category of
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those who, denying the validity of the teleological
argument, offer no substitute proof.
Bosanquet is not fundamentally interested in
finite individuals but in the one infinite Individual.
There can be only one such in his doctrine, and this
One is the absolute. The only true clue to reality is
logic, or the spirit of totality, not lesser consider-
ations such as will and purpose in terms of which the
145Absolute cannot be defined. Goodness and value be^
long not to members of the world, not to finite minds,
146
but only to the Whole. We are wont to think of
purpose in terms of psychological, temporal, and ethi-
cal ideas; such a conception is wrong; the principle
of purposivness
,
rightly understood "expands into the
147
principle of Individuality," of perfection, of the
whole. Finite purposive consciousness is neither the
source of mechanical "nature" nor the "sole vehicle of
148teleology within our experience." The world plan
is immanent in the whole, in finite mind and in nature
also, and finite mind can do nothing that was never a
plan before any finite mind acted. The only reason
why we ascribe teleology to man rather than to "his
material co-partners" is that man is able to react "to
14Q
a much more concrete whole" than can the lower forms
of nature. The aim or all finite purpose must be, in
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fact, to realize the worthlessness Af separate finite
consciousnesses, and to transcend that finitude.
The God of religion is to be distinguished
from the ultimate reality, though God may be said to
be an appearance of the reality. He is, however, ex-
150
perienced and not capable of proof. Evil is absorb-
able into good; it is a condition of our finitude, a
hardship of our selfhood, to be overcome by repudiating
finitude. Psychological selection cannot mould or
elicit positive structure; natural selection alone is
capable of doing sue!: work. The implication is,
although Bosanquet's objections are implicit only, that
the teleological argument, besides being open to all
the objections of all theistic proofs which fail to
see the proper relations between finite and infinite
beings, is invalid also because it claims for psycho-
logical selection the work which natural selection
alone can do.
The question of the role which natural selec-
tion plays in nature, with its bearing on the teleo-
151
logical argument is to be discussed in a later section*
and I shall discuss at this point simply the idea of
teleology in Bosanquet's theory, in order to determine
the relation between his ultimate reality and the
world of men and of space and time, for it is upon this
H9k
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relation that the teleological argument depends. The
teleological argument argues that because order and
adaptation of means to end is found in nature, because
nature is intelligible, there must be an intelligent
Mind, a Mind of purpose, as its ground. Bosanquet re-
verses the whole procedure adopted by the teleologie&s
by claiming that only totality, the whole, is the real.
His interest and focus ia not in the parts, but in
that of which these things are parts. We use the tele-
ological argument for God by analogy to our own pur-
posive action, and we argue that just as we finite
minds create and design, so God creates and designs,
and the order which we find in nature is a sign of God.
Bosanquet destroys the validity of that analogy by de-
claring that man can bring forth nothing new, that
everything existed in a plan before he performed his
151b
act. Furthermore, Bosanquet denies that the Abso-
lute can be defined in terms of will and of purpose.
The crux of the question of whether Bosanquet 's
theory successfully eliminates the teleological argument
does not, then, rest so much on the solving of the
problem of psychological versus natural selection,
although he has stated this problem. It rests on the
question of his definition of finite purposiveness and
of the Absolute. He has denied that teleology can be
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ascribed to such consciousness as we are familiar
with, declaring that such purposes as finite beings
hold are to be expanded into the Totality, the princi-
ple of Individuality. I do ndt think he has made a
complete case. Faced by two possibilities, one, that
my self-conscious purposes are able to accomplish
nothing new and that their destiny is to become merged
in the whole, the other, that my self-conscious activ-
ity is really what it seems to be , a striving for ends
which my mind knows, I would choose the latter alterna-
tive, not only because my experience tells me it is
true, but because this whole matter of the \bsolute
,
and of our highest destiny as becoming merged with it,
is conjecture. It teems to me self-evident that every
self-conscious being has ultimate value, value in and
for itself, not just instrumental value for the sake
of an all-devouring Absolute. Bosanquet does not, be-
cause he cannot, explain away finite self-consciousness.
LlcTaggart points out the fact that in our highest ex-
periences the selfhood of the finite conscious being
is heightened, not lowered or "transcended," as
Bosanquet would maintain, for in the experience of love
it is "just the particularity of the two selves which
152is the supreme element." It seems to me, moreover,
that even if we accepted Bosanquet 's decree on the
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ultimate destiny of the finite individual in this
world, of his highest good as just the transcendence of
this f initude , we could never know when we had attained
that ideal. If it is to be attained only in the next
world, as Bosanquet would not argue, then we must
logically look upon the present existence as mere il-
lusion.
Bosanquet is not more successful in his attempts
to eliminate the idea that G-od or the Absolute is to
be defined in terms of will and purpose. He admits a
153
"teleology above consciousness." Is that teleology
simply the urge towards perfection and wholeness? He
defines the Absolute in no other terms. If man's des-
tiny be to become merged finally with it, then man is
to become less than he is at present, for at present
he possesses will and intellignece . I believe that in
denying will and purpose to the Absolute, and by still
insisting that all finite purposes are to expand into
the principle of wholeness, or the Absolute, Bosanquet
has done an injustice both to the finite conscious be-
ings and to the Absolute himself. So far as the case
is concerned, the teleological argument is unimpaired.
Bruce defines God as the "one Supreme Will at
154
the heart of the universe." He reveals himself
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through nature in ways interpre table by man. The flact
of man's rational and moral nature creates a presumption
in favor of believing that God also has a rational and
moral nature, caring for men individualxy and collec-
155tively as their moral governor and benignant father.
He has been immanent in the world process from the be-
ginning, conducting the course of evolution upwards
towards man, who is the pinnacle of the whole process,
156
and the key to the meaning of the universe . G-od
seems to have worked according to three principles,
in his dealing with man: election, solidarity, and
157
sacrifice
.
The way to know God is through knowledge of
man and of his nature. The traditional proofs are
158
"out of fashion." Even the teleoiogical argument
Which is the "oldest, the most popular, and the most
159
impressive," must be overthrown because evolutionary
theory has accounted for those adaptations previously
ascribed to God as their Designer.
The arguments offered against the traditional
lines of proof need concern us little because of ob-
vious inconsistencies in Bruce f s work. The very titles
of his books "Providential Order" and floral Order"
imply a recognition of order in the universe which
forms part of the teleological argument. Furthermore,
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he speaks of God as revealed in nature, and of man's
ability to interpret that revelation. This is pre-
cisely the spirit of the teleological argument. The
statement that evolution has overthrown the evidence
for the teleological proof might be offered as an
argument against the truth of his statement that God
works through the three methods he has mentioned.
Would it not be possible for evolutionists to make out
a good case for the nations "elected" because in the
struggle for existence some nations have been naturally
selected to survive while others perished? Or could
they not point to certain facts to prove that solidar-
ity was a herd instinct, a banding together of people
in order to survive the struggle for existence? And a
lesson might also be drawn from the evidence of sacri-
fice, and that lesson might be that all through the
course of evolution individuals and species hatre been
sacrificed while others have lived, not because God
has chosen sacrifice as his principle, but because
evolution is just naturally a process of struggle in
which the fit survive and the others are sacrificed.
I do not dispose of Bruce 's three principles
in the manner indicated above, but I am attempting to
prove that he disposes of the teleological argument
too easily, and that the argument which holds against
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teleology may be brought against his own principles.
The objections offered to the traditional
arguments by the nine G-ifford Lecturers whose theories
ije have discussed above may be summarized: Whitehead,
James, Dewey, and Eddington oppose all "proofs" as in-
conclusive; Alexander objects to the traditional argu-
ments on the ground that they introduce invalid
apriori evidence; Morgan's theory is a description of
the emergence of different levels in the process of
evolution, and he insists on the concomitance of
physical and mental attributes throughout, admitting
"guidance" at a certain level, but denying that it is
a guidance by mind over "matter." The analogy of in-
finite to finite mind, as the guide or creator of all
the world could not hold, although Morgan does not dis-
cuss the teleological or other traditional arguments.
Driesch's vitalism virtually means that life takes
care of itself and works our its own salvation without
outside help; Bosanquet, like Morgan, tears down the
old analogy on which the teleological argument is built-,
betweeii infinite and finite mind, for there is no
psychological selection, in his view, nor can the
Absolute itself be defined in terms of will and pur-
pose. Bruce is satisfied in declaring that the tra-
ditional arguments are out of date, and that the theory
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of evolution is the final ground for overthrowing
the teleological argument.
We have examined all these theories for
possible inconsistencies which, if discovered, would
weaken the case against the teleological argument. We
find James arguing against proofs, but insisting on
his right to an "over-belief;" Dewey's statement that
the world is not inherently rational may be true, but
he has neither proved its inherent irrationality nor
accounted for at least the rationality of his own
statements in his book. Moreover, there is nothing in
the teleological argument that claims this argument is
conclusive or sole proof: it pretends to be an argument
only, and it could still be maintained as an hypothesis
in the spirit of Dewey's thought. Both James and Dewey
maintain a pragmatic criterion of truth which criterion
I have argued against
.
Eddington argues against all "proofs" , but
speaks of beauty and design in the universe as signs
of a spiritual realm as real as the physical. Alexan-
der introduces several apriori elements in his concep-
tions of God and deity which, in spite of their theo-
logical caste, can hardly be said to be adequate sub-
stitutes for the God of theism. Morgan has admitted
the fact of "guidance" and his view would be explained
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more clearly by the hypothesis of a designing Mind
back of the process of evolution, in which process
mind is a distinct emergent, than by the maintainance
of his dual aspect theory. Driesch's "entelechy"
,
again, is hardly a fair substitute for mind, and the
concept is obscure and is opposed by many modern
scientists. There are traces in Driesch's theory,
however, of adherence to a form of the teleological
argument. Whitehead's system is as yet so little
understood that it is impossible to state its implica-
tions .
Bosanquet has hardly made a case against
finite psychological selection, nor against defining
God or the Absolute as will or purpose. Bruce 's system,
while it purports to deny the teleological argument,
uses it several times, and even the titles of his
books indicate the adherence of the author to the
argument
.
The general conclusion is that these oppon-
ents have hardly made a case against the teleological
argument if we are to judge by their proposed sub-
stitutes for the God of theism, or by the internal con-
sistency of their several theories. The specific ob^
jections to the argument itself will be considered in
a separate chapter; this present section merely attempted

to examine these systems of the opponents
the is tic arguments.
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CHAPTER 3
Gifford Lectures Which Uphold the Traditional
Teleological argument
The first chapter of this dissertation was
engaged in the task of eliminating irrelevant Ledtures.
The second chapter considered the Lectures which op-
posed the teleological argument, and offered no sub-
stitute proof for God. This present chapter will con-
sider the Lectures which have unqualifiedly approved
the argument, and Chapter 4 will them take the middle
ground between opposition and approval, considering
the Lectures which, while not approving the argument,
have either used it or offered a substitute proof.
Cnly two sets of Gifford Lectures defend the
teleological argument in its traditional force. It
may be significant that these two are the work of men
who lectured very early in the series. The first to
defend the argument was J. Hutchinson Stirling who
lectured in 1889 and 189C, publishing his Lectures
under the title Philosophy and Theology . The second
was Sir G. G. Stokes who lectured in the years 1891 and
1893, publishing each year a book, with the title,
Natural Theology. 161
Stirling discusses each of the traditional
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arguments in turn, giving its history, an account of
the Kantian disproofs, and, in the case of the teleo-
logical argument, commenting upon the attempted dis-
proof by evolution. It is not necessary to review the
history of this argument. In regard to the Kantian
disproof Stirling insists that Kant's opposition was
never more than half-hearted, and that he had an in-
creasing respect for it as shown in his Critique of
Judgment . 162 On the other hand, when Kant argued that
the argument yielded only a conception of God as an
architect, he was not successful in belittling the
teleological argument, for, since the architect must
be proportioned to his work, and the cause to its
efi'ect, the architect of the world can be no other
163than "He that is, and whom there is none beside,"
In reality the three traditional proofs are parts of
one proof of God's unity, the ontological proving
God's being; the cosmclogical proving his living; and
164the teleological his knowing or intelligence. Nor
does Darwin succeed any better in disproving the argu-
ment. There are too many gaps in Darwin's system, and
his method is "one of £ypot; ; esis
,
supposition, probable
conjecture only."
Sir G. G. Stoked books are very largely
studies of the evidence of design. His theory is that
rc
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the study of nature "forcibly impresses us with an
166
idea of design lying somewhere," and that science
only serves to increase this impression. The theory
of evolution is "utterly insufficient" to prove that
man is derived "by transmutation from some other living
167
form, and in particular there seems to be no evi-
dence for the "continuous development of mind" which
168
might lead up to the mind of man. The creation of
man was a new thing, a miracle without precedence, and
something more than evolution was required to perform
this miracle.
Stokes elaborates at length the evidence of
design, mentioning particularly the laws of light and
169 1 7 C
sound, the processes of nutrition and growth,
171
the presence of beauty, and the structure of the
172
eye. The latter evidence is boldly mentioned,
even though. Darwin had treated of it particularly as a
173
proof of natural selection.
Both Stirling and Stokes account for evil and
suffering by declaring that these are necessary for
man's education, necessary in order that good may
emerge, and they insist on a sum total of goodness in
the world in spite of evil. It does not seem to me
that either Stirling or Stokes goes very far beyond
the work done by Paley and the writers of the
r(
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Bridgewater Treatises. The old homooentric viewpoint
so marked in the old works is strong witi both these
men.
. They are optimistic concerning evil, hardly
treating it more thoroughly, however, than the old
teleologists . Both reject the very formidable evidence
for natural selection after a superficial review of
the theory of evolution, and it is apparent that the
motive for both is the protection of man against t e
insinuation that he might have been derived from some
other living form. The suspicion of the evolution - - ry
theory so marked in religious circles during the latter
p rt of the nineteenth century seems to be fairly well
exemplified in both these books. One wonders if Stokes,
particularly, could have read Darwin's books before he
declared that the structure of the eye is a clear evi
—
dence of design; even if he had such convictions,
Stokes could hardly afford to ignore D rwin's evidence
to the contrary.
It seems to me also that Stirling is over-
stating Kant's friendliness towards the teleological
aggument. It is true that Kant did hold it more highly
than the other traditional arguments, but he was still
opposed to it, and that opposition continued even in
174the Critique of Judgment .
f
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CHAPTER 4
Gifford Lectures Which Either Use the Teleological
Argument in New Lines of Evidence for God, or Substitute
New Proofs.
This present chapter will be the longest,
for the great majority of the Gifford Lectures
neither categorically affirm nor deny the truth of
the argument, but modify, reinterpret, and use it in
other lines of evidence. It will be the task of this
chapter to determine the extent to which the argument
has been used in various other theistic proofs. It
will be found that in certain cases a Lecturer will
maintain more than one argument, and in such instances
his theory will be discussed in more than one section
of the chapter. Six main theories will be discussed,
representing six different types of evidence for
God's existence, and I shall discuss each of these
main types in turn. They are: (A) God as the
presupposition, synthesis and unity of experience;
(B) God as manifested by natural law and by man's
general nature; (C) God as the object of religious
experience; (D) God as the ground of values;
(E) God as proved by accumulated evidence, and
(F) God as seen through science.
(
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God as the presupposition, synthesis
and unity of experience.
It is difficult to frame a title for the
point of view of the group to be discussed in this
first section, agreeing in some respects, they deviate
sharply in others. Their chief common bond seems to
be a debt which they all owe and which some
acknowledge to Hegel. They would not all call
themselves neo-Hegelians , however. Their theories
are all theories of monism; in some cases it is a
qualitative metaphysical monism, in others a
quantitative metaphysical monism. S. S. Laurie,
who is a member of this group, calls himself a
175
"monistic pluralist", I include him in the group,
however, because of his insistence upon God as the
176 177 178Absolute Synthesis, the ^.11, and the One.
179
The other members of the group are Edward Caird,
180 181 182
John Caird, William Wallace, R. B. Haldane,
183 184 185Otto Pfleiderer, John Watson, and Josiah Royce.
My method .will tie to discuss first, the general
presuppositions of the group; second, the doctrine
of God as immanent, and as revealing and realizing
himself in the world; third, the idea of God; fourth,
the specific relation which each of the men in the
group bears to the teleological argument. Following
(
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'an estimate of the status of this group, I shall
consider a theory which may be regarded as a
corollary, namely, God as manifested through history,
(1) Presuppositions.
Edward Caird says that the three ideas
named by Kant, namely, the world, the self and God,
are all three "presuppositions of our intelligence", 1 ^6
that the idea of a unity which "transcends all the
187
oppositions of f initude" , is also presupposed, and
that religious consciousness is of that being who is
thus presupposed. God is "the unity presupposed in all
being and .ill thought." His brother, John Caird,
states that the Infinite Mind, as the constitutive
principle of nature and of finite minds, is "that on
it 189
which all finite thought rests as its presupposition.
Wallace declares also that men's intellects, instead of
"making" the gods, are merely "presupposing" them,
and this presupposition, evidently, he considers as
n ... . 190legitimate
•
R. B. Haldane's presuppositions are more
obscurely stated, but at the beginning of his second
volume he declares categorically that "the Ultimate
Reality is Mind"
, an(} ©n the same page he says that
192
"all knowledge is.... making explicit what is implicit."
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Pfleiderer holds that because we think causally, we
must presuppose that the hanging together of cause
and effect is due to the fact that both are grounded
193
"in the supra-temporal logical principle
Watson's contention is that "every conception by
which we characterize the world of our experience is
a special form of the single category of rational
194
unity." Royce expresses his presupposition as
follows
:
"Our whole theory presupposes that
individuals may be included within
other individuals; that one life,
despite its unique ethical signifi-
cance, may form part of a larger
life; and that the ties which bind
various finite individuals together
are but hints of the unity of all
individuals in the Absolute Indiv-
idual." (195)
I do not find in Laurie's work any pre-
supposition akin to those acknowledged above. He
has insisted at one point that "our method must be
the analysis of our individual selves as conscious
195b
of object and self-conscious". When we come
to the point of discussing the relation of various
members of this group to the teleological argument,
we shall find that Laurie's method is much more in
accord with that of the teleologists
.
<
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It is clear that if God is presupposed it is
hardly necessary to present an argument for his
existence. In general this is just what the members
of the group agree upon. An estimate of their
theories in relation to the teleological argument
must be concerned first of all with the validity of
such presuppositions as we have here stated.
(2) The immanence of God.
The idea of God, immanent in the world,
and revealing and realizing himself in nature and in
the minds of men is common to all this group.
196
Edward Caird speaks of God's transcendence also.
John Caird speaks of God as "inward Spirit in and
through which all things live and move and have their
197being." He insists also that God "fulfils himself,
TOO
realizes his own nature
"
AO in the world, and
especially in the life of man. Wallace finds in
evolution the evidence that "the whole organic
kingdom is a systematic unity, the unveiling in time
199
and place of one grand plan." Haldane insists
that final reality is l.:ind, and that of it we are
200
only phases.
Laurie, starting out with his analysis of
our individual selves, makes "mind-finite in presence
(
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of an object" the datum out of which he develops the
idea of "Mind-universal". For w if God be not immanent
201
in the man-mind, He is nowhere. 11
Pfleiderer calls God the "Infinite Spirit",
believing that he reveals himself in the rational order
202
of the world according to law and purpose. Watson
looks on reality as a "self-consistent unity,
differentiating itself in individuals", and he
declates that the world becomes a cosmos for us only
203
when it is conceived to be a "manifestation of Mind."
Royce*s "fourth Conception of Being" which he
approves as his own, is that one plan is fulfilled
204
through the lives of the many.
If the idea that God's existence is pre-
supposed is one which endangers the validity of the
teleological argument, or renders it and all
arguments useless, so also the idea of God as
immanent, without being at the same time transcend-
ent, strikes at the conception of God as the cause
and creator of the world, especially as the
teleological argument has been traditionally allied
with the point of view that God is external to the
world
.
(3) The idea of God.
The conception of God as infinite self-
<t
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consciousness is expressed by the two Cairds.
Ha,ldane expresses the same thought, insisting that
God is I.Iind, but not at all Cause or Substance.
He declares that the world is formed not by causes,
207but always by ends and purposes, Pfleiderer
speaks also of God's self-consciousness, and adds the
attribute of goodness, for he believes God to be the
208
commander and creator of the good. He speaks
further of God as "superpersonal." 2^ Watson's God
210
is Mind and rational unity. L urie's God is the
211
"One in Many", a term which justifies him in
calling his system a "monistic pluralism". He
speaks of the content of the Absolute as being
212
n teleologico-causal Royce's absolute is defined
213
in terms of purpose.
In addition to these general ideas of God,
two others are added which approach the status of
arguments. The first is the idea of development,
the second the idea of synthesis
Edward Caird and Pfleiderer see in the
process of evolution and in the general history of
the world a sign that God communicated himself to
human consciousness and that, through long tortuous
ages, man is working around again to the point of
realizing God's purpose in the world. The organic
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process of development manifests the unity of the
214
principle which is back of it.
Edward Caird, Pfleiderer and Laurie see also
in God the principle of synthesis. Caird speaks of
the three stages or forms of consciousness, the first
when the objective consciousness rules his thoughts,
the second when self-consciousness prevails, and the
third when both of the first two forms are subordinated
to the consciousness of God, which is the presuppos-
215
ition and the end of both. L urie's theory is
unique and terminologically difficult. God is the
"Absolute Synthesis". Laurie traces the development
of knowledge in man's experience from pure feeling to
sensation and then to pure thought. Each ascending
plane contains the lower, and 11 presentations at
these planes are equally valid. The self-conscious
spirit of man when it rightly understands its place
in the vast system of the universe _is "God feeling
and thinking His finite externalisation in and
216
through a finite." On its finite subjective side
the Absolute Synthesis is "Experience in the grip of
217
the Dialectic," and by "experience" Laurie means
the universals of feeling and sense. On its
objective side, the xlbsolute Synthesis is "Unconditioned
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Being conditioning itself in the modality of Time
and Space in the form of the Dialectic „218
Pfleiderer ealls God the "Unity of the True
219
and the Good," and recognizes God as the synthesis
of another pair of opposites, the world of consciousness
220
and the world of existence.
(4) Relation to the teleological argument.
It remains for us to discover what, aside
from the general relations already discussed, the
specific relation of each Lecturer in the group is to
the teleological argument.
Edward Caird makes no direct statement
concerning the argument, but restates and defends the
ontological proof, in terms of an "ultimate unity
between thought and reality, which is postulated in
221the very act of opposing them." John Caird also
makes no mention of the teleological argument, but
attacks the cosmological
,
saying that it assumes the
reality of the finite world, and infers from this
reality an infinite cause or creator; the argument is
invalid because "an infinite with a finite world
222
outside of it" is a contradiction of terms. He
opposes deism because it makes God an external
contriver, and such a contriver is no God but only
223
a colossal man with limited power. He opposes the
<
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distinction between natural and revealed theology on
the ground that revealed truth cannot be of a different
order from any other sort of truth. The idea of God
as "one with humanity, having His highest manifesta-
tion in a human person and life, and dwelling in us by
His spirit" is a more satisfactory conception than
224
that of God as First Cause or external creator.
William Wallace opposes Paley's work on the
ground that things are not external to each other as
225Paley thought, but are in "organic interconnexion."
Haldane holds also that God cannot be
conceived as the cause of the universe or as creator
from the outside. He does acknowledge "beauty,
goodness, godliness" as aspects of the world" under
226
which mind presents itself." Pfleiderer claims
that the old scholastic demonstrations" no longer
227
hold good", but that the truth of the belief in
God still remains the object of our reflection. He
228
restates the ontological argument in Caird f s terms,
holds that beauty and morality are evidences for
229
God's existence, and that, psychologically
viewed, God's existence can be proved from the idea
230
of retribution.
Watson discusses in detail the Kantian
disproof of the teleological argument, and Hegel's
<
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reply to Kant. He himself sees little good in the
traditional statement of the argument. He disapproves
* the idea of God as external creator, sees in the argument
the difficulty involved in God's either making his own
material and then refashioning it, which would be a
proof that he was limited in power to begin with, or
working upon a material that he did not make in the
first place, which equally implies limitation of his
231
power. He must therefore resign the old conception
of God as external designer and substitute the idea of
232
God as "immanent purpose, order and system."
Especially inconceivable is the idea that God contrives
men as an architect contrives a house, for, if we
suppose that men seek to realize ends mechanically
dictated for them by God, we must conclude that man is
not self-determined. The alternative is the idea that
God is immanent in man, and that when man realizes his
own true nature he is attaining to a consciousness of
233
God's real n.-.ture. kg in, in the matter of man's
moral nature, it is incorrect to speak of God as "moral
governor", for this implies that God imposes his laws,
as an external power, upon man who is compelled to obey
them simply because they are thus imposed. We must
conceive of God rather as imnrnent in man's conscience,
"The providence of God works, and can only work,
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through the free consent of man."
Laurie does not discuss theis'tic arguments
as such, but his method is quite in accord with that
employed in the teleological argument. He says," it
is our prerogative, as it is our duty, to know God by
and in the things that He has made." He is not
speaking of theistic arguments here, but rather is
developing his conception of the subject-object
relation by which a "potential subject", both passive
and .ctive in character, receives and builds up within
itself the object, which is "Experience", thus filling
up its potentiality" with all the proffered fulness."
The spirit of the statement, however, is compatible
with the method of the teleological argument.
Royce's system is so unique that it is
difficult to determine his precise opinion. His
method does not correspond to that of the others we
have studied, though L urie's approach from the point
of view of psychology and epistemology
,
starting with
an investigation of man's own finite experiences may
be said to have affiliations with it. Royce has
discussed finite ideas, and has concluded that they
can be defined always in terms of purposes, fulfilled,
but not completely fulfilled. He argues from this
conclusion to the idea of the Absolute, defined also
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in terms of purpose, and his problem- then is to find
a place in the universe both for finite beings and
for nature. His method, of investigating finite
experience first and drawing his conclusions con-
cerning the nature of the Absolute, is therefore not
out of harmony with the spirit of the teleological
argument, even though Royce's study is primarily
of human purposes and only secondarily of the role
of nature, while the teleological argument starts
with what is to be found in nature. Lurie's study
also is of human experience. Both start, however,
with relatively few presuppositions, certainly
without the presupposition of all-inclusive Mind as
the unity of all experience. Royce's conclusion is,
however, that all finite purposes are partial
expressions of the divine will, and that their
fulfillments are partial fulfillments of the divine
236
meaning. We should not speak of purposes,
whether divine or human, as causing their own
fulfillment, but should say rather that from the
point of view of the absolute the "genuine knowledge
of the absolute purpose, as an empirical fact, is
its own fulfillment. Nothing exists except as it
fulfills purpose. Divine purpose is fulfilled

91
through a "wealth of experience", but through
selection of the facts which express the desired
meaning and of the "individual determination of the
meaning itself." A similarly selective character
257
belongs to finite will also. Thus does Royce
seek to avoid a deterministic system, by allowing
selection both on the part of the Absolute and of
finite wills.
So much for his general idea of finite-
infinite purpose. He does not deny that the world
of facts exists, but declares that "facts" are not
final , and that finally they can be linked in a
238
teleological unity. This world of fact, of
nature, cannot be conceived mechanically; even
material nature has so many characteristics in
common with "conscious nature," in the fact that
many of its processes are irreversible, in its
tendency towards forming "habits", and towards"com-
munication" of its parts, and in the constancy of
its rhythms, even in the processes of evolution,
that we may conclude it is incorrect to speak of
nature as "unconscious . "^3S Nature is no
"arbitrarily determined realm of valid experiences
founded only in God's creative will and man's
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sensory life", but may be said to be an "orderly
realm of genuine conscious life", as a "sign" that
240
other finite conscious selves are present.
In his general method, then, Royce is not
out of accord with the teleological argument; in his
statements concerning the realm of facts as a realm
which is a teleological unity, and in his general idea
of order in nature, he is stating evidence that is
used by the teleologists as an argument for God»s
existence. In his insistence that God did not ar-
bitrarily determine the realm of nature, and his
general emphasis of God or the Absolute as defined in
terms of purpose, not as cause, he differs from the
defenders of the old argument, and we shall have to
examine his position in the general estimate of this
group. I proceed at this point to the task, examin-
ing first the general positions held by the group,
then the validity of the position taken by each mem-
ber to the argument.
The general method and presuppositions of
the group just discussed are invalid for a study of
the problem of whether God exists, and what his
attributes are. Hegel, to whom most of this group
acknowledge allegiance, and to whom all owe a great
debt for their conclusions and even for their
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terminology, asserts in his Logic that there ms
great danger in assumptions and postulates. He says
"All other assumptions cjid postulates
must in like manner be left behind
at the entrance to philosophy, whether
they are derived from the intellect or
the imagination. For philosophy is
the science, in which every such
proposition must first be scrutinized
and its meaning and oppositions be
ascertained." (241)
Oaird himself rises above his presupposition of
"wholeness" to say that "a philosophy that would be
thorough in its idealism, must stoop from the intui-
tion of the whole to the detailed investigation of tl
parts.-
242
It does not seem to me that he has lived
up to this ideal. The "whole" of which all finite
beings are presumed to be parts, is, after all, not
the datum of experience, and it is true that the
interest of this group in the Absolute which is t..e
unity and the whole of experience, even when it is
defined in terms of mind or even of personality, has
obscured the obvious fact that there ard marks of
243
pluralism in the universe as we experience it.
Now the datum as experienced is not the Absolute nor
244
any Whole, but a conscious self. If the Absolute
is known, it is known by an inference from this
datum. The presuppositions of this group should be
only regarded as hypotheses to be proved. Their
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mihod, therefore, cannot be substituted for the
method used in the teleological argument, of examining
finite experience, and inferring God's existence from
what is found there.
This group has rightly emphasized the immanace
of God, and their arguments against deism that would
make God wholly external are on the whole well taken.
They have not spoken sufficiently of his transcendence,
and even, as with Edward Caird, where he is made
transcendent as well as immanent, there seems to be
very little function for that transcendence. Unless
God be also transcendent, his immanence necessarily resolves
the theory into some form of the pantheism they
unanimously deplore. They are afraid of the con-
ception of God as cause or as creator, because these
terms seem to connote an external God; if reinterpreted
in terms of intelligence, will, and purpose, and
applied to God who is immanent as well as transcendent,
causation and creativity may well be attributed to God,
indeed there seems to be no way to avoid pantheism
if this is not done.
There is a marked tendency to substitute for
the idea of nature as created or designed by God the con-
ception of nature as "revealing* God, of God "realising"
himself through material and human nature.
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I do not see the difference between the two ideas,
if it be granted that God is both immanent and
transcendent. The difficulty comes, I believe, in
under-emphasizing or in denying the factor of trans-
cendence .
245
There is, particularly with Haldane, a
/\
disparagement of the role which feeling plays, and a
declaration which amounts almost to a boast, that the
idea of God shall be built by purely intellectual
processes. The argument that God's existence is to
be proved by religious experience forms another sec-
246
tion of this chapter, and it need not be discussed
at this point. William James, reviewing Caird's work,
states as his conclusion the belief that "the attempt
to demonstrate by purely intellectual processes the
truth of the delivera-nces of direct religious exper-
247ience is absolutely hopeless." He says also that
he believes that Caird has "simply reaffirmed the in-
dividual's experiences in a more generalized vocabu-
248
lary." However this may be, it seems to be true
that purely intellectual constructions, abstracted
from the realm of experience can result only in the
forming of dubious hypotheses. The treatment of the
problem of evil, which forces itself from the realm of
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experience into the thought of this group is an in-
stance of the embarrassment which problems of actual
experience cause those who try to demonstrate by
purely intellectual considerations. The problem of
249
evil will be discussed in another chapter. We
shall find, I believe, that many of the issues raised
by the problem are avoided by this group with the
possible exception of Laurie.
Concerning the various conceptions of God,
there seems to be a general agreement on his immanence.
If he be merely immanent, there is difficulty in find-
ing a meaning in the other attributes ascribed to him.
Haldane as well as others speak of him as self-
conscious mind, seeming to arrive at that conclusion
first by declaring that God and reality are identical,
a fact which they do not prove but assume , and then
passing over to the idea that reality is self-
conscious mind. In Haldane »s case he seems to arrive
at this latter position by use of Berkeley ! s " esse is
percipi "
,
yet he bases the latter proposition, not as
Berkeley did, upon empirical data, but by sheBr intel-
lectualistic conclusions. We may well question both
propositions. In all these theories there is too
much the tendency to "convert the sum-total of the
relations of God and the world into a theory of
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identity", and in such cases to speak of distinct
attributes of God is to utter meaningless phrases.
Pfleiderer's " superpersonal" God needs ex-
251planation, for as has elsewhere been st ted, if
personality is the highest category we know, it is
meaningless to refer to that which is higher than
personality. Ke might better have defined God as a
person, but as a person whose perfections, for instance,
far exceed our own.
Haldane and Royce have built their theories
around the conception of purpose. Haldane, as we have
seen, st.rts out with the assumption that God is reality
and that reality is mind. He goes on to declare that
it is ends that explain the universe and not causes.
Scott, reviewing Haldane 1 s book, speaks of the diffi-
culty connected with Haldane' s theory of ends and
252
categories. They seem in many of Haldane 1 s state-
ments to be disassociated, so that it might seem that
he believed that we have 11 on the one hand ends to
serve, und on the other hand categories with which to
25**
serve them" , a position which is not in keeping
with Hegel's own view whereby each successive category
breaks down because of its contradictoriness and be-
cause the end which it served has been superceded, and
the contradictory category gives place to a higher one.
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In Haldane 's view, with ends and categories separated,
any end might give way to any other. Haldane is thus
yielding to the tendency of anthropomorphism which he
laments in others. We have to ask of Haldane, then,
the relation between his "ends" and his "categories."
Haldane differs from Royce in holding that we start
not with purposes but with individual forms, and that
satisfied purposes are "features of individuality",
254
not "explanations of it." If Haldane actually held
to this belief consistently his system would be entire-
ly changed. He is, like Bosanquet, too much interested
not in individuals but in the One Individual. "We
have found," he says, "that universal and particular
are only abstract aspects of a single and indivisible
255
reality which is always individual in character."
Royce endeavors in his system to find a place
for the individual self and finite purpose within the
Absolute Purpose, but there is still difficulty in
finding any organic relationship between the infinite
and any particular finite portion. That he should
base the conclusion that material nature is not un-
conscious but simply uncommunicative on the fact that
in four respects material and conscious nature seem to
resemble each other, seems a hasty step. This is not
the place to discuss the theory of nature, which will
X
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be considered later, but in his effort to make every
part of the universe instinct with purpose, it seems
to me, Royce here oversteps the mark. As Dewey points
out, he seems here to leave ideal constructions and
to seek literal experiences. We question not the use
of empirical data, but the selection of the particular
facts he chooses rather than others, and the hasty
conclusion based upon them. Furthermore, how can the
Absolute, in working our its purposes, be both "selec-
tive" and all-inclusive, as Royce insists it is? How
can it fail to absorb every possibility within its all-
inclusiveness? Finite "selection" is easier to under-
st nd, for Royce does not ascribe all-inclusiveness to
the finite being, but it is difficult to see how Royce
can make both principles imperative for the one
Absolute
.
The conception of development may well be part
of the teleological argument, if it is used within
limits. If we speak of the process of development as
being an argument for God because of the fact that man
is its crown, the argument seems dubious. How shall
we know when the "crown" of development is reached?
Would not the recognition of development through the
ages rather lead us to believe that man is not the
culmination of the process, and that there are higher
forms yet to come? That is to say, the argument from
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development must not "become homocentric. It can well
be considered, however, as the method by which God
works
.
The idea of God as Ultimate or Absolute
Synthesis seems to me to be a conception that needs to
be used with caution. Caird's "Synthesis" seems t o be
in danger on the one hand of being a bare unity, and
on the other of becoming the "AIT which is meaningless.
Laurie's terminology is difficult. Muirhead believes
that he is not careful in his logical analysis of the
nature of affirmation and negation, and that he is
especially careless in not determining the relation
257
"between difference and contradiction." If this be
true, it may well be that his "synthesis" is not a true
synthesis between a thesis and a direct antithesis.
In other words, "Synthesis", is a term and a conception
to be used with caution. Is it truly a unity which
transcends a thesis and an antithesis, or is it a
barren "Allness" that ultimately means nothing? ^re we
sure, on the other hand, that the thesis had a direct
antithesis, that the antithesis is contradictory? It
may be that the antithesis is only different from, not
contradictory to, the thesis. God could still be
distinguished from, and yet give unity to, the world
of phenomena.
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Laurie's "Unconditioned" is like the "Pure
258
Being" of Hamilton and Spencer, Everett finds,
without predicates and unknowable. Like the conception
of God as Absolute Synthesis, this conception of the
Unconditioned, unknowable, but the object of mystic
intuition, needs further treatment. Laurie's idea
of evil as indicating that God is a Spirit but "in
259difficulty" is more fruitful and hardly consistent
with the doctrine either of synthesis or of the
"unconditioned."
As to the specific relation of each of the
group to the teleological argument, we have found
Pfleiderer distinctly friendly. He believes the old
scholastic arguments are untenable, but recognizes
beauty and moral order in the universe, and sees an
evidence of God's presence in the fact of development
in nature and in man. Laurie's method is not unfriend-
ly to the argument. The Cairds and Kaldane oppose the
conception of cause, insisting on the immanence of God.
I have pointed out that their theories are pantheistic
unless they develop God's transcendence. Haldane , how-
ever, has recognized beauty, goodness, and godliness
as manifestations of God, and is not out of sympathy
therefore, with certain lines of the teleological
argument. Y/allace's opposition to P?-ley need not
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detain us long. His theory of a "primordial organic
connexion" between things is presupposition only; he
makes no systematic opposition to the traditional
arguments, and his cautious avoiding of the main doc-
trines of evolution, his insistence that it is work-
ing hypothesis only, shows he is still in doubt con-
cerning the issue of design versus natural selection.
Royce has spoken of order and system in
nature, and is not out of harmony with the argument
in these respects. The bearing which his doctrine of
"uncommunicative" though not unconscious nature, has
upon the conception of teleology will be discussed
later; it has been pointed out, however, that Royce
bases this conclusion rather hastily on a few
empirical facts.
Watson's objections to the argument will not
be considered in full at this point. Two criticisms
may be made here, however, bearing upon his general
theory. The first has already been noted, the diffi-
culty of extricating God, immanent but not trans-
cendent, from pantheism. The second is an internal
inconsistency. He has objected to the theory of God
involved in the teleological argument, for that argu-
ment, he says, makes God the external creator of the

103
world, of the material of which the world is made.
This conception must be rejected, for it makes God in
some way responsible for the origin of the world, or
it makes him limited by the world, if we conceive the
world as originated before he designed it in its
present form. Now in speaking of Lamarckian and
Darwinian evolution W tson takes the example of the
eye of the mollusc and the eye of the vertebrate , and
notes that the development of the two has gone on in
a similar way. The Darwinian hypothesis would explain
all in terms of accidental variation, but cannot ex-
plain the appearance of differences not the appearance
of correlated flif ferences ; Lamarckian "effort" also
fails to account for the origins. He concludes that
? neither the neo-Darwinian nor the neo-Lamarckian
theory .... can be regarded as a complete and adequate
explanation of the process by w! icl species have
originated. (Italics mine.) He has objected to
the teleological argument as offering the idea that
God originated the world; now he objects to the
evolutionary hypothesis as offering an incorrect solu-
tion of the origin of the world. What is his own
view? Watson gives no answer. If he had left out
this treatment of the origin of the eye of the
mollusc and vertebrate respectively, he might have
<
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avoided the issue. \s it is, he has objected both to
the religious view and the scientific hypo the sis. He
himself offers no solutions
The conclusions to be drawn from a consider-
ation of this group is that their presuppositions are
unjustified, the problem of evil largely ignored, and
the ideas of God advanced as substitutes for the
ordinary ideas of theism unsuitable, for immanence
without transcendence is easily resolved into pan-
theism, "superpersonality" is meaningless unless ex-
plained, and more needs to be said about God and
finite beings defined in terms of purpose exclusively
.
On the other hand, there §as been recognition of the
facts of beauty, order, and system in the world, and
the theory of development can be brought in as part
of the evidence of design, if the term be properly
defined. The lesson to be drawn from the group is
the necessity of conceiving God as immanent. It is
true that older theologies have underestimated the
fact of immanence. It needs reemphasis, but not at
the expense of excluding God's transcendence.
(5) Corollary: God as manifested through
the course of history.
The "historical proof for the existence of
God is closely allied to the ideas just elucidated,
i
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of God as immanent in the process of development. One
of the first Gifford Lecturers to put this proof into
actual form was F. Max Muller, who states it in
several forms throughout his four volume work on
261
religion. He is thoroughly in sympathy with the
meaning of natural theology as defined "by Lord
Gifford himself, maintaining throughout the thesis
that the history of religion proves that "the human
mind was able by its own inherent powers to ascend
from nature to nature's gods, and, in the end, to the
262
God of nature." He sets about his proof of the
thesis by historical investigation. He finds that
"given man such as he is, and given the world, such
as it is, a belief in divine beings and, at last, in
one Divine Being, is not only a universal, but an
263
inevitable fact." The term" evolution" holds no
terrors for him; rather, it is looked upon as a "very
old friend", for he knew it in its German setting,
Entwickelung. The idea of God has come as the result
of a long historical process or development; it has
been an unfolding conception, not a sudden revelation.
Miracles, therefore, there are not, save that they are
264
"of our own making and of our own unmaking." We
cannot help conceiving events in terms of cause and
effect, and even if we were to find that the world is
chaos, we would still hold to faith in causality, since
<
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chaos is its {legation; "we could not deny causality
265
without first having conceived it." Before man
\ ever conceived supernatural beings he must have
perceived something infinite; the conception of the
Infinite, however, came later than the naming and
worshipping of infinite sky, infinite earth and
266
infinite sea. This last thesis is to be noted,
for it is at this point that Caird, the other defender
of the historical argument, disagrees-
Now the "historical proof" as stated by
Muller is that the hunger, weakness, and incomplete-
ness of human nature all through history testifies
to the existence of something which is beyond
finite knowledge. In its simplest terms it is the
argument that "where there is an act there must be an
agent, where there is something finite there must be
267
something infinite." The argument thus stated has,
perhaps, more affiliations with the cosmological
than with the teleological argument. Muller
demonstrates it by pointing to historical religions,
not to the development of thought of individuals,
and the most he wants to prove is the universality of
the belief in an infinite being, that is, in a
something that is beyond the finite.
Edward Caird states the argument in
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different form. It is the "long, unhasting,
268
unresting process of the evolution of religion"
in which he is primarily interested. This process,
he says, proves that there is a divine meaning in the
universe and that mankind has not sacrificed in vain
269
"upon the altar of an unknown or unknowable God."
That the development has been troubled only proves
the more that God has been present in the process.
Even the very turbulence of the stream of progress
has its healing virtues. We are to look not at man's
270beginnings but "what he ends with" in religious
convictions, and it is the steady, relentless
progress towards perfection of belief in the one
Divine Being that is the best proof of his imminence.
Caird criticizes Muller's definition and de-
velopment of the idea of religion as consciousness of
the infinite* He doubts Holler's evidence for the
thesis that a perception of the infinite is prior in
time to the worship of supernatural beings, believing
that it can be as easily demonstrated that such
worship must come first. Mailer's "infinite" is
only "bare negation of the fini te . . .only another
271
finite", he contends* This idea of a mere
negation of the finite must be carried further; it
must be developed into an idea of an infinite which
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is not negation of the finite but "its positive
272
presupposition,"
f
} The criticism is hardly fair, for Muller has
been discussing the psychological origins of the idea
of God, and Caird the metaphysical basis of the same
idea. Muller' s evidence for the historical proof on
a psychological basis is far more weighty than Caird 's
metaphysical presupposition. Indeed, the difficulties
connected with Caird 's view have already been
discussed,
Muller' s argument is: (1) The universality
of the belief in an infinite being or beings, in all
times, among all peoples is the best proof of the
existence of God. (2) The very incompleteness of
finite life is a further argument that completion
must be possible, that God must exist to satisfy our
hunger, longings, highest beliefs, and to transcend
our finitude. Caird adds a third argument: (3) The
development, growth in perfection, and persistency
of religious thought through history is a proof of
God's existence. Each part of this proof will be
examined.
(1) The universality of the belief in God.
The evidence Max Muller presents -is
imposing-* Judging by the mass of material he
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presents, there is decided reason to believe that
this consciousness of the infinite may be, and may
\ always have been, universal. The following defects
in this argument, considered as a proof must be noted:
(A) The lack of complete evidence. Millier is
limited as are .11 men by lack of complete evidence
to prove that all men everywhere have been conscious
of an infinite. Indeed, many anthropologists insist
that such a belief is far from being universal. In
our own generation and stratum of society, further-
more, it is a common experience to become acquainted
with those people who have fallen away from such
beliefs, if they ever held them. (B) Even if it
could be proved that there were such a universality
of belief, it is difficult to identify such an
infinite with God. Liuller himself admits that the
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"infinite" is a mere "beyond", and that centuries
of time have been required to perfect the conception
of God. It seems to me that we may yet question
whether the conception is perfect. Unless we be
over-confident and self-satisfied, moreover, we
must still admit that centuries of time, reflection
and progress, perhaps the future life itself, must
come ere we attain to a perfect knowledge of God.
(C) If it sould be proved that universally men
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believed- the same thing concerning God, the belief
would not necessarily be true. Beliefs once
cherished, if not by all, at least by the great
majority of the people, have been proved false, for
example, the flatness of the earth, and the belief
that the sun revolved about the earth. Thought
does not and cannc t by its very nature remain static.
I conclude that Muller's first thesis is false, that
his statement is unproved and unprovable, and that
even if proved, the statement could not mean that we
have a God worthy of worship, nor could it be true,
necessarily, that God exists.
(2) The incompleteness of finite life.
This argument hardly fares better. Which
of the many gods believed in by men through history
is to satisfy this incompleteness? There were Greeks
who required at least twelve, animists require innumer-
able deities. Even from the point of view of
quantity, Muller's statement about the infinite
appears to be indefinite, to say nothing of the
attributes or qualities of the infinite who is to
complete the finite self, and satisfy his hunger.
There are even those in our own day who find the
"infinite" in Muller's sense, not in God but in
human society, believing it to be the highest
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satisfaction of the longing of individual men.
This statement by Muller tells little and proves
leas.
(3) The development, growth and persistency
of the belief in God,
Caird insists that we shall look not at the
beginnings of religious belief but at its final
perfection, the idea of God, for instance, as
represented by Jesus. But, judging especially by
this very test of growth, of long history, we cannot
say that we now possess the final idea of God. May
it not be that there are stages of higher development
in the future, if not in the idea of God as one,
still in the conception of his attributes? Looking
down the years and ahe-'.d to the centuries to come,
if we judge by the past, we cannot conclude that we
have reached the end of the journey. Furthermore,
the conception seems fa.ulty as a proof of God's
immanence, for the reason that, according to Caird 's
belief, the earliest conceptions of God were faulty
and even base, perfection in belief coming only in
later ye^rs. If God has been immanent in the process
from the beginning, on the line of thought that Caird
has stated here, he must be either capricious and
favoritistic
,
willing to deceive men into false
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conceptions of him at first, letting only later ages
see him °.s he really is, or he has been growing and
developing with the years. Neither of these
alternatives would be adopted by Caird, yet either
one is a possible nd logical inference from his
statement
.
Neither Caird nor Muller is particularly
interested, in these volumes, in the teleological
argument, and their works would have been classified
in the first group, of those who have not treated
the subject, and whose works are largely irrelevant,
were it not for the fact that they offer a substitute
argument or proof, and one of the tasks of this
dissertation is an estimation of all alternative
proofs offered by Gifford Lectures. The "historical
proof" does not qualify as a formidable opponent of
the teleological argument.
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(B) Go-d as manifested in natural law and in
man's nature.
Edward Caird, in re-stating the ontological
argument, claimed that there was a unity between
thought and "being which was ultimate, and which was
274
postulated in the very act of opposing them, an
Absolute who transcended the differences between
them. Pfleiderer declared that in the reciprocal
relatedness between the world of consciousness and
the world of existence there is evidence that God,
275
as their ordering principle, is present. In his
276
Philosophy of Theism , A. C. Fraser -rgues in a
similar way that there is a pre-established harmony
between our thought and the course of nature, so
that we learn to look upon nature as dependent upon
277
the Divine Mind. He does not dwell long upon this
point, however, but goes on to show that the general
facts of natural law, and above all, man's own nature,
2 78lead us to believe in God. H. M. Gwatkin develops
a similar theory, and this section will be devoted to
an examination of this line of thought.
Fraser opposes all theistic proofs which
pretend to be conclusive arguments, but upholds them
if each is regarded as illustrating certain "specula-
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tive_. -Mid practical principles which underlie theistic
279
faith." The teleological argument should be used
to apply not to specific and unimportant instances of
adaptation in nature, but to adaptation in "cosmical
evolution as a whole, when viewed as a natural
process that has been continuously leading on towards
-280
the evolution of man" , for it is upon man that all
natural adaptations seem to converge. The argument is
really of little value without the presupposition of
God as reason, as good, as eternal, and as active.
When such a presupposition is made, adaptations seem
to .conform, but without it the teleological argument
has little meaning. Now if we presuppose God, and
admit the evidence for him in designed nature,
evolution will seem not an opposed theory but will be
looked upon as one practical way of proving the truth
that if the only creative power possible is "morally
intending" spirit, it must work through "continuous
growth", or evolution, not through only occasional
281
production. Nature's laws must necessarily proceed
from an active intelligence that "understands the
282
rules? They may thus be regarded as the temporal
process adapted to man's moral and intellectual
constitution, and nature itself looked upon as the
medium by which persons are to be trained in intellect
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and spirit. ->nd if n-ture seems to reveal God, so
much the more does man, with his "timeless necessity
of ethical obligation" -nd his inability to interpret
himself and his environment if the universe be an
accident, or if its final purpose be regarded as
284
"deluding and diabolical." Man's very nature de-
mands that God exist. Man stands intermediate be-
tween God and nature, sharing the , attributes of both,
but in his moral nature, -s a person, he rises above
nature to the divine principle.
Fraser rejects the pantheistic idea of God,
and the idea that miracles are performed, for, he
says, the "perpetual existence of the cosmos" is God 1
285
"constant miracle." The chief obstacle to theism
is evil, and in evil the hardest problem to solve is
sin, for pain is a means of educating for the spirit-
ual life, and even moral evil may be perfectly consis
ent with the moral ideal of the world, because, for
all we know, it may be an evidence of God's goodness
that he allows individu Is to exist, with all the
risks implied of goodness and badness, in order that
they may learn responsibility and realize a more
perfect ideal than could be realized in a universe
where evil did not exist. 286
H. If. Gwatkin defines God as a "personal
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Being above us" whose goodness is his most important
287
attribute. His existence cannot be demonstrated,
but neither can the existence of the .world nor of the
self. We are "driven" to a belief in God by the
•moral necessity" of finding a c --use for persons and
for things beyond scientific forces and sequences.
We are tlrivem" to it again in order to account for
pop
the origin of life and consciousness and conscience.
The argument from design is insufficient be-
cause it, and evolution, deal not with origins but
only with processes of development. Evolution,
moreover, leaves out of account the "breaks" in its
process, and cannot explain the existence of beauty
289
and of other values. The evidence for design,
however, is indisputable, and the objection to the
argument was on the ground, not of the appearance
of design, but of the legitimacy of inferring any
reality from this appearance. Now the question of
creation is vital., and the only alternative to belief
in a creator is belief in necessity. True, the theory
of creation is only a theory and undemonstrable , but
so also is the rival theory of necessity, and the
creation theory has the advantage of presenting "cum-
ulative evidence"
,
covering all cases with a single
theory, while the theory of necessity must meet each
case with a new solution. 290
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Of the evidence which the teleological argu-
ment presents, that of special adaptations can largely
be accounted for now in terms of natural selection;
yet we still have natural laws themselves to
explain, and we can do so only on the hypothesis that
2pthe universe is ime vast organic and r ticnal whole. c
That design on God's part may differ from ours makes
no difference in the argument that he is the designer;
he chooses and coordinates means to the chosen end.
Man's laws, on the other hand, are fixed for him so
that he cannot alter them; G-od works by laws made by
292
himself. That we do not see the whole of the de-
sign of nature, and perhaps not the whole of man's,
does not mean that there is none. There are only
two serious objections to the argument, one that,
admitted the evidence of design, this could only
indicate the work of a finite being who finds diffi-
culties in his way; the other that the fact of evil
is a flat contradiction of the presence of design.
The first objection can be answered by saying that
it falls to the ground unless we know all the ends
which the creator has in view. The limits of design,
in other words,- are in a different category .from the
facts of design, and G-od can do nothing else but
work out his design subject to the properties of
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things which he himself has given to them. The
problem of evil is more difficult, but until it can
be proved th t the world is designed to produce
unmoral or immoral persons, the problem of evil can-
not be regarded as finnl . Moreover, moral evil may
be accounted for in terms of personal free will. The
problem involved in denying design raises far more
questions, since, if there be no such evidence, only
an intuition of God by individuals would be left, all
294
other means of revelationbeing denied. The ac-
ceptance of the evidence of design, on the other
hand, leads us to look upon nature as God's eternal
revelation. Yet within nature some parts reveal him
more th n others, life, for instance more than matter,
and conscience more than life. Fence man is God's
greatest revelation and it is by this revelation that
we know that God is not only one and eternal but
wise and good.
In connection with this belief, common to
both Fraser and Gwatkin, that man is God's highest
revelation, I quote J. G. Frazer's sole hint of
opinion on the matter of the teleological argument.
Were it not for this one statement, Frazer's hook
would have been regarded as irrelevant to the
subject
:
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"To the man who traces the finger of
God in the workings of his own mind,
the deity appears to "be far closer
than he seems to the man whononly
infers the divine existence from the
marvelous order, harmony, and beauty
of the external world; and we need
not v/onder that the faith of the fiormer
is of a more fervent temper and sup-
plies him with more powerful incentives
to a life of active devotion than the
calm and rational faith of the latter ."(296)
It is not difficult to see the connection
between the views expressed by Fraser and Gwatkin and
the teleological argument. They have merely taken
the concept of individual adaptations, or evidence
of individual cases or design and expanded the
principle to one of universal teleology. I think no
defender of the teleological argument would have the
slightest objection to that procedure, although he
might well question some of the statements made by
t'^ese men. Has not Gwatkin, for instance, misunder-
stood the role played both by evolution and by the
designer, as argued for in the argument from design*
He says both are solutions of the question of how
God works, theories of method, not of origin. If he
had read the whole title of D rwin's Origin of
Species
,
he would have found that Darwin was aiming
to formulate a theory not only of
evolution is carried on, but also
new species originate, namely, by
the way in which
of tae way in which
natural selection.
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The same is true of the teleological argument. The
defenders argue from design to a designer who is a
creating and originating designer. The teleological
argument is not Bharply cut off from the cosmological
it, too, deals with God as a cause; it supplements
the cosmological argument, however, by saying
something regarding the attributes of God, the cause,
Gwatkin's whole argument is akin to the cosmological;
yet, having shown the drawbacks of the teleological
proof, he makes use of the evidence of design
throughout his book. The inconsistency is due to
his original misunderstanding of the meaning of the
teleological argument.
Fraser holds that the teleological argument
has no weight unless God be first presupposed. In
connection with our previous group we have noted the
drawbacks to holding such presuppositions. It seems
to me that Fraser shifts back and forth between two
ideas in his book, on the one hand holding that God
is presupposed, and that when this is recognized, the
teleological proof has a place, and on the other
hand of arguing that the fact of natural law and of
man's moral nature seems to be a mark of God's ex-
istence. Fraser does not make it clear whether he
is arguing from nature and man to God, or, whether
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having presupposed God, he finds nature and man
reveal him. Nov; I da not see how God can be pre-
supposed; we take certain evidence from experience
and infer God's presence from it. Naturally, when
we have satisfactorily established his existence,
m'iny other factors, not taken into account in the
proof, assume new meaning, reveal God in ways we
had not seen before. Fraser seems to say that gen-
eral natural law and man's moral nature are the
strongest arguments for God, although he wavers at
times from the position of regarding these as proofs
or arguments. Then, he adds, with God proved we can
see his designs. But could it not work another way?
If, from design in nature, we were led to believe
in a wise and intelligent God, would we not see him
more cle rly than before, manifested in human life
also? There may be people Of the temperament that
seeks God in nature rather than in humanity, those
who, having found lam in nature , are able later to
see him manifested in humanity. In other words, we
may let Fraser 1 s argument stand, but not at the ex-
pense Of sacrificing the teleological argument.
Both have their pi .ce.
The objections raised to the teleological
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argument, which belong to a general treatment of the
subject, rather than being peculiar to the systems
297just exstmined will be reserved for a l^ter chapter.
Fraser's hint of a moral argument will be considered
along with the views of others bearing on the same
298
subject.
The conclusion is that, eliminating the
inconsistencies just observed, we may consider the
argument for God's existence from the fact of natural
law a legitimate argument, one which, in its emphasis
upon order -nd intelligibility, is connected with the
teleological , but which in no way substitutes for this
argument, nor contradicts it.
(C) God s the object of religious
experience
.
We have already examined the work of William
James in a consideration of those who deny the
validity of the teleological argument. 2" His system
naturally belongs in this section, yet I have not
included it here because of his uncompromising
attitude in regard to the teleological and all
arguments. His book is a study of individual
religious experiences. Two other Gifford Lecturers
have to some extent considered the same argument.
These are -A. S. Eddington, whose work has already
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been discussed, though not his views of mysticism,
301
and C. C. J. Webb.
With ths exception of the work :of James
himself, the Gifford Lectures which lay greatest stress
on religious experience are those of Webb. He opens by
declaring that he differs in opinion from Lord
Gifford in that he believes that natural theology is
not a body of truths reached independently of an
historical religion, but that it is the "result of
reflection on a religious experience mediated in
every case through a historical religion.* A defeinite
type of religious experience is, then, assumed in
every natural theology, and as for the historical
religion involved, Webb is interested in the doctrine
of the trinity as being a representation of divine
self-eonsci ousness when freed from the limitations
we experience. The doctrine, he believes, preserves
the unity of God, and God's unity and personality are
his most important aspects, indeed, personality itself
303
is a principle of unity. God is Absolute and is
Ultimate Reality, transcendent and immanent. For a
finite being the only way to reach the ultimate
satisfaction of his aspiration after 'unity is by
following Plato's injunction of seeking a vision of
(I
o
I
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the idea of the good, in the light of which all
orders of reality are good "because they are facts of
304
one system. In somewhat the same way we reach the
conception of "Personality in God." (italics mine)
Webb is careful to distinguish this conception from
that of "Personality of God", for the latter would
not bring out the trinitarian idea. Science gives
no proof of such "Personality"; it comes through
religious experience only. Just as aesthetic
experience reveals in nature a spirituality of
which apart from the experience we would not be
aware, so religious experience reveals the "Person-
ality in God", of which, apart from that experience
we would hare no Pledge?05 We know others not by
analogy to ourselves but by social intercourse, by
participating with them in common activities; in
the same way we know the Divine Personality by exper-
iencing it; just as it is possible to know others
immediately, so it is possible to have immediate
knowledge of God himself, and religion is just this
"experience of a direct personal relation to the
306
Highest." Nothing except a manifestation of
Personality could elicit such awe from us.
Personality in God is doubtless of a different form
from and in a greater degree than our own personality,
<o
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"but St least it is such as to allov for genuine personal
307
and reciprocal communion. Yvebb refers to Junes as
holding opinions like his own, and adds that it tt is
no new thing for Religion to acknowledge the
immanence of the Godhead in.... the sublimal region
308
of our spiritual life." Furthermore, acknowledg-
ment of "Personality in God" is a pragmatic help in
the solution of our principal religious problems
309
such as sin, forgiveness, sacrifice and the like.
If we are conscious of the reciprocal relationship
between ourselves and God, we must believe that God
cares for the preservation not only of certain
universal values expressed in our lives, but also of
310
our own unique personalities, and thus the
doctrine of "Personality in God" becomes the "only
true positive ground of which a Gifford Lecturer can
take cognizs-nce for a belief in future blessedness
311
and immortality."
Eddington manifests more than ordinary
interest in the experience of mysticism. We have
already observed his declaration against proofs of all
312
kinds. His chief interest is in the field of
science; he believes religion to be a matter of
surrender," not to be enforced by argument on those
(Q
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who do not feel its claim in their own nature."
Now it is in mystical felling that truth is
"apprehended from within us and is, as it should be,
314-
a faot of ourselves." By it man reaches upward
to fulfill his nature, and the sanction for the
reaching, for the striving is within ourselves, but
315
it proceeds from a "greater power." Eddington
warns his readers that by mystical states he does
not mean abnormal, but rather commonplace, everyday
experiences. These have their own sanction, and
316
concerning them men of science have nothing to say.
It will be noted that the two views expressed
here offer different accounts of the object of
religious experience. Webb believes that the
experience proves the "Personality in God";
Eddington concludes nothing at all except that the
mystical experience seems to bring us to the
consciousness that there is "something there."
Webb's definitions of God, the Absolute,
and personality, both as applied to God nd as
applied to men, are not clear. When he uses the
term" Personality in God" does he mean by God, a
common nature which all three persons of the trinity
share, or is God a substance containing three
r
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persons? He is not cle r on this point nor on the
relation of God to the absolute, .-jid are finite
beings to be thought of as persons in the same sense
that personality can be said to be attributed to
God? Sorley points out that if personality is
different in finite beings, the ground is cut away
for the personal intercourse between God and man,
and if personality is the same, then God is
manifested in two systems, one of the trinity, one
of finite beings, and he has not made it clear that
317
the two can be related*
The very difference in point of view
maintained by these three defenders of religious
experience, V.rebb, Eddington and James, is significant,
Y/ebb holding that it proves the "Personality in God"
,
Sddington that it tells us "something is there",
and James believing that the experience may be
authoritative for the individual experient, but not
318
necessarily for anyone else. The accounts of the
great mystics and our own experience testify to the
privacy of that experience, the inability to
communicate it to others. It may, as J mes says, be
authoritative for us as individuals, but it has
little value for others unless it can be translated
r
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into other terms. Moreover, one of the commonest
difficulties in religious life is the alleged lack
of reciprocity in prayer, of the inability of the
subject to "find God." This very difficulty, it
seems to me, would cause Webb's argument to be in-
conclusive, as his proof depends upon the reality
of that reciprocal experience.
The object of religious experience is
vague; the value of religious experience as a
stimulus to believing and serving God is not to be
questioned, but unless that experience can be justified,
and unless its object can be found to hold a place in
the coherent system of all life's experiences, taken
as a whole, it does not have a vital relation to the
validity of the idea of God. The teleological
argument may or my not be valid; it may not be the
sole line to follow in justifying or defending the
object of religious experience, but this experience
alone not only does not preclude the possibility of
the teleological argument, but certainly also needs
the teleological or some other argument to justify
it and give its object a definite status, else it
319
cannot be taken seriously.
r
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(D) God ?,s the ground of values.
This chapter has been gradually working
towards the conception of God as in some way vitally
related to man's life and aspirations. The first
group studied presupposed God as the unity or
synthesis of man's experience; the second group saw
God manifested in natural law, but preeminently in
man; the third argued that God's existence is proved
by man's personal religious experience. The fourth
group, by far the largest, will argue that God must
exist .s the ground of values. I shall discuss first
the views whioh hold that God is the ground of moral
values, and secondly the group which base God's
existence on the objectivity of all values.
(1) God as the ground of moral values.
The views of four of the Gifford Lecturers
who belong in this group have already been discussed;
Wallace, Bruce, Pfleiderer, and Fraser. In addition
320
L. R. Farnell's work on The Attributes of God bears
upon the subject, and the Gifford Lectures of James
321 322
Ward and lllf. R. Sorley are primarily
considerations of moral value and its significance.
Wallace has advanced the theory that the
function of morality is "not merely to keep us from
r
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falling", but it is to "teach us to love God with all
our hearts and strength and mind, and our neighbours
323
as ourselves •" Morality is not, then an argument
for God's existence, strictly speaking, but it has an
emotion .1 function; God himself as we have seen, is
presupposed by Wallace. He is not out of harmony with
the rest of the group, however, for by "loving God"
he means to imply that God is good, and that morality,
by the very place which it holds in hum .n life, is
an argument for the goodness of God.
A. B. Bruce, ;.s we have noted, attempts to
rule out the traditional :rguments, yet he holds that
the progressive development of the universe is an
evidence of God's imminence, and he emphasizes the
development of the moral order as especially
324
significant. He approves the "ethical movements"
of his time, and the love of virtue for its own sake,
but holds that the guidance and inspiration of the
God of religion is necessary in all such developments.
He believes in immortality, and holds that the chief
325
argument for it must be the moral argument.
Pfleiderer concurs in the opinion that
morality needs religion; he believes further that
man's longing for freedom and satisfaction can be
satisfied only by surrender of individual to divine
(
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will, and assimilation with the Perfect Ideal, or
326
God. The fact that this is true proves we are all
descended from God and that he implants these moral
longings in us. Badness is simply had will, a
327
falling away from this Ideal.
Fraser argues that it is in the exercise of
the morally responsible will tht man rises above the
merely physical and impersonal realms, and that the
presence of such a will illustrates the fact of a
328
divine presence working in him. The very "timeless
necessity of ethical obligation" is justification
for believing that "the theistic or moral conception"
329
is the final one.
Farnell speuks of an "intuitive perception
of moral values", which is the background for moral
judgments, and he claims that these and all value-
judgments belong to a spiritual order which is
330
"permeated with the power and essence of God."
Farnell is open-minded on the subject of a finite
God, but believes that the conception "lends itself
331
to dualism." He freely admits the presence of
evil in the world and acknowledges that if God is
omnipotent, and absolute lord of all matter, he
"might be logically imagined to have shaped it more
332
mercifully."
r
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The difficulties in the general theories
of all but Farnell have been discussed. Pfleiderer
seems to be arguing in a circle in his statement of
the moral argument. Man's longing, he says, needs
fulfillment, and God must exist as this fulfillment.
The longing, then, is, in a way, an argument for
God's existence. Then Pfleiderer adds that this fact
proves that God implants the longing, and that we
are descendants of his. The question we would ask
is, What is Pfleiderer trying to prove, God's
existence or our own? He uses finite longing to
prove God, and then uses God to prove the validity
of our longing. The answer would probably be that
each implies the other, but this point Pfleiderer
does not make clear.
Farnell 's statement of the moral argument
is not unique, and may be considered as part of the
whole evidence to be estimated at the close of this
section. His statements concerning the finite God,
and the problem of evil will be considered in a later
section also; both are noteworthy.
\j rd's two books are an argument for God's
existence conceived from another point of view.
His Naturalism and Agnosticism is an argument that
r<
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natural selection as a doctrine to be held for all
cases of individuals :nd species, is not sufficient
to give a mechanical explanation of the world. For,
in the first place, the evolutionists themselves are
not agreed on the exact role which it pl-ys in life,
and at any rate it is negative and destructive when
taken alone, needing at least the fact of the
struggle for existence to give it any postitive
status. Moreover, there are positive evidences of
teleological factors operating in biological
evolution: individual variations, sexual and human
selection bear witness to the fact that mere natural
selection cannot do away with teleological factors
333
altogether. Ward summarizes the problem by
stating his view that so long as there are principles
of self-conservation at work in evolution, and so
long as there are evidences of "subjective selection",
of special environments singled out of general
environment by individuals, the only conclusion
possible is that the mechanical principles in
evolution are not final, and that teleological and
spiritual factors "underlie them and are presupposed
333b
by then." Nature itself is a teleological
process: it is conformable to human intelligence
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and amenable to human ends. Its perfect orderliness,
however, must not be mistaken for mechanical
333c
necessity.
In his Realm of Ends Ward goes on to
develop his own conception of evolution. It is not
an unfolding or expanding of what has been present
from the first, but it is an "epigenesis" , a creative
process in which new beginnings are made, this
creative process being the result of the "mutual
conflict and cooperation" of agents who act
334
spontaneously and freely. The world, in other
words, is a "realm of ends"; order and meaning in
this realm are the outcome of the purposes of the
active beings composing it. In sue: -: a realm there is
contingency of individuals and of species, but there
is a general tendency to reduce the contingency and
335
to "replace it by definite progression." But is
this the last word to be said for the "realm of ends"?
Ward answers that this doctrine, taken in itself
lacks the treatment of the full meaning of
personality, and it does not "rise high enough to come
in sight of what is meant by the Supreme good." 336
In other words, the "many" which compose the "realm
of ends" require a supreme spiritual unity before
that ralm can be seen to possess teleological
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continuity. The existence of such a Spirit is a
postulate of faith; it is not a matter of knowledge,
yet it is required on the grounds of both practical
337
and theoretical reason. Hegel 1 s conception of
the Absolute is not acceptable to Ward. Ward starts
with the "many" as real, not as derived, and with
such a start he can never arrive at an all-absorbing
Absolute. God, in Ward's system, is related to the
338
"many" , and he is limited by them.
ls for the arguments for God's existence,
Lotze's argument from interaction is to be rejected
for Lotze has left the question of the real unity of
the "many" absolutely untouched. He has attempted
to "resolve the logical universal .... into a personal
339individual"
,
and he has failed'. The traditional
arguments have serious defects; Kant's disproofs
struck a fatal blow to all of them. The teleological
argument "does not carry us beyond pluralism", and
the harmonious adaptations found in the world do
not force us to the belief that these are due solely
to one principle. That there are these adaptations,
however, is not to be denied; developments in man,
the prodigalit}*- of nature and beauty are all
340
noteworthy evidence. Nature is orderly aad its
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laws .constant. Rational agents are aa integral
part of the cosmic order, and they give meaning to
the whole, so that the "moral order is the order of
341
the world. M (italics his.)
It is at this point that Ward develops his
moral argument. The master clue to reality is the
idea of the good, and it is this which all our
strivings and ideals imply. "The further we advance",
342
he says, "the more we see of guidance and advance."
It is on the basis of belief in moral ideals that we
have faith in God and in immortality.
While he criticizes many of the grounds of
the teleological argument, Ward still appeals to
order aad system in nature, and finally, he considers
man's moral ideals as the clearest evidence of God's
existence. That he speaks of the moral order does
not take way the fact that it is order . He
criticizes the mechanical view of nature, implied
sometimes by defenders of the teleological argument;
he does net even approve the idea that nature is a
system of signs of Gq^ f or the "world of his
interacting creatures" is much clearer as a '
manifestation of God, and the necessity of nature as
a distinct medium of intercourse is unnecessary and
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hardly allowable. Ward's own view is the view of
panpsychism which, he claims, is far preferable to
the occasionalistic theory which makes nature
essential only as a medium, God is the creator of the
world and he limits himself "by his creation, but
how he creates and limits himself we cannot know. 344
As God's self-limitation, the world also exemplifies
God's self-renunciation, and we thus understand the
meaning of his love. God is a member of the "realm
of ends", although he is"the highest and, so to say,
345
the central member." Ward does not approve the
definition of God as Absolute Self-consciousness,
but he substitutes the idea of God as a creator.
Nor does he approve Royce's conception of the
"eternal knowledge" of the Absolute, for, on this
basis, the world's evolution would be as Hegel
supposed, a rehearsal after the actual symphony has
been composed; such a view maintains the One, but
346
"leaves no room for a real Many at all."
The postulation of a limited God relieves
Ward of some embarrassment when faced with the
problem of evil, still he feels compelled to discuss
that problem, and admits at the start that "God and
347Evil are contraries," and that if we admit the
existence of the first we must somehow explain and
fi
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reconcile with theism the second. Ward does not
belittle the dysteleological evidence. He speaks of
the lack of connection between worth of life as it
is estimated, and the fitness to survive as the
evolutionists see it; he mentions the fact of the
death of great and useful men from disease due to
microscopic bacilli, of creatures who have to adapt
themselves to environment, rather than of environment
adapted to them, though theirs be the higher form of
life; he speaks of the blemishes that mar the beauty
348
and detract from the usefulness of nature • To say
that evil is part of the world's perfection is to
state a shallow solution, for it would have to be
true then that were the evil replaced by good the world
would be less perfect. All that can be said in the
last analysis is that if God is a member of the "realm
of ends", he has not made t) e world as it is to be
but only given it certain "talents" with which it is
349
to work out its own salvation. It cannot be shown
that any" physical cause of suffering is really
350
superfluous"; we can only conclude that the world
is in part fixed and in part fluent, and that we
cannot know "how far down within the ....fixed
mechanism the fluent processes of life extend.* 351
i
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The more good comes out of evil, however, the more
we can believe that good is supreme; at any rate the
very conception of a perfect world in the sense of
"being "finished and complete at once" is repugnant
352
to the mind, and it is a contradiction in terms.
Sorley's L'oral Values and the Idea of God
systematically sets forth the argument for God based
upon the objectivity of moral values. His first
thesis is that the appreciation of value "is as true
and immediate a part of our experience as the
353judgments of perception," and just as the laws of
nature describe the regularities in sense experience,
so order and law with a claim to objectivity can be
affirmed in moral experience. Moral judgments claim
validity, a validity which does not depend on the
individual who m^kes the judgment, but which is for
all persons alike. It is to be noted that moral
predicates apply only to persons, not to tilings; the
world is only the "environment" for personal life,
and ideals are realized only by making the world
354
their "instrument." Sorley offers three proofs
for the objectivity of the moral value: the fact
that the judgment itself claims objectivity, the
universality of the judgment, and the ability to
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connect moral judgments so that they form a system.
Such a system is no aggregate but an "organic whole"
366
to which the name "chief good" may be applied.
Values are discovered by thought, following experiences
in which they must be realized, and he asserts that
values form a third division of reality of which the
first two parts are (1) existents, and (2) relations.
Relations exist between things, a.n / example being the
laws of nature; values apply only to the personal
357
realm. By saying that values are one division of
reality two things are implied, namely, that they have
an "imperative reality", that their objectivity is
independent of personal achievement , and that they
35,
satisfy personal purpose and fulfill personal nature.
When he has established to his satisfaction
the fact of the objectivity of values, Sorley turns to
the idea of God, examining first the tr-.dit ional argu-
ments. He states that they have "fallen into disfavor"
for many reasons, one of them being the destructive
criticism of Hume and Kant. The underlying defect of
the arguments is that they begin with an idea of God
w] ich they define, and then strive to prove the ex-
istence of that God, shifting the basis of the argu-
ments whenever doubt arises, lioreover, each line of
argument is supposed to have "independent validity",
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whereas we know that they largely converge. Again,
they illustrate or imitate the scientific "part-to-
part M proof, and when they shift from the evidence to
the reality itself, they often do so in an"obscure and
*z £$ r\
questionable manner." Finally, they neither define
their conception of the universe nor compel acknow-
ledgment of a "God worthy of our worship", especially
361
omitting all mention of God's goodness. Yet, in
spite of their defects, each argument has made an
important contribution to the conception of God; the
motives of the ontological argument are "the demand
that our highest ideal .... shall not be severed from
reality", and the "intellectual desire for completeness
362
in our conceptions." Again, while the whole validity
of the causal concept and of its application to the
world may be called into question, the cosmological
argument at least points to the need of interpreting
all events in the finite world in terms of a greater
reality. The difficulty is, however, that it is
necessary to reach the view of reality as a whole be-
fore we can even assert the beginning, in . time , of the
world.
The teleological argument is hardly to be
considered apart from the cosmological; it is only
that the teleological argument goes into more detail,
)
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in regard to the world and in regard to its creator.
The argument had been influenced both by the doctrine
of natural selection and by the problem of evil. °*
-s to natural selection, it may be said that heredity,
the tendency to variation, and impulses towards the
preservation of race and of individual ire all irreduci
365bleto a mechanical or physico-chemical process.
Furthermore, natural selection cannot account for
man's wider intellectual and spiritual interests, for
moral and other intrii.s ic values, but only for life
preservation. There is an adaptation between human
reason and the cosmic order which is a "design greater
then any Paley ever dreamed of" , and of this also
•Z O a
natural selection gives no account. While natural
selection may interfere with the belief that certain
physical adaptations are due directly to the hand of a
designing God, it floes not interfere with maintaining
the validity of the intrinsic values. The traditional
arguments lead naturally and progressively into a
consideration of the moral argument for God. We had
first the idea of God as a F'irst Cause; then, as the
order of nature impressed man more and more we ' ave t' e
conception of God as a Lawgiver; the next stage was a
recognition of abstract truths and an inquiry as to
whether the order to which they belonged was eternal,
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and men knew God to be a God of Truth. Finally comes
the recognition of the validity of moral values and
the inquiry as to whether on the basis of moral
values we are justified in affirming God's existence
and his goodness.
Dysteleological evidence must also be con-
sidered on moral grounds; to establish the moral
argument as an argument for God it must be proved
that actual experience is fitted to realize the
moral order, that the world is a fit medium for
realizing goodness. The problem of evil is "the
strongest objection to the theistic view of the
368
world." The purpose of the world is very evidently
369
not to give its inhabitants a "good time"; Paley
overlooks obvious evidences of suffering when he
argues that God's sole end v/as to make his creatures
happy. Yet suffering makes for character and we know
that "perfect adaptation would mean automatism", and
370
would be undesirable. Each person "bears his own
burden", pain being distributed over the whole human
371
race. Our fairest conclusion is that our experience,
however full of pain, is ifter all "not inconsistent"
with the conclusion that the world provides a medium
for realizing goodness. Hence the moral argument for
God seems justified, and he should be conceived as
Supreme Worth, as the "final home of values", as
"possessing the fulness of knowledge and beauty and
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goodness and whatever else is of value for its own
sake
.
M
As to God's attributes, to ascribe to him
infinity is to state a negative idea; rather do we
assert his perfection, which is a positive idea, and
which means that certain of his qualities are known
to us. Thus to describe him is not to be guilty of
crude anthropomorphism: we argue for God's goodness
not because we find goodness in man, but because the
idea of goodness has been found to be "valid for that
373
universal order which we are trying to understand."
Ward and Sorley, colleagues in Cambridge,
attack the problem from much the same standpoint, and
with the same general background; both are interested
in finite persons, their acts, ideals, and purposes;
both approach the conception of G-od from the stand-
point of the plurality of persons. There is a decided
similarity in their refutation of the proposition
that natural selection precludes the possibility
of purpose in the world.
For both Ward and Smiley the teleological
argument forms the basis for the moral argument,
that is, it is the motive back of, and method involved
in, the teleological argument which interest them in
developing the moral argument. The teleological'
(X
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argument is the first of the traditional arguments
seriously to consider God's attributes, and its
defenders argue for his wisdom and intelligence. The
moral argument, as outlined by Sorley and Ward,
purges the teleological argument of many of its
factual mistakes and invalid inferences, and then
proceeds further to develop the question of God's
attributes. Its defenders strive to establish God's
goodness, and this attribute is, for both Sorley and
Ward, established by considering not the adaptations
in inanimate and non-human existents, but by examin-
ing the implications of human striving to attain
ideals, moral ends. The teleological argument concerns
natural, physical processes; the moral argument is
interested in non-physical, moral aspirations. Yet in
both realms there is order and system, indeed, the
fact that moral judgments can be systematized, the
fact that morality is an order, impresses all the
defenders of the moral argument, ward mentions also
beauty in and prodigality of nature, both of the
realm which is considered by the teleological argument.
It seems to me that both Ward and Sorley owe more to
the teleological argument than either has acknowledged,
and that while it is true that Paley and his fellow
(•
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teleologists of the eighteenth century naively
attributed to God many processes now acknowledged
to be due not to the direct act of God, but to
natural processes, the same might be said of those
early defenders of God's existence on the basis of
personal conscience, who were, however naive, the
forerunners of Kant and those of our day who have
developed the moral argument.
Eoth Ward and Sorley grapple with the prob-
lem of evil, as does Farnell also. All three are
Obviously more interested . in God's goodness than in
his power. All have freely acknowledged evil as a
problem, and an obstacle to theism. Ward and Sorley
ansv/er negatively the question as to t; e presence of
evil being an absolute obstacle to moral progress.
It is significant that Ward and Sorley definitely
acknowledge little interest in God's infinitude,
and they have discussed evil far more freely than ..
those who, starting wit' the presupposition of God's
infinitude, speak of all evil as being unreal, or as
being a mere temporal incident of finitude.
Deviation of Ward from Sorley 's viewpoint
comes at the point of determining the status of
nature. Ward's solution is that of panpsychism; he
(•
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opposes the Berkleyan view of nature as God's signs
and language, and Sorley's view of nature as God's
medium, through which human beings become moral
persons. Sorley says definitely that "nature is a
medium only; through it the end is to be reached.
But minds are not a mere medium: it is in and by
374
them that values are to be realized." The merits
of panpsychism will be discussed as a separate topic,
but it is sufficient to note here that while for
Ward there seems to be but one order of purpose,
acting in all exi stents in the same way, for Sorley
there are two orders, one of natural causation, the
other the moral order, and that the first serves as
a medium, an instrument, of the second. If Ward's
theory be true, then the teleolo^ical argument and
the moral argument converge, for the latter concerns
human beings who are of the same stuff as all other
existents, though possessing a greater degree of
selfhood, while according to Sorley's view the two
arguments are not the same, though as we have already
noted in Sorley's own words, the moral argument owes
a debt to the teleological . I do not see why both
arguments cannot be valid at the same time, one
argument considering the realm of nature, the other
the -moral realm, both being the manifestations of
(I
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God's presence.
The question Inevitably arises in connection
with the moral argument as to whether its defenders
have not unnecessarily limited themselves to the
consideration of one value* Are not all values to be
considered as evidences of God's existence? Dean
Inge, in reviewing Sorley's book, attacks the
latter' s statement made in aa attempt to prove the
catholicity of moral values, that aesthetic and
intellectual values are limited by external conditions
of the social order in such a way that only the
375
economically favored could possess them. Inge
declares that only internal limitation prevents a
man from realizing all values, and that he, a
Platonist, regards Sorley's statement as "flat
376blasphemy." Inge's theory vail now receive
consideration in the second division of our discussion
of the value argument. The group he represents will
hold that all intrinsic values are to find their
place in a general value argument for God's existence.
(2) God as the ground of all values.
The views of only one of the group to be
studied in this section have been considered, namely
those of 3. S. Laurie, whose theory does not enter
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into this section very largely, but whose name should
377
nevertheless be included. The others are SIT. R. Inge,
378 379 380
A. J. Balfour, Henry Jones, Pringle-Pattison,
381
and E. W. Kobson. Of these Inge and Laurie do not
commit themselves on the subject of the teleological
argument, although, as we have seen, Laurie is not
opposed in his general method, and Inge will be
found to appeal to nature's beauty and prodigality
as evidences of God's presence. The others are all
friendly, although they do aot adhere to the
traditional form of the argument. Inge's name has
already entered into the discussion of value, and I
shall discuss his theory after merely noting that
Laurie gives no system. .tic treatment of values; he
does say that man seeks truth, beauty and goodness,
but never finds them until he has found God, since
God is the heme of all values, and in God they ha.ve
382
their guarantee.
Inge has written on the philosophy and
religion of Plotinus, but in such a book has been
able to express his own views, for he admits that he
is a disciple, though a "not uncritical one." 383
Neo-Platonism teaches that the self or ego is not
"given", but is in the process of being made, or of
"being communicated. 11 Inge quotes Royce with
<
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approval as one who agrees with him and with Plotinus
385
is "believing the self to be a teleological category.
Plotinus spoke repeatedly of the order and attribute
of limitation in the universe, proving that that
universe is a product of the divine mind. Inge holds
that modern science increases that same conviction,
in its contrast between the immeasurably great and
the immeasurably small, even in its proof of nature's
386
prodigality in achieving her ends. The v/orld,
according to Plotinus, is worthy of its maker in
being complete, beautiful and harmonious, in being
the image of the completeness, beauty and harmony
which characterize the eternal world. Inge quotes
387
with approval Y/hittaker 1 s The Neo-Platonists
in which the author speaks of nature as the expression
of unvarying intelligence, of bodies as containing
the "footprints of the Universal Sou/l," but adds
that the phenomenal world could not exist apart from
the perceiving soul. For Inge, God or the Absolute
is both first and final cause; as the One he is
first cause, and as truth, beauty and goodness he is
388
the final cause of all. There is in Inge's view
no sharp cut between the teleological argument and
the argument from value; the earth is worthy of its
isST*
4
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creator and in it are the creator's traces. Each
soul strives for truth, beauty and goodness and
finds the ideals guaranteed in God. "The idea of
389
teleology is inseparable from that of value."
Of the role played by religious experience,
Inge says that the Platonic faith has a "sober
390
trust" in it, but that it must be "earned." It
would seem that the mystical experience could have no
rightful place until after a hard-earned fight for
attaining values. Concerning evil, Inge ventures the
opinion that the prodigality of nature in achieving
her ends may be an indication that the creator, with
all infinity and eternity to work in, is as prodigal
391
of v lues as he is of existences. Inge is sure
that "love and suffering cut the deepest c oneIs in
our souls, and reveal the most precious of God's
secrets." Suffering is itself not an evil but a
good, because it is a means to progress. The idea of
a finite God is "intolerable both for philosophy and
392
for religion." We cannot know the future but we
do know that "amid the eternal ideas of Truth, Beauty,
393
and Goodness is our birthplace nd our final home."
Balfour's thesis is that the belief in God
must be linked up "with all that is, or seems, most
t
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assured in knowledge, all that is, or seems, most
beautiful in art or nature, and all that is, or seems,
394
most noble in immortality." He speaks of the
teleological argument as the "most modest" of the
traditional arguments, commends it for being based
upon the facts of nature, and says it may compare
favorably with his own which is based not on facts
"objectively considered", but at least partly on "our
365
own loose md halting beliefs about those facts."
The teleological argument is not bad, he says^, but it
is limited both in respect to its premises and to its
conclusions. From our observation of inanimate nature
it is not possible to infer design, since mere natural
laws cannot be the basis of the argument. It is
required instead that the laws combine to "subserve an
396
end." Nor does the mere progress towards complexity
in inanimate nature prove to be sufficient evidence
for an argument, for elaboration in the evolutionary
process does not necessarily mean progress; it may
mean only purposeless change. When we look backward
over the course of evolution, we may find that the
physical order seems rather to indicate a lack of
design; disintegration of energy itself seems to in-
dicate that G-od has not been present in the process.
In regard to adaptations in the natural world,
t
153
natural selection would indicate that at least it is
eo.sier to believe in chance and accident than if no
such factor was at work; yet natural selection
"breaks down wherever intrinsic worth is involved. It
"begins too late" in the causal sequence to provide foi
the origin of human reason, and "it ends too early"
to explain our "ideals of love, of beeoity, and of
396aknowledge." Now it is the fact of these ideals
that leads to the value argument, and argument not
from design but from values. The connection between
belief in God and belief in values is not a logical
one, for the first cannot be deduced from the second;
when we attempt to trace the reasons for a belief we
reach a point where "every trace of rationality
vanishes" , where the conditions of belief are rather
39 6b
a-logical in character. In other words, beliefs
and emotions depend upon each other;" emotional
values" connected with beliefs about beauty and
goodness need a "more congruous source than the blind
396c
transformation of energy"; hence design is required
for them, and for all we "deem most valuable in life,
by beauty, by morals, by scientific truth."
'.nalyze the feeling for natural beauty: we care not to
understand the physical or psychological theories
which may explain either the object or the feeling;
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we ask to regard beauty as a revelation of spirit
to spirit. The consciousness of a designer is involved
inevitably in every aesthetic feeling: God must be the
root and the consummation of it, its guarantee of
survival and fulfilment. Moral values must have a
similar explanation: our "highest loyalties", our
"most devoted love" , our "most limitless self
396e
abnegation" require a theistic theology. Ethics
must have its root in the divine, and in the divine it
must be consummated. The belief in universal
causation, moreover, cannot be based on argument, nor
yet on observation, but the belief depends on
"intuitive probability". We have, for instance, in
evolution to assume "something in the nature of a
direct force and.... of supermundane design." Thus
only in a "theistic setting" can be found the meaning
of love, beauty, and the greatest truths of ethics.
Reason and all its works have their inspiration and
source in God.
Henry Jones declares at the outset that if
there be a God, of love and of power, nature and the
spiritual world must illustrate these attributes.
Nature and spirit are parts of one unity, and they
397imply each other. The evidence of order, beauty,
nature 1 s- prodigality , of moral values is all about us;
I
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it is only in the face of personal calamity that we
deny the evidence. Lloreover, the evidence is
constantly increasing; even what we once called pests
are found to be men's friends; cause must be
proportionate to its works, and God must surely be as
great as his works. Jones makes a strong case for the
presence of beauty, for its "gratuitous generosity",
and its purpose of enriching man's life, rather than
398
merely preserving it. Surely, he says, its source
must be intelligent and benevolent. Evolution, in the
hands of idealism, has been the "final refutation of
all theories that account for results by origins",
and it not only "opens out into the future a
399
boundless vista; it also redeems the past."
Spiritual values alone are final and absolute, and if
the purpose of men's lives is to acquire them, God
must be the ultimate principle of the world and
immanent in it. Religion reveals to man his need of
God, and to know the need is to find God as the
400
principle which secures final value. Bosanquet's
Absolute is to be discarded because of its "disembodied
universals"; it has a static perfection, and in it the
finite being is lost. "Self realization" or "self
attainment" is to be substituted for Bosanquet's
"self transcendence" as the true aspiration of the
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finite individual. Man is not to go beyond himself,
but rather to reach nd become himself. The only
Absolute worth maintaining is one which will cherish
and maintain in its turn the differences between the
elements within it. God is perfect, loving, of
unlimited pov/er, giving men the opportunity and the
-402
power "to learn goodness." The final meeting place
of God and man is love, which is the "supreme
403
principle of morality and religion." As for evil,
admitted that there is a contradiction between it and
God's perfection, we find after all that the world is
a "school of virtue", and that man is permitted choice
between right and wrong, according to God's love which
gives man this power; moral evil is therefore a matter
of evil human volitions; physical, evil or pain is
404
nature's way of saying not to "do it again."
For Pringle-Pattison, the principle back of
all the traditional arguments is that we and our ideals
are all derived, not made by ourselves; they point to
a Perfect Source "in which is united all that, and
more than, it hath entered into the heart of man to
conceive." 405 Pringle-Pattison admits the imperfec-
tions of the teleological argument; that it implies a
preexisting or independent material world; that at
I
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most _ it argues that God is an architect; the material
originated seems to have no relation to his purposes
hut to be rather a "fiat of omnipotence 11 ; it takes up
the universe piecemeal while modern science teaches
that it is necessary to regard the process of the
406
universe as a whole. Purpose in the world implies
three things: (1) desire for a state of affairs which
does not yet exist; (2) a conception of a plan for
bringing the world into being; (3) an act of will
407
proper for carrying out the plan* The "state of
affairs" is, then, not simply the final stage of a
process, but it is the spirit of the whole in every
stage. Pringle-Pattison agrees that God must be the
ever active spirit in all purpose; the universe is no
finished fact, but is a process even now in the act of
being made. God or the Absolute is called personal,
408
since personality is the highest category known.
.ill purpose, ^11 pursuing of ideals means the presence
of God in finite experience; every value claim is a
claim for objectivity even though values may be
imperfectly realized. Man cannot make values any
409
more than he co.n make reality. Truth, beauty, and
goodness have no meaning unless they enter into
conscious experience, and they carry men on to
postulate an Ultimate Llind in which they are all
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realized; God as Supreme Reality is Supreme Value.
Bosanquet sacrifices finite selfhood in order to
develop the concept of the One Individual; he makes
finite individuality adjectival, reducing it to a
complex of universals or qualities. Against his view
it must be said that unless God be the Creator of
creators there can be no real creation nor freedom at
all unless it be of selves with independent states;
moreover, the greatest experiences of life disprove
Bosanquet* s statement of the merging of individualities.
411
"Selfhood is not selfishness." If the Absolute
be not defined in terms of will -*nd of purpose it is
411b
then "assimilated" until it means nothing.
Evolution is not the enemy of theism; rather
it has given back to philosophy the idea of end or aim,
even though the end be acquired by mechanical means;
evolution's every step can be interpreted teleologically
.
Nor does natural selection rule out teleology, for by
relating org nic development to the general course of
things, both organism and environment may be brought
412
within the scope of purpose . Vitalism is to be
opposed, even the Drieschian variety, for it "treats
413
life or entelechy essentially on the physic, 1 level."
If life be autonomous, it cannot be defined in physical
and chemic 1 categories. "Contingency is written
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across the face of nature", yet that very fact
contributes to the world's perfection, and is its
414
condition.
Hobson approaches the idea of God from the
standpoint of a scientist. There is no division in
reality between natural and revealed theology, for if
God be immanent, all knowledge may be regarded as
revelation. Natural science by itself does not affect
theism negatively or positively, although it is
largely responsible for the decline in the belief in
415
miracles. The argument for God from mystical
experience cannot be valid because of the large number
of people who never have such experiences, and yet
416
believe in God. The traditional arguments are no
longer to be regarded as proofs; rather they are to
represent certain lines of argument still employed in
theistic thought. Natural science has no bearing on
the ontological argument in particular; the
cosmological argument is open to the objection of
assuming as perfectly definite the concept of cause
without defining what kind of cause is meant; it does,
however, point out the truth recognized by natural
science that the whole perceptual realm contains
factors that can be described by "rational schemes."
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The reality that underlies the perceptual world must
correlate with the rational processes of our minds.
The teleological argument is closely allied v;ith the
cosmological. Paley's argument assumes the external
relation of God to the world; it might he valid for a
polytheistic view of God, but is hardly adequate for
a G-od of unlimited power and intelligence. Rather,
the trend of the times points to purposiveness , not
as an external relation, but as immanent in living
organisms and perhaps in the phenomenal world
417
generally. There arise in this connection,
however, the questions relating to the respective
rdles played by natural selection, the vital processes
within the organism, and the faets of evil, natural
selection is anti-teleological in its tendency, but
at the present time the sufficiency and scope of the
theory is in. question, and it is far from being
established that it is an adequate account of the
evolution of species and of their adaptations. It
seems to apply not at all to the mental and spiritual
418
faculties. As to the theory of vitalism, natural
science speaks here also with an uncertain voice on
the question of whether there must be
,
supplementary
to physico-chemical categories a teleological factor
to give -account of vital processes; yet if we admit
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such a factor it could be used as a teleological
419
argument only for a pantheistic view of the v/orld.
Evil is the most serious obstacle to theistic belief;
bacteriology "nd parasitology especially being to
light the existence of organisms whose purpose seems
to be to inflict death and torture on other organisms.
The problem of physical evil is still to be solved. 420
Of all the arguments that have been, advanced
for the existence of God, the moral argument a.nd the
argument from values seem to be the most convincing.
Sorley's treatment of the former is especially to be
421
commended. The apprehension of values for both
religion and morality is a factor which cannot be denied.
We have now concluded the study of the
theories advanced by the thirteen G-ifford Lecturers
who find the value argument to be the most convincing
of all theistic arguments. The first seven have
specialized on the moral argument, and their views
have already been discussed and estimated. It remains
for us to estimate the strength of the general value
argument as represented by the six men just
discussed.
The opposition to Bosanquet is noteworthy;
Jones and Pr ingle-Pattison oppose him on the same
ground,,- that Bosanquet has belittled finite selfhood
4r
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for the sake of an Absolute who is static, dead, and
in the last analysis, a pure abstraction. None of
them find natural selection an insuperable obstacle to
belief in God, since natural selection does not apply
at all to the realms of value. Hobson and Pringle-
Pattison reject the theory, md Hobson remains
neutral. Inge, oones, and Hobson have aj.1 declared
themselves opposed to the argument from religious
experience as a proof that God exists.
Turning to their respective attitudes in
regard to the traditional arguments, we find that
Inge, while not using the argument specifically, still
maintains that the world is worthy of its creator in
being complete, perfect and harmonious, and he has
advanced in detail the idea of such harmony and order,
even of beauty in the universe; he has supplemented th
line of thought with the value argument. Balfour has
criticized the old argument from design, but, better
than the others, he has shown the real points of
connection between the value and the teleological argu
ments, referring to the former as an argument to
design. The old argument, he says, was not bad, but
only limited, and he has sought to supplement and
complete it with his own theory. Jones openly speaks
of the evidence of design and declares that modern
^
163
science increases that evidence. Pringle-Pattison
and Hobson have opposed the argument in its old form,
but still use it s a trend of thought to argue for
the universal purpose in the universe, of God not as
external creator but as immanent, and of all nature
as representing one cosmic purpose. Pringle-Pattison
thinks there can be no question about the one purpose;
Hobson finds that three modern trends work against the
idea, and he deals with each briefly but without
definite conclusions. \s we found with the defenders
of the moral argument, so here also it is as if, even
with its critics, the teleological argument provides
the clues for the formulation of the argument from
values, which is brought in either to correct the
idea of G-od's externality, making him immanent in
nature, but still recognizing the facts of order and
of harmony, or to supplement the limited evidence
offered by the teleological argument by bringing in
the fact of values which concern not the physical but
the moral and spiritual nature. Often, as with
Balfour, there is acknowledgment- of the debt which
the value argument owes to the teleological. The
problem of evil does not seem to challenge the
defenders of the general value argument to the extent
that it troubles the moralists. Inge and Jones treat
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it very briefly, but see no difficulty in believing
that evil is a means of stimulating the good;
Pringle-Pattison, more thoroughly, seems to stand for
the same solution; Balfour does not deal with the
problem at all; Hobson admits there are difficulties
involved in reconciling the presence of evil with
theistic beliefs, but offers no solution.
Two of the defenders of the general value
argument need to be questioned in matters of
statements they have made. Pringle-Pattison has
rejected the terms of the old teleological argument,
insisting that the universe is being carried on by one
great cosmic purpose, and he argues that God is a
Personality on the basis of the recognition of that
purpose. He rejects vitalism, and the panpsychism of
Ward also. On Page 188 of his Idea of God he speaks
of nature as having no reality apart from its "spiritual
completion", of its being only complementary to mind.
There are, then, two orders, one natural and one
moral; yet he never makes quite clear the way in
which the one co smic purpose expresses itself in
these two orders; the statements of Fraser and of
Sorley on the subject are more clear. More will be
422
said of this in a later section;
I
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I question Balfour's terminology regarding
the "emotions" of value and the right to base any
argument for God on evidence given by such "emotions"
alone. We have seen the folly of basing any argument
on the testimony of individual religious experience;
there must be the same opposition to any argument
built upon evidence from emotions. He has striven to
resolve all logical necessity into psychological
necessity, an impossible proceding from the point of
view of the truth of results to be obtained, and one
which Balfour himself does not follow through
consistently. As a matter of fact, he cannot avoid
appealing to reason, and he does not. The value
argument for God's existence must be based not on the
subjectivity but on the objectivity of values, not on
their relevance to individual intuitions, but on their
universality and ability to be systematized.
Furthermore, what Balfour regards as common sense and
obvious beliefs, held by every one, are not so
necessarily; his inevitable beliefs have been subject
to too much modification all through the centuries to
be valid for every one in this generation.
Two more observations need be made concerning
this group: the first is that they have not
I
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established the objectivity of all intrinsic values
to the degree that the defenders of the moral argument
have established the objectivity of the moral values,
and if they still would hold to the objectivity of all
values they are under obligations to prove it in the
same manner that Sorley has undertaken to prove the
objectivity of moral values only. Pringle-Pattison
insists that every value-claim is a claim for
objectivity, and that we, as individuals do not make
values any more than we make reality; this may be
true, but it needs fuller treatment. Until the
defenders of the objectivity of all values can refute
Sorley 's statement, regarded by Inge as "blasphemous",
that aesthetic and intellectual values are externally
and economically limited, and only moral values to be
regarded, therefore, as universally objective, moral
v lues alone will hold the center of the stage.
The final comment to De made concerning this
group is, as we noted in the case of the moral
argument, that even if the value argument be held as
valid, it does not necessarily rule out the argument
from design unless we hold that nature itself is
illusion and not reality.
(i
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(E) God as proved by accumulated evidence
Only one Gifford Lecturer has made an appeal
to all evidence as the final proof for God's existence
423
W. P. Paterson begins his book with a general
review of the subject-matter of the Gifford Lectures
up to his time(1925) and states from his survey the
conclusion that "religion has made a mmy sided
appeal to man."^*^ The test of truth, he says, is
coherence, self-consistency, and consonance with the
425
facts of the universe and of human life . For the
truth of the idea of God, then, the test must be the
measure of that idea to meet the demands made upon it
by man for the satisfaction of his spiritual life.
The traditional arguments have been attacked for being
composed of unsound evidence or for following unsound
method; yet there is a general agreement that their
conclusion is sound, and until that conclusion (that
God exists) be proved false, we should continue to
426
believe in God. Though there is much in history
that points to apparent failure and futility j nd trag-
edy, there is an impressive "sum of gains" made by the
"achievements of intellect and will" which far
outweigh the evil and which point to the work of a
427higher intelligence. Kant and natural selection
have combined to cause the decline of the teleological
i
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argument, but the universe as a v/hole "presupposes a
divine intelligence"; it is the "embodiment and the
428handwork of reason." Evolution only increases
this belief. The intelligence of man is an argument
for the greater intelligence of God since he could
not be inferior to his creatures; the same holds true
of God's moral attributes.
nother argument for God's existence is the
a i i4 a + + 428b . .
.
universal religious instinct and tne universal
capacity for recognizing in the divine a distinct
category, belonging to a sacred sphere. There is,
then, a strong presumption that the principles of
religion are true, and when one considers the long
process of religious history and its culmination in
Christianity, it seems as if the whole experience had
429been "in touch with reality. Moreover, the
fruitfulness and coherence of the idea of God is an
430
added argument for his existence; neither the idea
of the world nor that of the self prove to be as
fruitful or as coherent.
Certainly there is something to be said for
the persistency of the idea of God in the minds of
men of all ages, :.nd Peterson's summary of the lines
of evidence shows the impress iveness of the idea; yet
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unless" ~the various lines of argument are themselves
flawless, the mere accumulation of them may add
nothing to the final proof of God's existence: the
aggregate of half-truths may possibly make a whole
truth, but to argue for God's existence on such a
basis is a dubious proceeding to say the least.
Hov; shall we know that the conclusion of
traditional arguments is true if the arguments them-
selves be invalid? Paterson admits possible flaws in
the arguments themselves, but argues that their
conclusion is true; if the conclusion, that God
exists, be valid, it must be based upon other
arguments, nd the traditional proofs must be
abandoned as either presenting false evidence or as
adopting an invalid logical method. In either case the
coherence criterion, so strongly emphasized by
Paterson, is violated at once. We have already noted
the defects of the "universality" test of truth, the
argument that God's existence is proved because men
of all ages have believed in him, and need not repeat
431
the discussion of that test at this point. As for
the fruitfulness of the idea, and its alleged
superiority in this respect to the idea of the world
and the idea of the self, Paterson' s statement may be
i
170
true but it is not proved; he has failed to show its
superiority, in its fruitfulness and coherence, both
to the view of naturalism and to such doctrines of
the self as Me Taggart , for instance, would offer.
Nor does he show just why the doctrine of evolution
increases rather than decreases the belief in God;
there are those who would differ from him, and he
ought to defend his position .nd not stop with a bare
statement of it. Too much apparent damage has been
done to the traditional idea of G-od, at least, by the
doctrine of evolution to warrant an undefended
declaration such as Paters on gives. Furthermore, he
seems to have glossed over the problem of evil,
leaving us with a "balance" or "sum" of good.
According to his own statement of the coherence
criterion of truth, Paterson must reconcile the fact
of evil, however little of it there may be, with the
belief in an infinite and good G-od v/hose existence he
has avowed.
The conclusion is that Paterson has done
little but summarize the general lines of evidence
for the belief in God, but has added little to the
general proof of the validity of any of the theistic
arguments
.
(I
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(F) God as seen by science.
The final group whose Lectures will be
discussed in this chapter is the group of scientists
whose theories have thus far not been examined.
Morgan and Driesch were discussed as those who oppose
all proofs as such; Eddington dealt with "probabilities"
and yet referred to evidence obviously included in the
teleological argument. Hobson's book has been
examined as one of the works advancing the value
argument. In this section, therefore, there remain
only two to be discussed: J. Arthur Thomson and
J. S. Haldane.
432
J. Arthur Thomson speaks of the short-
comings of the physico-chemical explanation as answers
to such biological questions as inheritance,
433
embryonic development, variability, and selection.
He recognizes both the existence of adaptations and
434
the presence of beauty; regarding the latter he
emphasizes the importance of the aesthetic emotion
435
as well as beauty's objective side. He finds the
teleological argument faulty because it implies that
individual organisms cannot work out their own
salvation, and because Darwinism very largely
436
accounts for individual adaptations. The general
I
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idea back of the argument is sound, however, for in
the evolutionary process one can see the working out
of purpose or of purposes involved in the "origina-
437
tion of the first organisms. " Moreover, in nature
there are features corresponding to truth, beauty and
goodness, the highest human values. On the other
hand, dysteleological facts arc not to be overlooked,
although many of them are not real, but only exist in
man's misunderstanding; nor do the facts negate the
proofs of order and abundance of life, self
preservation, self assertion, and self realization,
the welfare of the race, and the beauty that are to be
found everywhere. Much of the so-called cruelty of
nature disappears as we oo me into fuller knowledge;
the secruing of health is largely in man's power;
parasites often play the part of eliminative agents;
nature may lack plasticity, but physical conditions
on the whole are suited to human life, and this very
lack of plasticity is the "minus side of stability",
438
which has been established through the ages. It
is true that adaptations are often imperfect, but
usually the imperfection is apparent only in cases of
emergency; for the ordinary run of events the same
adaptation works well. On the whole and within
limits one- can trust to the regularity of frequently
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observed sequences, and no amount of tragedy or evil
can "blot out the sun." 4"^ It should be remembered
also that evolution is still in progress, not complete.
Natural selection has its complement in the
"struggle for existence; 11 the latter accounts for a
440
certain "endeavour after well being." Whatever
the evolutionary theory may add, man must be
recognized as the crown of nature and its interpreter.
Driesch's theory of entelechy cannot be whole-heart-
edly accepted; rather a "descriptive" or "methodologic-
al" vitalism is the correct view, a view which does
not look on "entelechy" as a "bolt from the blue" but
recognizes that the qualities which render its
a 41postulation necessary have been present all along.
Living creatures are individualities whose behavior
has a "psychical aspect", order abounds in animate
442
nature, and beauty is revealed everywhere . Yet we
cannot worship nature; its voices do not satisfy; we
443
rather worship the God whom nature reveals.
444
J. S. Haldane declares at the outset that
"our universe can be nothing else but the
445
manifestation of one Supreme Reality or God." He
opposes the traditional arguments, believing them to
be a combination of "bad theology" and "bad science." 446
The only Teal evidence for God's existence is "within
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447
and around us everywhere ." The teleological
argument is false because the life manifested in
organisms maintains itself as a whole without spatial
boundaries; the living structure and activity are only
448
a manifestation of this organic unity. The
significant thing in nature is not its structure but
the fact that "specific structure and composition
11 449 ^themselves ate being maintained and reproduced.
Nature is God's manifestation; evolution the "order in
time-relations of His manifestation", and structure,
450
activity and environment are inseparable. God is
the creator \nd sustainer of the universe
,
the source
of good, revealing himself to us directly, ." s we
accept the revelation, we become one with him. As
individuals we are mere abstractions, and the whole
conception of the universe as seen by science is
abstraction, for the real universe is spiritual.
Contrary to Driesch, therefore, life is not centered
in the body of the organism as as entelechy, but it is
a unity, including all environment, and this unity is
none other than God. Contrary to Alexander's view,
the world cannot be deduced from Space-Time, for its
basis is spiritual; contrary to mechanistic
physiology and behaviorism, the living organism is
not reducible to a physical body, within spatial and
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temporal boundaries. The view of "soul psychology" is
not a correct interpretation, for it would reduce the
organism to a "soul", which, though of spiritual
character, is nevertheless limited to the individual
possessing it. The only correct interpretation is
that the organism is a unity, but a unity which is
without significance except as it manifests the One
451
Reality. The only kind of immortality possible or
desirable, is not the immortality of the individual
but the immortality which is of the One Reality of
which we are but parts.
Thomson's view is one which combines
features of both the teleological and the
cosmological argument. He has spoken, for instance,
of the facts both of beauty and of adaptation, and
while he has criticized the traditional teleological
argument he has allowed the general idea of design as
a description of the method by which the divine
purpose is being worked out. However, not content
with what seems to be a method, Thomson insists on
going back to the origins of the whole divine scheme,
and he declares God to be the "Unmoved First Llover"
,
who originates the process, and Hows individual or-
ganisms to work out their own salvation. This latter
argument—smacks of eighteenth century deism, of a
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purely transcendent God who sets the machinery going
and lets it carry on its own program thereafter.
Lloreover, the lengthy treatment of evil seems hardly
adequate to cover all cases, as we shall see in a
later section; the theory of vitalism will also be
460
discussed in another chapter.
Haldane 's God is a presupposed supreme
spiritual reality of whom the universe is a
manifestation; Haldane belongs with his brother and
the others who maintained such a postion, and would
have been discussed with them, had he hot introduced
certain scientific aspects into his system. In
addition to the obvious criticism that the pre-
suppos it ion of such a reality, of which all creation
is a p.rt, is not allowowable , his neglect of the
problem of evil should not be overlooked. His oppos-
ition to the teleological argument was made on the
ground that the evidence for God's existence is
"within and around us. 11 Precisely what does he mean?
Is not nature "around us?" And are we then prohibited
from using the data of our senses as a basis for
arguing for God's existence? Haldane does not define
this phrase; it may be that he is referring to
intuition or to feeling or to certain moral sentiments
The statement in any case, needs explanation.
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Reviewing the points of view of the scientists
studied thus far in regard to their opinion of the
teleological argument, we have found Driesch allow-
ing the validity of the argument only as a proof of
the entelechian factor in "Givenness"
,
not of the
Absolute; Morgan and whitehead fail to mention the
argument. Eddington opposes all "proofs" but uses
the evidence which bel ongs to the teleological
argument; Haldane is opposed, but what his subsitute
line of evidence for God's existence may be, he has
not made clear; Hobson and Thomson are friendly to
it, although they re-interpret it, and Hobson swings
in the direction of a value argument.
The purpose of this chapter is now
accomplished; we have exs.mined six groups of Gifford
Lectures which have sometimes used the teleological
argument consciously, sometimes unconsciously,
sometimes discarded it entirely, in formulating new
arguments for God's existence. The first group was
criticized for making God's existence a presupposition
rather than an existence to be proved, for making God
a synthesis and a unity of all experience without pre-
cisely defining the elements which needed thus to be
unified or synthesized. The second group took the
general argument of the existence of natural law and
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order, and of man's general nature, and made God's
existence as inference from these facts. It is, as
a whole, a form of the cosmological argument, or may
be regarded in some of its phases, especially those
presented by Gwatkin, as a teleological argument in
wide and general terms; it is not out of harmony with
the teleological argument, and does not exclude it.
third group, arguing for God on the basis of
religious experience was criticized on the ground
that the individual experience itself carries no
guarantee of its object, nd that the experience
needed reinterpreting by reason, through the
teleological argument or some other. The fourth
group emphasized value aspects, shifting the center
of interest from nature to man. The conclusion was
that while the value argument may be valid it does
not necessarily exclude the teleological , and that
the latter in its motive and method is often used as
a basis for the value .rgument itself. Furthermore,
the argument as stated was criticized because, while
Sorley had established the ground of objectivity of
moral values, the same proof had not been given for
other values claiming equal validity. Paterson's
argument from accumulated evidence was criticized
because it was held that accumulated half-truths
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could not necessarily make a whole truth, and that
the validity of each argument should be proved ere their
accumulation could be of worth. The final group of
scientists we have just discussed. The general conclus-
ion is that while other lines of evidence for God's
existence have been advanced, no one of them, nor
their sum, necessarily rules out the teleological
argument
.
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— Examination of the Evidence
CHAPTER 5
A Consideration of the Evidence for the
Teleological Argument
Two types of evidence for "design" in nature
which have not been emphasized to any great extent in
the classical writings on the subject, but which have
received considerable comment by Gifford Lecturers,
even by those who were not consciously upholding the
teleological argument, are (1) the prodigality of
nature, and (2) the presence of beauty. Because these
two factors are presented as new evidence their
respective merits as factors in the tel eological
argument deserve discussion.
Eddington has remarked on nature's
prodigality, and has said that if so many acorns have
to be scattered in order to grow one oak, it seems
not unreasonable to believe that nature would also,
in order to "provide a home for her greatest
experiment, Maa,,* waste a million stars in order that
of the number one might prove the achievement of her
461
purpose. Inge finds in the prodigality of nature
a clue_ as to the way in which God v/orks in the matter

181
of ..values, that it might well be, judging by nature,
that God is as "prodigal of values as He is of
existences," and that that fact itself might be the
462
solution of the problem of evil. Henry Jones speaks
of beauty and sound and of their "spendthrift
463
pientifulness. 11 Ward speaks of the inability of
natural selection to account for the phenomenon of
prodigality, and says the evidence forms a part of
the teleological argument, which he himself does not
464
uphold altogether. Thomson believes that the
alleged wastefulness of nature is a "question-begging
epithet", because "small fry" are always sacrificed
for big fry and more important species; the very
abundance of the "small fry" is necessary for the
465
production of the higher species, .lex aider,
however, sees in the wastefulness involved in the
process of evolution an argument against God's
immanence, if that God be conceived as all-powerful
465b
and good.
It seems to me the height cf homocentric
conceit to argue that God wastes his stars and the
material forces of earth in order to give human
beings a home or a beautiful sight to behold. To
view the wastefulness of the process of evolution
as necessary in order to bring forth man as the
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pinnacle of that process seems dubious, let alone
arguing that additional waste has "been necessary in
order that man may be both comfortable and
aesthetically stimulated, koreover, Inge's analogy
between nature's waste and the possible wastefulness
of v lues on the part of God seems abhorrent, if we
regard God as omnipotent, intelligent, good, and
desirous of preserving human personality. Unless
values be attached to human personality, realized by
self-conscious individuals, they have no status; then
Inge is proposing that God wastes the most precious
and valuable beings in the world. He must be
capricious if he is not lading in foresight and
wisdom.
If it is difficult for natural selection to
account for this prodigality, it is infinitely more
difficult to assign it to God. It is Thomson who
begs the question, not those who object to
w stefulness, when he dismisses the issue by saying
that the waste is necessary in order to bring forth
a newer and higher species. Why, if God be
omnipotent, should so much experimentation, with all
its attendant cruelty, be necessary? By what
standard of value are the various species measured
that the small are sacrificed for the great?
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Are the small fry to be used always as instruments?
And when shall we reach the end of the process in
which one species shall be sacrificed for another?
It there any guarantee that human life is not being
wasted in the same way?
The prodigality of nature, it seems to me,
is the manifestation of either a clumsy force or of
a hand limited in power. The moral argument has
fairly well established G-od's moral attributes. If
he were both good and oil-powerful the waste that has
come down through the ages in the natural world, and
which even now is, could net have been; granted his
moral nature, we hove no alternative but to believe
his power is limited. He should not be represented
as a Nero playing in peace while his subjects burn
and die in the Rome below him, but rather as a father
who pitieth his children and would spy.re the
frightful waste in life nd material resources if he
could; as yet he cannot.
The second bit of evidence that has been
advanced is the beauty of the universe. Eddington
466
believes we are impelled to recognize it; Inge with
Plotinus agrees that the world is worthy of its
467
creator, in its completeness, beauty nd harmony;
and that the beauty in the universe is to remind the

184
soul of its spiritual nature; Jones speaks of the
"gratuitous generosity" of beauty which is everywhere,
and of the fact that its purpose is not utilitarian
468but that it is to enrich men's lives. Thomson
maintains its objective and subjective character,
declares that it is everywhere, and insists that"not
469
only nature is beautiful, but man's own handiwork."
Laurie believes that God is immanent as the beautiful
in things, and that the feeling of beauty is the
470
"sensuousness of reason." Pfleiderer has dwelt on
471beauty as the revelation of God's creative spirit.
Balfour declares that the value of aesthetic objects
depends on the subjective emotions, that chance and
natural selection do not work in the aesthetic realm,
472
and that it must be the product of design. Ward,
however, is not so easily convinced, and he reminds
men of "blemishes" which everywhere rob nature of its
473beauty and detract from its perfection.
It does not appear that any two of these
defenders of beauty agree on the status of the
aesthetic values; certainly their objectivity has
not been established, nd at least Laurie and Balfour
have emphasized the subjective aspects of them,
Thomson also declaring them to be not unimportant.
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The aesthetic value has not, so far, been established
as objective on the s me basis as the moral value, for
instance, on grounds of universality and systematiza-
tioh. There is no proof in any of the Gifford Lectures
which discuss the question that the designer of this
beauty must be one; Mackenzie, reviewing Balfour's
work, declares there might conceivalby be an indefinite
number of "designers
.
w 474 At ny rate, there seems to
be so little agreement on the subject, and so little
explanation by the individual defenders of the exact
me ning of the term, that it seems unwise to offer
it as evidence in the teleological argument. There is
the additional problem also, as Ward suggests, of
explaining the existence of blemishes as well as
beauty, even as, in the general teleological argument,
there is necessity to explain dysteleological facts.
The conclusion is that the facts of nature's
prodigality and beauty cannot claim to be evidence of
the existence of an unlimited, good, and intelligent
God.
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CHAPTER 6
A Consideration of the Objections to the
Teleological Argument.
The survey of the Gifford Lectures is now
complete, -,nd the conclusion to be drawn from a study
of the various systems is that, while other arguments
for God may be offered and may be valid, they do not
necessarily rule out the place of the teleological,
unless the objections offered to it in these Lectures
are valid, The task of this present chapter is the
consideration of all the objections raised against
the teleological argument. The objections may be
divided into three main classes: (A) Objections to
the general method and emphasis of the argument;
(B) objections to the conceptions of nature and of
God implied in the argument; (C) objections from the
field of science. Each of these classes of objections
must be examined in order to determine the validity
of the argument.
(A) Objections to general method and emphasis*
There are four main objections to the method
and emphasis of the teleological argument. The first
is the general objection that the Kantian disproofs
are final. The second is that the whole method of
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the argument breaks the rules of logic. The third is
that the argument is homocentric to an illegitimate
degree, and the final objection is that it imitates
scientific method, but that the transition from the
evidence to the view of reality as a whole, is obscure.
In the case of each of these objections, I shall
state the position of the objectors, then estimate
the value of the objection.
1. The finality of the Kantian disproofs.
Four sets of Gifford Lectures have claimed
that the Kantian disproofs have at least greatly
weakened the validity of the teleological argument;
475 476 477these are the Lectures of Ward, Sorley, Kobson,
478
and Paterson. Only Stirling has attempted to refute
479
the disproofs. Kant, he s ys, was only half-hearted
in his opposition to the argument; the "artificer"
ide;. , criticized by Kant, is precisely what its
defenders admit, for the architect must be proportioned
to his work, and the wo rk being, in the case of nature,
so great, the architect can be no other than God
himself. None of the arguments, says Stirling, can be
taken alone, but each is a part of the unified concep-
tion of God.
It is true that Kant was more friendly to the
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teleological than to the other arguments, but to say-
that his objection to it was only half-hearted, and
that he became in his later work more and more con-
vinced of the validity of the argument is, as I have
already said, going too far. There is a vast
difference between the general recognition of the
fact of teleology and the support of the teleological
argument, Kant consistently upheld the difference
between phenomenal and noumenal realms, and opposed
the traditional arguments on the ground that they
attempted to bridge the gulf between those realms in
an illogical fashion.
The Kantian criticism of the teleological
argument will be discussed in its various forms, in
the pages following. The first objection was that
the argument rested on the cosmological , and that
both arguments, therefore, were faulty in logic, since
one could not argue from the facts of the phenomenal
world to the character of the noumenal realm. This
objection will be the second one considered in this
section. The second objection was that the
argument yielded merely an architect, not a God
worthy of being considered as the ground of the
universe. This objection will be considered with
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the group of- those which argue that the teleological
proof is of a God not worthy of worship.
2. Objections from the field of logic.
Alexander insists that the teleological
argument introduces apriori concepts "in the had
sense of the word"
,
supplying material not taken from
480
experience. Thomson accuses the argument of
involving the fallacy of " tra.nscendent inference",
and quotes Lovejoy as an .uthority for supporting
the belief that the analogy between human agency act-
ing causally, ..nd a divine agent who acts causally,
is not allowable, since we can have no experience of
481
the latter at all. James claims that the whole
concept of causality is too obscure to be applied to
482
God in his actions upon nature. Uorley states that
defenders of the argument actual ly begin with what
they want to prove, using the evidence of design
485
merely to corroborate their presuppositions.
Fraser and James largely agree on the same point,
that the so-called evidence of design could mean
484
nothing unless God v/ere presupposed. Dewey holds
the theory that every idea is only a plan of action,
and that reason itself is only action; therefore,
unless the idea of God -Drove fruitful in terms of
485
action no argument for his existence could be valid.
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Putting aside for the time the question of
presupposing God's existence, a subject which has
already been discussed at some length, the question
of the "fallacy of transcendent inference" may be
examined. Unless the Kantian gulf between phenomenal
and noumenal realms be maintained by the critics of
the teleological argument, there can be no question
concerning the use of facts of the present experience
in an argument relating to possible experience, to
God who, though unknown, perhaps, is not unknowable.
Unless the absolute unknowability of the thing-in-
itself be maintained, there is no reason to think that
the facts of experience cannot offer some evidence
concerning the unseen cause of such facts. There
remains the question of whether an argument by
analogy to human agency is allowable when that analogy
is applied to God. The issue concerning how he may
work, whether as immanent or transcendent need not
enter in as yet; it is simply a matter of whether we
have a right to attribute to God the causing of
adaptations in the natural world, and the general
order of that world.
Consider any bit of evidence used in the
teleological argument; consider, for instance, the
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structure of the human ear. 0ur method of accounting
for such structure is to set up at least five
hypotheses to explain it: (l) It may be self -caused,
by some inner principle of the ear itself, by some
* entelechy* , or by some self or group of selves
or souls within it. (2) It may have been formed by the
principle of natural selection, not by inner activity.
(3) It may have come about by the intervention of some
other human being, a Burbank, for example, who fashioned
it to suit himself. (4) It may have been formed by a
supreme creator, non-human, or superhuman, who makes
this ear structure a part of his divine plan; the ear
structure itself may be designed by him, and all
adaptations may thus be regarded as evidence of his
existence. (5) It may be a combination of tne above
hypotheses.
The first three proposed theories are not
very old. As we saw in the Introdeict ion, it is only
in recent times that natural selection and Drieschian
485b
vitalism have had a place, and the panpsychist •
s
theory is advanced in the very Gifford Lectures them-
selves as a new hypotnesis. The range of possible
hypotheses, therefore, is greater than it was at tne
time of the Bridgewater Treatises; and the method of
» i
<
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accounting for the evidence in nature, however, must
be that indicated above. Each of the hypotheses must
be examined in turn as each one is a possible solution
of the problem, and it is possible that the hypotheses
are not mutually exclusive, that God has caused the
organ, for instance, to work out its own salvation,
and that he may still be regarded as the cause of the
structure, albeit the indirect cause. The question
at this point concerns the validity of regarding God
as the direct cause of the phenomenon, and the answer
is that this conception at least deserves to be
treated as an hypothesis, on equal ground with the
others. It is not altogether on analogy to human
design, then, that we argue that God may be the
designer of the world; God's direct causation of the
world of nature, analogous to the potter's causation
of the clay, is simply one possible explanation of an
obvious fact. Some other hypothesis, or combination
of hypotheses, may be proved instead, in which case
that of God's direct causation would be disproved;
until this is done, however, the latter has a right
to stand as an hypothesis. The method of analogy
cannot and should not be ruled out entirely; it is
the background for much of our knowledge of all causes.
To be-sure, once convinced of the existence of God,
QC
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as a powerful, wise, nd intelligent being, it is
easier to behold his created works than if no such
idea had preceded the investigation. It is evident
that some of the work on the evidence of the proof of
God in nature has been done on this principle;
evidence from nature has been used simply to
corroborate preconceived ideas of nature's creator.
It is true also that the argument is closely allied
with the cosmological , and that, if the idea of God
as the cause of the world were overthrown, the
teleological argument would go also. Nevertheless,
with full acknowledgment of the fact that the
teleological argument taken alone might not lead
conclusively to the idea of one God, good, powerful,
and intelligent, it may still be maintained that it
has its pi -ce as one line of evidence leading us to
the conviction that God exists. Moreover, it has
a unique place, for, in addition to and contrast with
the other two traditional arguments, it goes some
distance in describing God's attributes of intelligence
and wisdom. The ontological argument and the
cosmological may have proved that God exists, but the
teleological argument actually points out the kind
of God he is. It is not used simply to corroborate
c(
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an idea already proved; it has proceeded on an induc-tive
method, and if its conclusion is valid, it has added
something to the idea of God which would not have been
there otherwise.
We have already noted the difficulties involved
in presupposing God. God's existence is not a datum
of Immediate experience, but must be proved.
Dewey's doctrine of the function of ideas,
reason, and values, has already been discussed. Unless
we accept his criterion of truth, we need not regard as
final his pragmatic criterion of truth in regard to
God's existence. Moreover, the teleological argument
makes no pretense of attaining certainty; with Dewey
its defenders would claim that it leads to less than
certainty, although they would insist that it claims
high probability.
(3) The argument is homocentric.
James has criticized the argument as being
centered on m n, his wishes, ..nd his needs. It takes
the attitude that nature's developments, its
adaptations, and its processes are for man's sole
487
benefit. Watson, on the other hand, declares that
the argument is unfair to man's essential nature,
since, if God is related to man only as an architect
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is related to his work, the most characteristic
elements of man will be unexplained and inexplicable,
for man would not, then, be self-determined. Morover,
the conception of God as Horal Governor also implies
the imposition upon man of moral laws, when man's
essential nature dictates that only those laws which
man himself deems reasonable should be obeyed.
James 1 criticism as applied to Paley's work
and to the Bridgewater Treatises seems well-directed.
It is indeed well for man to pause in his thought of
humankind as the pinnacle nd crown of all creation,
to consider the long process of evolution, its cost
in time and in creation, from the beginning, and to
adopt at least the hypothesis that the crown has not
yet descended, the pinnacle not yet reached, that
there are higher species yet to come. At the sa.me
time the egocentric predicament and the homocentric
point of view are unavoidable since man is what he
is; any other speculation about the development of
adaptations for the sake of some other species than
man must needs be highly speculative because as human
beings we are limited largely to knowledge of our own
kind.
Watson's criticism would be true if it was
actually claimed in the teleological argument that God
(
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is the architect of man's "essential nature." The
argument makes no such claim; when the question of
man's moral and intellectual nature is to be raised,
the teleological argumant resigns in favor of the
argument from v -lues, or other arguments concerned
with what is most significant in m-n's nature. The
teleological argument m kes no pretenses of
maintaining that God is the architect of men's souls
as their external creator, nor does the conception of
God as the ground of the moral law mean that he imposes
the law upon unwilling subjects. Lien may still choose,
and often men do choose to disobey these laws,
(4) The argument imitates scientific method,
but the tr nsition to the idea of reality
is obscure.
488
Sorley has advanced the criticism that the
teleological and all traditional arguments illustrate
the scientific "part-to-part method", but that when the
transition is finally made to the view of reality as
a whole, the change is obscure .^.nd uncertain. The
criticism seems to me to be well-founded, for the
difficulty with all three of the r rguments seems to
be that to account for a few facts in the finite
world the existence of God is necessary; the arguments
C
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are b:sed on too little, or on only one kind of evidence
The teleological ax ument may have erred in this
respect just because it does adopt the scientific
method of induction, and jumps to the idea of God as
the creator and designer too quickly; this may hive
been, as I pointed out, because the known range of
possible hypotheses was small at the time when the
argument was flourishing. If it is to be defended today
it must be because other hypotheses have been examined
and discarded.
(B) Objections concerning the conceptions on
which the teleological argument is based.
There are three main classes of objections
to the teleological argument's basic conceptions.
One of these is that the argument implies a mechanical
view of nature; another is that the mere existence of
laws is insufficient evidence for God's existence,
and a third is that the argument offers a very
limited conception of God. These objections must be
examined. It is the third class of objections,
however, which will claim the major attention.
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(1) The argument is based upon a mechanical
conception of nature.
489 49J. S. Haldane and J. Arthur Thomson,
both approaching philosophy from the point of view
of science, have accused the teleological argument of
implying that animate nature could not vd rk out its
own salvation but needed some outside help; science,
on the other hand, demonstrates the opposite truth.
The criticism seems fair as applied to
Paley's book and the Bridgewater Treatises; these
imply, or express the belief in continuous creation
of nature by God, as if nature in herself had no
power. The question of the whole conception of
nature, as seen by the defenders of the traditional
teleological argument, nd as expressed by modern
science and philosophy will be discussed when the
third main set of objections, those arising from
science, is faced. It is well at this point, however,
to be reminded of the substitute theory of nature
offered by Haldane nd Thomson respectively; the
former opposes the theory of Driesch which gives
a solution of the autonomous quality in life, and
holds that instead of confining life within the
organism as Driesch would have it, life is a whole,
(
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including structure, activities, environment, each
inseparable from the other, and that it is a unity,
itself a manifestation of God; Thomson equally opposes
the vitalism of Driesch, but holds to a "descriptive
vitalism" which claims the immanence in the organism
throughout of those qualities referred to by Driesch
as "entelechies" , or by Bergson as "elan vital."
I agree with both men that the old mechanical
viev/
r
unqualified, can hardly be accepted. It remains
to be seen if the two theories here offered as
substitutes can correct the fault of the old argument,
without doing an injustice to some other equally
important phase of the question.
(2) The mere existence of law is not enough
to prove God's existence.
Balfour asserts that even if natural laws
are recognized, the mere fact does not prove God's
491
existence. Both Gwatkin and Fraser, on the other
hand, lay great emphasis on this fact of natural law,
the former claiming that it means that the whole
system of the universe is a rational unity, and that
it must have, for this reason, only one moving power
behind it; if Force, only one Force; if God, only one
492
God. Fraser f s argument is essentially the same:
<
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design and natural law are two sides of one truth; the
493
only creative power is "morally intending Spirit"
,
and therefore continuous growth, regularity in the
physical world, manifest clearly such a spirit.
Balfour's criticism, it seems to me, is
ratl.er shallow, hut Gwatkin and Fraser err in over-
stating the regularity of the world. The presence .and
regular working of physical law, so that the universe
can he, in general
,
depended upon^surely creates the
presumption of rationality working in the process, and
the unity and uniformity of the laws, and their way of
cooperating for a common end, in forming, for instance,
the organism, creates a further presmption in favor of
believing that the power back of the process is one.
Unless we can prove the universal benevolence of
these laws, a presumption concerning God's goodness
would not necessarily follow; the existence of the
laws refer only to God's power and rationality.
Furthermore, the breaks in the laws, the very fluency
or unf inishedness of the universe may well be regarded
as arguments for believing that this pov/er is
limited.
It is the order of nature, as well as
specific adaptations within its realm, that has to do
with ^he teleological argument. "Order" refers not
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to the adaptations, but to the relation between the
constituents of nature. We can ill afford to neglect
the laws of nature in our estimate of the evidence fo
the teleological argument, for of all the evidence,
it, rather than the evidence from adaptations,
points to the power back of the universe as a unity
,
as one, not many.
(3) The argument yields a conception of a
limited God.
In addition to the criticism which points
out that the teleological argument gives a faulty
conception of nature, there are a large number of
objections on the ground that the argument, even if
design be admitted, and God as architect of the
world be proved, yields an unsatisfactory conception
of God. In the first place, Wallacef04 Pringle-
495 496Pattison and Hobson agree that it is an
argument for a deistic conception of God's relation
to the world. Furthermore, regarding God's relation
to the world, it implies that God either creates his
own material, and that the material is in such form
that he later changes it, "designs" it, or it is the
conception of a God who is set over against an
independently existing material, not created by God
f
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at all, and such a conception necessitates a dual
principle working in the universe. The first concep-
tion leads to the idea of an experimenting God, a
God who grows or who changes his mind, and therefore
reshapes the material universe; the second leads to
the idea of primordial dualism; in either case God is
limited; in neither case is he a being to be worshiped
497
he is at most an architect. Gwatkin sees no
difficulty in admitting that God finds difficulties
in the way, as he designs nature, for our knowledge
is limited and we cannot know all the ends God has in
view, "The fact of design is one thing, the limit of
design quite another." God works out the design
according to the properties and limitations which he
himself has given things, and the ends which he has
in view are infinitely beyond our comprehension; we
have no right to judge that he is limited against his
498
will. Laurie would admit that God is a spirit,
but speaks of him as a "Spirit in difficulty"
,
admitting that he is such, and still finding him
worthy of worship.
Now the only way to avoid the deistic
solution, says Alexander, is by conceiving God as
immanent in nature. This solution, as has already
been noted, is the one adopted by the Cairds
,
Watson,
f
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Pfleiderer, and others of their school, by J. S.
Haldane, and by Fraser. The latter, however, differs
from the others in emphasizing the fact that the
immanence of divine design, in the existence of natural
law, has a definite purpose, namely, that of adapting
the temporal process to the moral and intelligent
499
constitution of man. Still, replies Alexander, to
those who abandon the idea of external creation in favor
of immanent purpose this statement of immanence is
simply a statement of the fact that a certain plan
seems to exist; it does not prove that there is
,
. . . , 500divinity m the plan.
-Jiother set of objections to the argument
concerns God's attributes. Llerely to argue that
certain facts in the world bear the mark of intell-
igent purpose is to hold an "impoverished" form of
501theism, according to Balfour, and Gorley objects
that the teleologies 1 argument c:.n never yield the
502
idea of God as a God of goodness. The objection
of Driesch is hardly to be classed with the others
because of the uniqueness of his ideas f and of the
place he gives the Absolute in his system, yet it
belongs to this group since he also felt that the
teleological argument fell short of yielding his
idea of the absolute, merely applying to the
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" entelechian factor in Givenness." It may not be
out of order to note here that another famous critic,
not a Gifford Lecturer, has stated his opinion that
"every indication of Design in the Kosmos is so much
evidence against the Omnipotence of the Designer.
This critic is John Stuart Mill* He goes on to say
that design means contrivance, and that contrivance
means the "need of employing means." Such a need is
a "consequence of the limitation of power", since no
one who could attain an end immediately would use
indirect means.
Still another group protests that the
evidence of design might conceivably be used for
proving the existence of several gods, but not for
505proving the existence of one God only. U'ard and
Hobson have made such a declaration. The argument,
therefore, is no proof of God's unity.
The above criticisms are on the whole well-
directed. It is true that Paley and the Bridgewater
Treatises present the view that God is external to
the world as potter is external to the clay, that he
creates continuously and stands 'part from the
creation. There is ground also for the deistic
dilemma stated by Fringle-Pattison, the choice that
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must be made, if God be external to creation, between
God creating his material and later changing it, and
God limited by the material world which has been
created independently. The dilemma is a real one if
we conceive God as wholly external to the material
world. Nor does Gwatkin' s solution by appeal to man's
ignor'-.nce in the face of God's perfect knowledge of
infinite ends completely solve the problem, since
Gwatkin himself explains that God, having set the
properties and limitations of the material v/orld, can-
only design the world within these original boundaries
Such a solution makes God an all-pcwerful and
champion solitaire player who sets his own handicaps
even when the cards must be thrown away. That is,
God, if he be omnipotent and all-loving, valuing
human personality above the rest of creation, would
hardly have changed his mind concerning his design, as
Pringle-Pattison indicates he must have done as
external creator, according to the first horn of the
dilemma stated, just because he had originally set his
own properties and limitations, if_ he saw that the
design he was working out, within these properties
and limits, was interfering in many cases with the
welfare of personality. The conception of God's
development of a plan, within limitations set by
I
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himself, in -such a way as often to interfere with
man's welfare, simply because he had once thus set
limitations, does not encourage us to believe in
God's absolute goodness. It seems to me that
Gwatkin is striving to save G-od's power at the
expense of his morality.
The alternative view offered is that of
God's immanence. Already it has been noted that
there are difficulties connected with belief in a
God who is wholly imminent, and not, at the same
time, transcendent. Alexander is largely correct
in claiming that such a view is the mere naming of
a plan, and the restatement of observed facts. It
is a solution that declares God is in the world, but
it does not tell what his purpose is in thus being
in the world. Only Fraser states the end of God's
immanence in a clear fashion. God is immanent in
nature, he says, and we see that immanence in the
existence of natural law; God's purpose is to use
these laws as a means of adapting the whole natural
process to the moral and intellectual constitution
of man. This solution stands in sharp contrast to
that of G-watkin, for it gives God an aim and it
names his purpose as being something other than
working out a design according to his own set
t
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limits.. Only Fraser, it seems to me, solves the
dilemma caused "by facing God's relation to nature;
God is not wholly external, "but is iram .nent in
nature also, miking the natural world the medium for
the creation of persons. In such a view God is not
wholly immnent; he is also the spirit which directs
the process, understanding it, using it; he is more
than the plan, yet he works in it, and he has a real
aim besides working out a game for himself.
Fraser' s theory would be the answer to Mill
also. Bowne has pointed out, in replying to Mill,
that even if God had the power by simple fiat of his
will to produce finite existence, he would not do so,
507for his "work must have qualities." If God's
purpose be, as Fraser has st ted, the producing of
moral and intellectual personality, direct production
by God of such personality, without a setting of time
and space would simply be a conception of God produc-
ing a set of machines, for moral and intellectual
personality is developed
, not created immediately.
Therefore, in order that his work might have qualities,
as Bowne says, the setting is nr.de, the stage is
built. I do not find the conception of contrivance
itself an argument against God's power, if we assume
that his purpose is the production or development of
i
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moral .rid intellectual qualities in humankind;
immediate creation of such would be impossible
and undesirable, for it would mean that the entire
realm of persons is a re.-i.lm of automatism. On the
other hand, lack of design, evidence of creation
which appears to interfere with this moral and
intellectual development does seem to indicate lack
of power, for it is a contradiction of the avowed
purpose of God. More will be said concerning this
point in the last main division of the "objections",
when the objections from the field of science will be
considered
.
Concerning the objections raised in the
matter of God's attributes, it may be agreed that the
idea of mere intelligent purpose is "impoverished 11
as Balfour says, and that particularly in the face
of dysteleological evidence, it may be proved that
the natural world is not conclusive in the matter of
God's goodness. It should be borne in mind, however,
that the teleological argument as a supplement to the
other two traditional proofs, was a distinct advance,
in that it presented evidence for God's goodness, to
be added to the evidence for his power. Even Mill
concludes his study of the argument from design by
sayin^ that there is a "large balance of probability
i
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in favour of creation by intelligence." 8 If the
teleological argument is not regarded as the sole
proof or argument for God's existence, it may well
claim validity for having advanced the conception
that God is intelligent, and this is no mean advance
in the idea of God. Other lines of evidence also need
to "be pursued, but if the teleological argument has
established the intelligence of God, it has made a
very positive contribution.
A like -nswer may be given to those who
criticize the argument on the ground that it leads to
a polytheism, perhaps, but not necessarily to the
idea of one God. Judging by the Bridgewater
Treatises especially, in which each writer claims
God as the designer of a specified field of nature,
one might easily conclude from a reading of all of the
work, that there is a group of designers, each with
a field of his own, forming a kind of architectural
firm. Here it is important that we bear in mind that
the teleological argument is used in conjunction with
others, certainly in connection with whatever
arguments would prove God the one cause of the world.
The teleological argument simply goes on record as
supplying the adjective "intelligent" for the one
«
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God. Ivloreover, there is a relationship between these
separate designs, an order, in fact, in nature that
justifies us in claiming finally that the world is an
organic unity, manifesting purpose, °nd that it must
be guided by one God, not many. Taken in pluralistic
fashion, then, the separate evidences of design may
be arguments for many designers; taken together in
their inter-relationships, in the order that runs
through them, all pluralism is resolved into a unity,
and the belief in one God is a necessary result of
the recognition of such unity.
(C) Objections from the field of science.
The most formidable set of objections to the
teleological argument comes from the field of science;
these objections originate from three sources, each
representing a special branch of scientific research.
They may be classified as follows: (1) Evolution and
especially the method of natural selection adequately
account for all adaptations formerly attributed
directly to God. (2) Within the organism itself is a
factor or group of factors which enables the organism
to work out its own salvation. (3) The fact of evil
in the universe is the disproof of the theory that a
good, wise, powerful, and loving God has designed the
<
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universe. Each of these theories must be examined.
(1) Evolution adequately accounts for all
adaptations
.
509 510 511 512Alexander, James, Bruce, Thomson
513
and Bos .nquet, each representing a different theory
of the idea of God, are agreed that natural selection
now accounts for all adaptations in the natural world,
and that such a solution is the sounding of the death
knell for the teleological argument* Balfour, on the
other hand, claims that natural selection neither
514proves nor disproves the argument, but is neutral.
There is a strong protest, however, that
evolution as a theory, and natural selection as its
method do not preclude the possibility of God's
existence. Stirling515 and Hobson516 declare that
natural selection, so far from being established as
the main factor in evolution, may be regarded simply
as an hypothesis. It is interesting to compare the
early date of Stirling's statement with the recent
date of the work of Hobson, who wrote as a scientist,
not as a theologian, and still came to the same
conclusion. Stokes, 51^ Wallace 518 Watson510 and
520Driesch declare that what Stirling and Hobson
say ef natural selection is true of the whole doctrine
<<
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of evolution. The first two make brief but uncomprom-
ising statements at an early date, while Driesch and
Watson announce their conclusions in more recent years,
and after a careful examination of the evidence. Of
the six who attack the theory, only Stokes and
Stirling are whole-hearted friends of the teleological
argument; the other four are its critics.
Assuming
,
however, that the theory of
natural selection is established as true, can it
account for the progress that we find in experience?
521 522 ro^
, 524Gwatkin, Thomson, Balfour, ° and Watson
point out the failure of the doctrine to account for
525 526 527
origins; Driesch, Ward, and Thomson speak of it
as in itself negative and destructive, unable to
explain positive advance, and needing a positive
factor, therefore, to make such accounting. Thomson
calls this positive factor the struggle for existence.
528
Bosanquet, on the other hand, is convinced that
only natural selection, not a subjective or
psychological selection, can mould to a "definite
line of progress and elicit .... a positive structure."
His reply to those who think natural selection is purely
negative and destructive is that their statement is
like saying that the vrork of a sculptor is negative
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because he "works by removal." Driesch finds that
the evolutionary principle does not account for
mutual adaptations and for restitutions in organisms;
529 530 531
Grwatkin, Balfour and Sorley insist on the
inability of evolution to explain or account for
life's great spiritual values, which are developed in
spite of the work of natural selection, rather than
because of it.
There is still another group, however, who
claim that the theory of evolution falls in line
532
with the idea of divine purpose. Henry Jones
claims that the theory has destroyed all past theories
which claim that results are to be measured by
origins, that it has spiritualized the world,
redeemed the past, and given hope for the future.
533
Max duller looks upon it only as "pragmatic
history" or as the Entwi eke lung of the whole plan,
eternally present, or as the record of progress
534 535
already made. Fraser and Pringle-Pattison
see it as the evidence of continual and continuous
progress, not of sporadic production, as the
description of the only way a God, worthy of worship,
could act. J. 3. H aldane calls it the "order in
536time-relations" of God's manifestation.
I*
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Morgan and Alexander have developed their
theories of emergent evolution, and found their God
or their deity, in the very concept of evolution
itself.
Before estimating the value of the criticisms
made about the teleological argument on the one hand,
and the doctrine of evolution on the other, it is
necessary to examine the claims of Darwin himself,
concerning the doctrine of evolution. That he
claimed to have a doctrine which accounted for
origins, I believe we shall have to admit. Whether
he was able to establish the thesis or not, is
another question. The very title of his book, The
Origin of 3pecies ought to be conclusive evidence of
his claim. He did not, however, claim that natural
selection was the sole factor working in the process.
In the introduction to his book he states that he is
"convinced that natural selection has been the most
important, but not the exclusive means of
537 538
modification." His book, The Descent of I.Ian
was an attempt to emphasize the additional factor of
sexual selection. Darwin was, then, not dogmatic in
his assertion of the place which natural selection
held in evolution. Several of the Gifford Lectures
t
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imply that Darwin held it to he the only factor
operating in the process.
The following conclusions may be made
concerning the theory of evolution and its bearing
on the teleological argument and the general evidence
for God's existence:
(l)It ©ay well be said that natural selection may
account for the way in which certain adaptations in
nature are made, and in case it were proved to be
actually operating, it would account for many
adaptations hitherto ascribed directly to God. It
would not necessarily rule out God's existence, for
he might still be the power back of the whole process.
(2) The exact scope and definition of evolution and of
natural selection, especially of their relation to
the idea of God, is still a disputed matter.
(3) Darwinian and Lamarckian evolution seem unable, to
account for the prodigality of nature, for mutual
adaptations, for certain organic restitutions, for
the general order of nature and its laws, and for
intrinsic values.
(4) The doctrine of evolution may even be used to
establish God's existence, in naming him as the
ultimate cause of the process, and in calling the
I
216
process God's own plan. Certainly it has no effect
on the value argument, or on the argument from the
general order and intelligibility of nature.
(5) The argument that evolution proves that God
spiritualizes the world depends on the view which may
he taken of God's relation to the world. If he is
merely an external creator, the view would h rdly hold
even a theory of God's immanence in the world calls fo
explanation.
The fifth conclusion leads especially into
the second set of objections to the teleological
argument from the field of science, and it will be
necessary to determine precisely the meaning of nature
for itself, for man, and for God.
(2) Within the organism itself is a factor
or group of factors which enables it to
work out its own salvation.
Bowne divided the existents or things of
which the universe is composed into two classes: the
metaphysically real and the phenomenally real. The
members of the latter class were in no sense
illusory, but they had no inner independent life,
539
and were dependent upon the first class. it seems
to me that the Gifford Lectures, particularly those
I
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engaged in studying the life of the organism, have
been attempting to push out of the phenomenally real
rid a number of entities which had formerly been
regarded as permanently consigned to that realm.
That is, the tendency has been to narrow down until
it is almost nothing at all, the range of "dead matter."
One of the movements which has been engaged in this
work is the movement of vitalism, represented by
Driesch, the main tenets of which have already been
discussed. \nother movement is that of "panpsychismy
represented by James Ward, foreshadowed , at least, by
Royce, upheld in these days especially by Miss
Calkins. Still another group of scientists have
been engaged in reexamining the character of
inanimate nature, and asserting that this realm also
is far from being mechanical. All of these theories
consciously or unconsciously im to tear down the old
idea of a creator, externally related to the world,
and thus they vitally affect the teleological
argument
•
Driesch and his theory of entelechy have
already been discussed. He claimed that in the
realm of inorganic matter there is no differentiation,
but that when we oome in the process of evolution to
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life we find, it is autonomous. The autonomous factor
he called "entelechy" . Pringle-Pattison discusses the
theory and decides that while he cannot uphold the
whole Drieschian conception of entelechy and its place
he still realizes the need of more adequate categories
540
for biology, to replace old mechanical conceptions.
J. S. Haldane opposes the theory on the ground that
Driesch has not risen .bove physico-chemical concepts.
Furthermore, it is not the independent structures that
541
should concern science, but their organization.
Life, says Haldane , is not to be confined to the
individual organism; it is a unity which includes all
542
environment as well. Watson believed that the
organism had a principle of life within it, was self-
determined, was both universal and particular, was
eternal principle manifested within specific limits.
He believed in immanent purpose, order, and system,
but did not express his opinion of the Drieschian
543
entelechy as an autonomous factor. Thomson goes
farther: A physico-chemical description of life can
never explain such things as the development of the
544
embryo, and the workings of inheritance. Mature
is inherently rational; it is full of purposeful
545
self-determination. God originated organisms in
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order that they might with their own power become
546
perfect selves. Thomson adopts not the "dynamic
vitalism" of Driesch, but a theory of "methodological
vitalism", by which he declares his conviction that
ultra-mechanic ill concepts are required for describing
547
organisms, that the qualities which Driesch
describes as entelechies, suddenly and unexpectedly
548
appearing, have been, instead, "present throughout."
Hobson rem" ins neutral on the subject of vitalism, but
sees no reason to disbelieve that some sort of element,
like the entelechy, may be present. Alexander
criticizes Driesch, holding that instead of the
entelechy acting as the directing agency, the real
direction is in the princi pie or plan of the
550
constellation.
The connection of the theory of vitalism
with the teleological rjument is apparent. If true,
it can mean either that the form of life has no
connection with God (from the point of view of God's
causation of it) because it is self-determined, or it
can mean that God allows life to determine itself
within limits just as he grants freedom to finite
human beings. The advantage of the theory is that it
does thus grant autonomy to life, removes one more
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element from the region of dead matter, from phenomenal
existence, letting life work out its own salvation.
It seems as a theory to he not yet established, at
least its dynamic aspects are questioned even by
Thomson who has adopted a methodological vitalism as
a substitute, not caring to commit himself to the
Drieschian "entelechy" and all it involved. The
trouble seems to be that the "entelechy" is neither
physical nor psychical, does not fall to the level of
the first, nor rise to the heights of the second.
551
Spaulding criticizes it particularly for concerning
itself only with the level of life, denying different-
iation in the inorganic realm. Llorgan is opposed to it
552
for at least this reason also. Other grounds for
opposing it, on the basis of internal inconsistencies,
553
we have already discussed, in an earlier chapter.
As for the theory of panpsychism, inklings
of this theory are found inRoyce's book, where he
notes the striking parallels between the life of nature
and the life of man, and concludes that nature cannot
554
be called unconscious, but only uncommunicative.
It is Ward who develops the theory fully, looking
upon all beings as "monads", and essentially as
persons, though some are human and some non-human.
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The universe is made up of selves of different levels.
Miss Calkins has stated the doctrine by saying that
"completely personalistic doctrine must maintain, not
that selves exist alone with other real though non-
mental beings, but that the yjo rid consists wholly of
persons or selves"
,
although a large number of these
556
selves are "undistinguished and uncomprehended .
"
Pringle-Pattison has opposed Ward's view in his own
G-ifford Lectures, declaring that "nothing is gained,
and much confusion is introduced, by resolving
557
external nature into an aggregate of tiny minds,
"
Nature in the thought of Pringle-Pattison, Sorley and
Fraser is recognized as complementary to mind, but as
possessing in itself no real existence apart from its
557bfunction of acting as a medium for human persons.
These three, at least, recognize the universe as
consisting of interacting selves and non-mental things;
there are distinctly two orders, one the natural and
the other the moral order. The advantage of panpsychism
is, of course, that from the point of view of God, it
postulates one order throughout, and from the point
of view of the individual entity, it lets each one
work out its own salvation. The universe is a
pluralism of minds, but with a purpose all of one
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pattern, and manifested in the same way. There are
difficulties with the theory, however, that interfere
with its acceptance. In the first place, the lowest
level of these minute minds, undifferentiated and
uncomprehended seems to serve little purpose .nd to
have little status; everything unique about conscious-
ness as we know it in human life appears to be
558
lacking. Again, as Dean Knudson points out, the
rigidity of n_ture, its order :.nd uniformity seem to
argue against the theory of a society of myriad
selves, no one of which is like another. Hoernle
speaks of our knowledge of our bodies, which are
themselves a part of nature, of the lack of evidence
of such "minds" in them, and of the fact that even
we ourselves, conscious beings, do much of our work
559
unconsciously, without specific purpose. Moreover,
if God is the sole cause of the universe, there is no
reason to assume that he cnuld not have created non-
psychic centers of life as well as finite minds,
letting them interact, also, but made of a material,
and serving purposes different from those of pyschic
centers
.
There is a third theory- that has been gaining
some prominence and which deserves mention. Lorgan,
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in his theory of emergent evolution, has advanced the
doctrine that there is differentiation and emergence
within inorganic matter. Driesch, as we have seen,
discourages the idea. In recent times L. J. Henderson
has been working out a theory to show that there is
fitness of environment as well as fitness of life for
environment, that the properties of hydrogen, carbon,
and oxygen constitute a unique group of physical -nd
chemical characteristics so that they are fittest
possible for organic life; these properties are
adapted for an end, and that end is forming a fit
560
environment for life. In other words , there is a
movement on foot to take inorganic matter out of its
dead state, or rather, to prove that it never was
dead, that there is teleology in this realm as well
as in the others. There has been considerable
opposition to Henderson's theory and general view of
the connection between inorganic and organic matter.
561 562Conger and H. C. Warren are both opposed to
attributing purpose to the inorganic realm, the former
on the ground that belief, desire, and causation are
all involved in purpose, and that these cannot be
attributed to the inorganic world, the latter on the
ground that anticipation, an indispensable element in
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purpose, is lacking in this realm. Henderson's view
is, however, attracting no small attention, and the
theory deserves to be investigated and fairly-
estimated .
This third trend would not rightfully have
belonged in this chapter, for Henderson was not a
G-ifford Lecturer, but his theory of the inorganic
realm is so closely allied to other theories regarding
the organic realm, which have been advanced in Clifford
Lectures, that it should be included in order to
complete the evidence of the general trend in the
direction of removing entities of every degree and
level from the status of "dead matter." None of the
theories advanced have been conclusively proved.
Particularly the theory of panpsychism is in question.
If vitalism in the organic realm, and the
Henderson! an theory of the inorganic realm were
proved, we would, from a theistic point of view,
merely have to say that God has given to each realm
of nature the power to work out its own salvation,
that all realms show purpose of the same character,
and that the very fact of unity within the universe,
the interaction of these several realms, the order
that is manifest in the whole process and in each
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process of each realm is a proof of the divine
immanence. Order and intelligibility would still
remain, out of the old teleological argument, as
factors found in nature, even newly conceived, and
with the added evidence of purpose running through
all realms, there would be the more reason to believe
in God.
Assuming, however, that these hypotheses are
not proved, we would have, as Sorley, Fringle-
Pattison, and Fraser conceived the universe, two
orders, one human and mental, the other non-human,
dependent, phenomenal, occasional; both realms would
be objects of God's purpose, but the non-human realm
would exist as the medium by which persons are
developed.
It do es not seem to me that the hypotheses of
vitalism and of panpsychism have been proved conclus-
ively, and, therefore, they do not affect the cogency
of the teleological argument except to warn theistic
believers that the time has come when they can no
longer complacently believe as a certainty that
mankind alone is self-determining, that the time may
come when we shall know that God has endov/ed all
forms of being with the same power of self-determina-
i
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tion, according to their respective levels; that he
h as given man, and that he stands to all nature not
as potter to inert clay, but as the being who is able
to give each realm its power of self-determination;
that he is immanent in nature just as he is immanent
in man, and that one eternal purpose is being
accomplished through the interacting levels of one
universe. Such a conception would rule out the purely
mechanic '.1 conception of nature implied in the old
argument from design; it would also do away with much
of the homocentric attitude that runs through such
work; it would lay emphasis upon the general facts of
order and intelligibility, unity and purpose which are
the more apparent if the theories advanced in this
section be true, and less upon individual structures
and adaptations. We would have, nevertheless, room
for the teleological argument, although it would be
an argument based upon the relations and cooperation
between structures and organisms, not upon individual
adaptations; the latter might still be regarded as
clues to the ends to which the whole process is
striving. The conception, if proved, would simply
define in more definite terms the immanence of God;
many of the Gifford Lecturers have declared their
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belief in God's immanence, but in very few instances
have they defined their meaning, being content to
regard it only vaguely and in broad general terms, or
to think of the whole process of evolution as the
unfolding of a preconceived plan. Evolution would the
more have to be regarded as purposive; natural
selection as a theory to cover some or all cases must
in any case be reexamined, for to claim that in the
same system of purpose some species are originated
fortuitously, and others by design would seriously
endanger the conception of God's constant immanence.
In any case, the hypothesis of occasionalism cannot
be regarded as final, although, admitting the opposing
trend of the times in the realm of science, no
substitute for the theory has been proved conclusively.
(3) The fact of evil in the world is the
disproof of the theory that a good, wise,
powerful and loving God has designed the
universe
.
The third objection from the field of science
is the evidence of dysteleology which faces man on
every side, of moral degradation and sin on the one
hand, and of physical evil on the other; both facts,
or groups of facts, seem to indicate a pov/er working
((
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agaiast all good and useful purpose. Science has
chiefly concerned itself with the problem of physical
evil, but the Gifford Lectures have discussed both
types. The advance of scientific investigation in
recent years in disease among plants, animals, and
human beings, with the discovery of parasites and
bacteria as organisms admirably adapted to accomplish
their purpose of destruction of life, has led nearly all
the G-ifford Lecturers to discuss the problem, and to
attempt in some way to reconcile it with their
respective systems.
The views of Alexander and Morgan are so
unique that they can be easily separated from the
others . Alexander insists that evil is only the
563
misdistribution of satisfactions; Morgan
distinguishes sin from suffering, claiming that the
first must be regarded as a mark of "retrogression",
of falling back into a lower level of emergence in
the evolutionary scale; the latter, however, has a
useful function in that it contributes towards the
564
ultimate perfection of the universe. The diffi-
culty with both theories is in accounting in terms of
their own systems for the facts of accident and error
of any kind, for Alexander's "misdistribution", and
<
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for llorg-.n's "retrogression," because conscious control
by will of man's actions has no place in either
system. Moreover, it will be difficult, as we shall
see, to • .ccount for 11 physical suffering, as Lorgan
would have us, in terms of its contribution to the
world's perfection.
The only straightforward st tement of the
direct and irreconcilable antithesis between the
conception of G-od and the presence of evil, is James'
statement that any kind of disorder may as easily
prove the existence of a malevolent God, on the basis
565
of the teleological argument. Because this is
the sole st tement to this effect it may be discussed
at this point. If the teleological argument were
stated in the form of teleological arguments
.
that is
to say, if each separate bit of evidence of design
were considered as final, and each as a separate and
independent proof of a designer, we would have an
ultimate polytheism, a group of architects; but we
have already shown the difficulty with such a view:
the demand for rational unity, the general principle
of law and order in the universe demand one force, one
G-od as their sustainer. Now James is never convinced
on this point; he says himself that he is not
{I
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satisfi-ed as to the existence of one God, except as
an "overbelief ; " he thinks it quite in accord with
experience to argue for polytheism; he is avowedly
and almost consistently a pluralist. In such a frame
of mind he turns to the facts of disorder. There are
gods for various realms of order in the universe, and
therefore there must be gods for disorder by the same
token. We have already argued, as have many of the
Gifford Lecturers, that the prevalence of order and
law, the relations between structures, are signs of
the interpretability of the universe in terms of
organic unity: goodness, order, law, these form a
coherent system, and hence our argument for the
existence of one God as a ground of these. Disorder,
evil, sin, cannot be so systematized; they are in
their very nature incoherent. Granted, then, that
these facts of incoherence must somehow be explained
and reconciled with theistic belief, the evidence for
disorder and evil is not of the same kind, nor could i
be used as an argument for God or gods in the same
way as the evidence from order and intelligibility.
Disorder may mean more than simply lack of order, but
at least it is that, purely negative, indicative of
lack of intelligence and power and not to be used as
»(
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a argument for a god, even though he be a god of
malevolence; it is a contradiction of terms to speak
of a god of lack-of-order or of lack-of-power . The
problem of reconciling evil and disorder with a
belief in God who is the source only of good and of
order, still remains.
566 567
Hobs on and R. B. Haldane admit the need
of reconciling the facts with the belief in God but
offer no solution.
On the other h; nd, the great majority of the
Gifford Lectures have advocated some theory, attempting
in every case to find even in evil an evidence of
God's work. Some of these have dealt with the
problem of sin, others with physical evil, a few with
both problems.
Bosanquet, Edward Caird, Stokes, and Thomson
have maintained that what appears to be evil is
568
really absorbable into the good. Stokes and
569
Thomson appeal particularly to our finite ignorance
concerning the ultimate end and meaning of apparent
ills, saying that if we indeed knew everything about
the universe we would see that there was, after all,
no evil in it. Bosanquet claims that all evil is due
to our inherent finite nature, and that our only
I
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escape €rom it lies in our loss of that finitude.
571
This is the view also of Edward Caird. Royce
declares that evil is "explicitly finite", and that
the Absolute as such is not evil although" its life is
572
unquestionably inclusive of evil."
A larger number see- in the presence of evil
a better state of the universe than there would be
573 574 575
without it. Bosanquet, Fraser, Pfleiderer,
576 577 578 579Sorley, Inge, Jones, Pringle-Pattison,
580 581 582Morgan, Stirling, and Watson declare that
since the ultim-te purpose of the universe is not to
give mankind a good time but to enable us to develop
character, the universe is admirably suited for that
purpose, evil acting as an obstacle for man to over-
come on his way upward. Stokes, Gwaikiaf
585 586
Laurie, and Paterson, not going so far as to
declare evil an actual means to goodness, still insist
that its presence in the universe does not cancel the
sum total of good which exists and will always exist
587
alongside it. Royce sees evil as the condition
inevitably bound up with our social nature, .nd the
latter being good, we can afford to take on its burdens
588
and oblig tions. Sorley finds that though evil and
suffering exist, each bears only his own burden, and
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the fact—4h«.t evil is thus distributed among all men,
589takes away its curse. With Ward he speaks also of
the uni inishedness and fluency of the universe as
being, on the whole, a desirable condition, but one
which necessarily involves the penalties of evil.
Such a world, they insist, is far more desirable than
the finished, nerfected, and altogether automatic
590
world. Ward declares -that the burden of proof that
evil is superfluous rests on the critic of evil, and
declares that no one can demonstrate the superfluous-
591
ness of physical evil. Jones sees m physical
evil the warning, "Don't do it again," which is good
and protective of life. Fraser, 592 Pfleiderer^03
594 505
Jones, and Webb insist that moral evil is due to
finite will, which is free to choose, and chooses
darkness rather than light; they declare that man's
freedom with the necessary consequence of the possibil-
ity of moral evil is infinitely to be preferred to the
perfect, sinless wo rid of determined beings*
596 597Sorley and Laurie connect the idea of
evil with divine purpose, the former declaring that
evil is failure in the manifestation of that purpose,
the latter developing the idea that it is the failure
of God himself, who is a Spirit, but "in difficulty."
598Farnell^ speaks of the fact that if God were
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omnipotent, he might be "logically imagined" to have
shaped his creation more mercifully.
Each of the above solutions of the problem
of evil must be examined.
The belief that evil is in some way due to
man's finitude, and that it is absorbable into the
good when man realizes his true nature, cm only be
accepted if we adopt the whole viewpoint of the
defenders of this view, for those who uphold this
explanation believe finite beings to be parts of the
Absolute nd Infinite Being. Even admitting that
such is the case, it would still be only a matter of
faith that in the long run all seeming evils are in
reality good. Taking experience as it is met day by
day it is difficult to account for most of our evils
in such terms; disease, especai lly disease that comes
without warning by germs which are themselves
organisms, the suffering of dumb animals, especially
appear unreconcilably evil and contrary to good. Even
if evil be attributed to man's finitude, furthermore,
these evils would then be part of the Absolute, since
all things are parts of it, including finite
experience
. There would be the difficulty of
ascribing evil to absolute experience since the latter
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is represented only as good. Fame 11 points out the
additional defect in the theory which is that if we
argue that evil is illusion, we may by the same token
599
argue for the illusory character of good, for our
consciousness of evil is fully as vivid as that of good.
Again there is the solution that we judge an
experience to be evil because of our own ignorance;
if we knew ~11 we would see apparent evils in their
true light as actual good. It is true, as Thomson
points out, that many so-called evils have been found
in time not to be so in an unmitigated sense; certain
parasites h ve been found to be eliminative agents;
we are getting control of certain diseases; as
knowledge increases evil decreases; many of the so-
called evils are in the power of men to cure, for
example, unhealthy old age can be made healthy and
useful. Yet there still remains much that has not
been accounted for, and even if it were true that in
time we should find out a great deal more concerning
the control of disease, there would be a condition not
of good, changed out of evil, but only a condition of
having learned how to control evil; the evil is still
there; the yellow fever germ is still deadly even
though it can be controlled and eliminated in some
regions. And even if it could be proved th-.t in time
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all ev-ils could be used as* good, the problem would
still remain as to why we, in the twentieth century,
should enjoy the benefits of such discovery at the end
of the "long run", instead of being victims of these
forces when they were known simply as evils. Why,
for instance, should we be immune from small-pox when
three hundred years ago hundreds of human personalities
were destroyed by it, simply because they had not
learned the means of control? If God is the lover of
all personality there is no reason to think that ours,
in this day, mean more to him than those of another
age. Furthermore, is it possible entirely to justify
the waste of "smaller fry" in order that a higher
species may be created? Unless God has been an
experimenting God there seems no way to account for
the tremendous waste through the long course of
evolution. One other remark on the subject of
Thomson's solution! He speaks of the fact that old
age may be made healthy through man's own efforts.
Is he thinking of bodily health only? The misery of
old age seems to come mot from unhealthy bodies but
from sick minds, and for Thomson to declare that we
have it in our power to control them is to state
What physicians say is impossible, since the workings
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of the "mind, even in this advanced era of mental
hygiene, are still largely a mystery. In other words,
Thomson's solution covers only a limited number of
cases, leaving out many others, and even if all he
said vere true, we should still have to face the fact
that there have "been ages of waste of life and
personality in the days when men did not have such
knowledge
.
The solution that evil acts as a stimulus
to good, and that the universe is a "vale of soul-
making", again accounts for much of evil, but applies
after all only to pain that can ennoble. As Farnell
600
again points out, there is too much pain that is
hopeless and paralyzing, pain which after weeks of
inflicting torture, blots out the personality and
prevents forever in this world the opportunity of
becoming a more perfect soul; there are those who are
rendered helpless both in mind and body by pain and
those also who are mowed down in such physical
catastrophes as the earthquake in Japan, cut off from
any further opportunity of spiritual growth. The
world may be a vale of soul-making, but it would seem
as if the force inflicting this evil that good might
come of it has often acted clumsily, and barred the
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way to-that good which should come out of evil. Nor
does the solution in any way account for the suffering
among dumb animals.
It is true that the fact of evil must not
obscure the realization that the world is also good,
and it is to be borne in mind that good is to be
expl ined as well as evil, but the optimism of
realizing good must^ on the other hand, not dim the
faculties for dealing with whatever evil does exist.
So long as the slightest evil comes into human
experience it must be investigated, and reconciled
with the belief in God. Royce has held that evil
comes into experience because of our social natures;
and he lauds vicarious suffering; it seems to me to
be true that we suffer vicariously and would prefer to
do so rather than relinquish our social nature. On
the other hand, earthquake, fire and storm, which
descend and destroy, so far from being due to our
social nature are obviously the work of the giant
enemy, Nature. And again, the social solution
hardly accounts for animal suffering.
The human free will accounts in large measure,
perhaps completely, for moral evil, but scarcely for
physical evil, and it seems to me that the problem of
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evil ts—essentially the problem of physical evil.
Seldom does a man volitionally make himself suffer a
physical ill, Jones says it is nature's way of saying,
"Don't do it again," but while we may reply that some
men voluntarily break a natural law, for the vast
majority the reply to nature's warning is, "Don't do
what again? Tell us that we may know." There is as
yet no solution that will account for the diseases
which spring up in the dark, whose treatment and whose
cause are unknown. If nature is warning us not to
"do it again", she is speaking in riddles. Again, the
solution of Jones could hardly apply to dumb animals who
could not even interpret in concepts the meaning of the
warning. We are interested in the solution of the
suffering of all creation, not of a selected group of
human, beings
.
The truest notes, in my opinion, are those
sounded by Sorley, Laurie and Fame 11 , who define evil
as failure. Evil, says Sorley, is failure to realize
divine purpose; G-od, says Laurie, is a Spirit in
difficulty from which he is slowly extricating himself;
an omnipotent deity, says Fame 11, might be conceived
to have shaped creation in a more merciful way. Moral
evil may be readily ascribed to failure on the part of
man to~"realize God's purpose, and some physical evil
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is the- result of wilful finite disobedience. On the
other hand, the waste of individuals and species
through the course of evolution, the multiplication
and prosperity of germs and parasites, the suffering
in animal life, the cutting down of thousands of
personalities through flood, famine, and earthquake,
all these, with the fact of evolution itself point to
a God who is good, who is trying to realize his
purpose but is as yet unable to do so, experimenting,
struggling, endeavoring, but undoubtedly, as Laurie
suggests, in difficulty. Such a solution would in no
way reflect on God's goodness nor on his intelligence;
it would not exclude the presence of design, of
beneficial adaptation, of man's ideals, of the order
and intelligibility of nature as a whole; it v/ould in no
way detract from the arguments for God's existence
advanced in the Gifford Lectures nd described in
these pages, but it would account for the immense amount
601
of evil which remains unexplained. The limitation
upon God would be a limitation of his power, not of
his intelligence nor of his goodness.
The conclusion to this section concerning
dysteleological evidence is that there is undoubtedly
dysteleology as well as teleology, but that this
evidence in no way cancels teleology or the
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teleol-ogical argument; on the other hand it points to
failure on the part of man to realize God's purpose,
and to failure on the part of God to realize his own
purposes, not because he would not but because, as yet,
he cannot.
Summarizing the conclusions concerning the
objections from the field of science, we have
discovered the following facts: (1) The truth of the
doctrine of evolution as outlined by Darwin, and of the
scope of natural selection is still disputed, even in
scientific circles. It may be said, therefore, that
the precise relation between these doctrines and the
teleological argument is as yet unsettled, but that
even if these theories proved to be correct, though
they might well interfere with the old ideas
concerning specific adaptations, they could not affect
the fact that order, intelligibility And progress in
nature are apparent everywhere, and that these lead
to the conviction that an intelligent God must be
their ground. Nor does the doctrine of evolution in
any way affect the significant fact that men recognize
and strive to realize values. (2) The movement to
establish the self-determination of all nature is
growing. The evidence is as yet incomplete and
inconclusive as to the factors of that self-determina-
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tion,— If proved, a revision of the occasionalistic
theory of nature would be necessary, but the new theory
would not affect the recognition of nature's order
and intelligibility, hence would not impair most of
the evidence in the teleological argument, as it is
revised from the days of Paley's writing and the
Bridgewater Treatises. Rather, it would increase the
evidence in favor of cosmic teleology, and of
purposive evolution, giving meaning to the expression,
"God's immanence. " (3) Dystelological facts are
undeniable, nor are most of the solutions offered
sufficient to solve the problem in all its phases,
to include all parts of nature, non-human as well as
human. These facts do not interfere with belief in
the teleological evidence
t
but they mean that God is
limited, not in goodness, nor in intelligence, but in
power
.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The Gifford Lectures represent a variety of
interests and therefore of emphases. Not all of tnem are
relevant to the teleological argument, and tne first task
of this dissertation was the classification of the Lectures
according to subject matter. It was apparent from this
classification that it would be necessary to treat the
Gifford Lectures, in tneir relation to the teleological
argument, in four separate groups. One group ignored, or
made bare mention without critical comment upon, tne argu-
ment; a second group was unqualifiedly opposed to it; a
third approved it in its traditional form; a final group
opposed tne argument in its traditional form, but reinterpreted
and used it in, or substituted for it, other theistic
arguments.
The first group was summarily treated,
and eliminated from further consideration. In the case of
the second group, the grounds of opposition to trie argu-
ment were examined, as well as the general theories of the
opponents, for if any internal inconsistency should be
found within these theories themselves, the strength of the
opposition to the argument would in some cases be perceptibly
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weakened. Discussion of the specific objections to the
teleological argument was reserved for a later section of
the dissertation. The third group consisted of two members.
Their systems were investigated, and since much of the
opposition to the traditional argument comes from the field
of science, it was necessary to note tne extent to which
eacn system maxes use of current scientific tiieories, in
order to estimate the value of the unqualified approval
of the argument by this group.
By far the greatest number of Gifford Lectures
belong to the fourth group, composed of those who reject
the argument in its traditional form, but in some cases
reinterpret and use it in new arguments, in others reject
it, and offer substitutes for it. Each theory belonging
to this group was examined for internal consistency, 'method-
ology, presuppositions, and for the extent to which the
teleological argument was used. It was necessary also to
estimate the value of the arguments offered as reinterpteta-
tions or as substitutes.
Having completed the examination of the Lectures tnem-
selves, the next task was to estimate the value of two new
forms of evidence advanced by some of the Lectures to
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illustrate design in nature, namely, the evidence from
the prodigality and from the beauty of nature. A final
chapter was devoted to the examination of all the obfi
jections which had been raised by the Lectures against
the teleological argument, objections wnich came
from the fields of logic, general philosophy, and
sc ience.
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Tne study of the Gifford Lec tores and their
bearing upon the teleological argument has led to
the following conclusions:
1. There has been no denial of the evidence of
of order and of adaptation of means to end in
nature. The criticisms of the teleological argument
have been based upon the conclusions to be drawn
from a recognition of these facts of order and of
adaptation.
2. Those who maintain unqualified opposition
to tne teleological argument are usually opposed to
all theistic arguments, and their opposition cannot
be said to be successful if we judge their proposed
substitutes for the God of tneism. The systems wnicn
endeavor to establish such substitutes contain
internal inconsistencies*
3. The teleological argument is well-adapted
to the point of view advanced by several Gifford
Lecturers, that human beliefs are all hypothetical,
for it is based upon facts of experience, not upon
purely rationalistic grounds.
4. Those who maintain the teleological argu-
ment in its traditional form do so at the expense of
underestimating the importance of recent advances in
the realm of mcience.
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5. The teleological argument has served as the
basis of several other theistic arguments, and has
"been used consciously or unconsciously by the defenders
of the arguments from universal development, from law
and order, and from value; these arguments in no way
need exclude the teleological argument.
6. Science has, on th6 whole, proved friendly
to the teleological argument- although there are notable
exceptions, and the- argument must be reinterpreted
in terms of recent scientific investigation in a way
that will emphasize the facts of general order and
teleology in nature, rather than individual and
specific adaptations in the same realm.
7. The evidence offered in support of tne
teleological argument from the prodigality of nature
is inconclusive, for it represents a clumsy or im-
potent God, ratner than a wise creator.
8. The evidence offered in support of tne
teleological argument from the beauty of nature is
inconclusive, there is no agreement on the status of
aesthetic values*
9. The objection to the teleological argument
from the field of logic is unfounded, unless the
Kantian division between phenomenal and noumenal
realms be strictly maintained.
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10. The Objection that the teleological
argument yields a mechanical world, governed by an
external, non-immanent God, is well-founded as
an objection to the traditional argument, and
it points out the necessity of conceiving God as
immanent in the world*
11. The fact that additional the is tic
arguments have been offered in the Gifford Lectures
is evidence of the fact that the teleological argument
alone cannot establish God's existence nor his good-
ness. Taken with the other arguments, however, it
may be considered one valid argument of theism, and
it makes an important contribution by offering evi-
dence of God's intelligence.
12. The objection that the theory of natural
selection rules out the teleological argument is an
invalid objection. The scope of natural selection
has not yet been determined; there is, judging from
the scientific Lecturers, much that it cannot do,
and even if its scope were known, the fact3 of
general order and law, in which the teleologists are
interested, would still remain to be explained.
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1$. The theory that all parts of nature are
self-determining is as yet based upon inadequate
evidence, and even if proved would not invalidate
the teleological argument; it would mean merely
tne revision of the theory of occasionalism; mlt
would also increase ratner than diminish the evidence
of order in nature, and of the cooperation of all
its parts, thus increasing tne importance of the
teleological argument*
14. Dysteleological facts do not cancel
teleological evidence, nor do they prove the invalidity
of the teleological argument. They do appear to
indicate that God is limited in power.
V<
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And in regard that in so far as 1 can at present see or
anticipate, there will be a large" residue" of my means
and estate in the sense in which 1 have above explained
the word, being that which remains after fulfilling the
above ten purposes, and being of opinion that 1 am
bound if there is a "residue" as so explained, to employ
it, or part of it, for the good of my fellow men and
having considered how l may best do so, 1 direct the
"residue" to be disposed of as follows; I having been
for many years deeply and firmly convinced that the
true knowledge of uod, that is of the Being, Nature and
Attributes of the infinite, of the All, of the First
and the Only uause, that is, the One and Only Substance
and Being, and the true and felt Knowledge (not mere
nominal knowledge) of the relations of man and of the
universe to Him and of the true foundations of all
ethics and morals, being 1 say, convinced that this
knowledge, when really felt and acted on, is the means
of mans ...highest waJJ being and the security of his ,
upward /
upward progress, I have resolved, from the "residue"
of my estate as aforesaid, to institute and found in
connection if possible with the Scottish Universities,
lectureships or classes for the promotion of the
study of said subjects and for the teaching and dif-
fusion of sound views regarding them among the whole
population of Scotland, Therefore I direct and ap-
point my said Trustees from the "residue" of my said
estate after fulfilling the said ten preferable pur-
poses to pay the following sums or to assign and maKe
over property of that value to the following bodies
in trust, First To the Senatus Academicus of the
University of Edinburgh, and failing them by declina-
ture or otherwise to the Dean and Faculty of Advo-
cates of the College of Justice of Scotland the sum
of Twenty five thousand pounds (pounds) Second To
the Senatus Academicus of the University of Glasgow
and failing them by declinature or otherwise to the
Faculty of Physicians and Surgeons of Glasgow the sum
of Twenty Thousand Pounds Third To the Senatus Aca-
demicus of the University of Aberdeen, whom failing
by declinature or otherwise to the Faculty of Advo-
cates of Aberdeen the sum of Twenty thousand pounds
and Fourth To the Senatus Academicus of the University
of Saint Andrews whom failing by declinature or other-
wise to the Physicians and Surgeons of Saint Andrews
and of the district twelve miles round it the sum of
Fifteen thousand pounds sterling amounting the said
four sums in all to the sum of Eighty thousand pounds
Sterling /
3.
Sterling but said bequests are made and said sums are
to be paid in trust only for the following purpose,
That is to say, for the purpose of establishing in
each of the four cities of Edinburgh, Olasgow
, Aber-
deen and Saint Andrews, a Lectureship or Popular Chair
for "Promoting, Advancing, Teaching and Diffusing the
"Study of Natural Theology in the widest sense of
"that term, in other words, the Knowledge of God, the
"Infinite, the All, the First and Only Cause, the One
"and the Sole Substance, the Sole Being, the Sole
"Reality and the Sole Existence, the Knowledge of His
"Nature and Attributes , the Knowledge of the rela-
tions which men and the whole universe bear to Him,
"the Knowledge of the Nature and Foundation of Ethics
"or Morals, and of all obligations and duties thence
"arising; The Senatus Academicus in each of the four
Universities or the bodies substituted to them re-
spectively shall be the Patrons of the several Lec-
tureships and the Administrators of the said respect-
ive endowments and of the affairs of each Lectureship
in each city, I call them for shortness simply the
"Patrons" , now 1 leave all the details and arrange-
ments of each lectureship in the hands and in the
discretion of the "Patrons" respectively, who shall
have full power from time to time to adjust and regul-
ate the same in conformity as closely as possible to
the following brief principles and directions, which
shall be binding on each and all of the "Patrons" as
far as practicable and possible, I only indicate
leading /
leading principles, First the endowment or capital
fund of each lectureship shall be preserved entire and
be invested securely upon or in the purchase of lands
or heritages, which are likely to continue of the same
value or increase in value, or in such other way as
Statute may permit merely the annual proceeds or in-
terest shall be expended in maintaining the respective
lectureships Second the "Patrons" may delay the instit-
ution of the lectureships and may from time to time
intermit the appointment of lecturers, and the deliv-
ery of lectures for one or more years , for the purpose
of accumulating the income or enlarging Capital . Third
The lecturers shall be appointed from time to time
each for a period of only two years and no longer, but
the same lecturer may be re-appointed for other two
periods of two years each, provided that no one person
shall hold the office of lecturer in the same city for
more than six years in all, it being desirable that
the subject be promoted and illustrated by different
minds: Fourth, The lecturers appointed shall be sub-
jected to no test of any kind and shall not be requir-
ed to take any oath , or to emit or subscribe any de-
claration of belief, or to make any promise of any
kind, they may be of any denomination whatever, or of
no denomination at all (and many earnest and high-
minded men prefer to belong to no ecclesiastical de-
nomination) they may be of any religion or way of
thinking, or as is sometimes said, they may be of no
religion or they may be so called sceptics, or agnos-
tics, or free thinkers, provided only that the'Tatrons"
will /
5 .
will use diligence to secure that they be able, re-
verent men, true thinners, sincere lovers of and ear-
nest enquiries after truth; Fifth, 1 wish the lect-
urers to treat their subject as a strictly natural
science, the greatest of all possible sciences, in-
deed, in one sense, the only science that of Infinite
Being, without reference to or reliance upon any
supposed special, exceptional or so called miraculous
revelation. I wish it considered just as astronomy
or chemistry are. 1 have intentionally indicated in
describing the subject of the lectures the general
aspect which personally I would expect the lectures
to bear but the lecturers shall be under no restraint
whatever in their treatment of their theme, for
example, they may freely discuss (and it may be well
to do so) all questions about mans conceptions of G-od
or the Infinite, their origin, nature and truth,
whether he can have any such conceptions, whether
tfod is under any or what limitations and so on as 1
am persuaded that nothing but good can result from
free discussion: Sixth The lectures shall be public
and popular, that is open, not only to students of
the Universities, but to the whole community without
matriculation, as I think that the subject should be
studied and Known by all, whether receiving Univer-
sity instruction or not: 1 think such knowledge, if
real, lies at the root of all well being, 1 suggest
that the fee should be as small as is consistent with
the due management of the lectureships and the due
appreciation /
6.
appreciation of the lectures . Besides a general and
popular audience, i advise that the lecturer also have
a special class of students conducted in the usual way
and instructed by examination and thesis written and
oral . Seventh As to the number of the lectures
,
much
must be left to the discretion of the lecturer, 1 should
think, the subject cannot be treated, even in Abstract,
in less than twenty lectures and they may be many times
that number. Eighth The "Patrons" if and when they
see fit may make grants from the free income of the en-
dowments for or towards the publication in a cheap form
of any of the lectures or any part thereof or abstracts
thereof which they may thinK likely to be useful . Ninth,
The Patrons respectively shall all annually submit their
accounts to some one chartered Accountant in Edinburgh,
to be named from time to time by the Lord Ordinary on
the Bills , whom failing to the Accountant of the Court
of Session who shall prepare and certify a short Ab-
stract of the Accounts and Investments, to be recorded
in the Books of council and Session or elsewhere for
preservation And my desire and hope is that these lec-
tureships and lectures may promote and advance among all
classes of the community, the true Knowledge of Him,
who is and there is None and Nothing besides Him in whom
we live and move and have our being and in whom all
things consist, and of mans real relationship to Him,
whom truly to Know is life everlasting: If the "residue"
of my estate, in the sense before defined, should turn
out insufficient to pay the whole sums above provided
for /
7.
for the four Lectureships (of which shortcoming, how-
ever, 1 trust there is no danger) then each Lecture-
ship shall suffer a proportional diminution and if
on the other hand there is any surplus over and above
the said sum of Eighty Thousand Pounds Sterling it
shall belong, one half to my son, the said Herbert
James Clifford in liferent and to his issue other than
the heirs of entail in fee, whom failing to my un-
married nieces, equally in fee, and the other half
shall belong equally among my unmarried nieces;
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